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Abstract 
 
The experiments presented in this thesis sought to establish combinatorial effects 
operating within novel semantic priming paradigms. These experiments 
demonstrate the combining of several pieces of semantic information 
(specifically, what certain items afford in terms of some form of interaction) 
from objects within simple visual scenes, and an account is offered based on the 
construction of representations from these presented items. These composite 
representations subsequently facilitate responses to target items, but it is only 
with a combination of items (e.g. a knife and a tyre) that is felicitous to a 
particular event (e.g. bursting) that priming to target items (e.g. a burst tyre) 
obtains. Priming is less evident when a combination of items is presented that 
does not allow the same event to occur (e.g. a ruler and a tyre). These 
combinatorial processes appear to occur in longer time windows than those of 
automatic visual processes such as gist abstraction, and the representations 
activated upon viewing these stimuli appear to be specific to the objects 
presented.  
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Chapter 1 
 
The notion of internal (mental) and external (physical) worlds and how entities 
around us are coded or internalised mentally has been a major concern of 
cognitive psychology since its inception. The methodologies used to explore this 
have provided researchers with ways of studying the complex interplay between 
vision, language and action. The current chapter aims to provide an overview of 
literature relevant to the studies that are to be presented and discussed in 
subsequent chapters. Each chapter will be organised in the following way: First, 
the issue that the experiments aim to address will be considered with a brief 
discussion of the relevant supporting studies. Next, the methods and information 
relating to the design of the experiment will be provided. Finally, data from the 
experiment will be presented with a discussion of the relevant implications and 
edifications that these data provide.  
 This thesis will explore several questions related to the aforementioned 
notion of internal and external worlds, and how information pertaining to both is 
processed and shared between them: How is the external world represented 
cognitively, and what form do these representations take? Is information relating 
to features of objects or entities routinely combined so as to aid subsequent 
interaction with them? And what are the approximate time windows in which 
these representations are constructed and utilised? 
To begin with, vision research has perhaps offered the earliest insights 
into the nature of the representations activated as our eyes scope our visual 
environment. It has also provided indications as to the types of processes 
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involved with this extraction of information from our surroundings, and what 
type of information is extracted in the first place. 
 
Vision and scene gist 
 
Our perceptual experience as we look around our visual environment is one of a 
stable, richly-detailed world, with everything in our visual field experienced 
simultaneously. Intuitively, it would seem we build up an equally detailed inner 
‘picture’ of that environment, a mental representation with which to guide 
appropriate visual operations (Rensink, 2000). Indeed, many early attempts to 
specify the role of the visual system converged on the idea that vision’s primary 
function is to recreate a detailed mental copy of the external world (Tsotsos, 
1987). However, there is a considerable body of evidence that contends this 
conceptualisation of vision as some sort of ‘scene recovery’ system (Aloimonos 
& Rosenfeld, 1991), suggesting instead that we never build up a complete 
representation of everything in our visual field (e.g. Milner & Goodale, 1995; 
Rensink, 2000; Rensink et al., 1997). 
According to Clark (1999), the main function of the visual system is to 
use visual information ‘cheaply’, only utilising information if it is needed at the 
time, to aid our real-time interaction with the external world. Earlier views of the 
visual system, which present it as a means by which one can ‘throw the world 
away’ (Clark, 1999, p345), are thus rejected by researchers aiming to 
reconceptualise the process of extracting visual information from our 
environment. Researchers in the field of interactive vision present an alternative 
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view of this system, whereby the active retrieval of information is driven by a 
dynamic, changing concurrent visual scene.  
Even though it appears we do not build up detailed representations of our 
surroundings, we can still derive semantic information from visual stimuli in the 
form of ‘gist’, within a few hundred milliseconds. The simple fact that we don’t 
build detailed representations might be one of the reasons we are able to 
extrapolate semantic information rapidly from visual stimuli – The system is not 
laden with the processing of unneeded information. 
 Although it is a fairly poorly-defined term in the literature, Henderson 
and Ferreira (2004) outline three elements involved with the abstraction of gist 
from visual scenes. The ‘identity’ of a scene is established, along with semantic 
information associated with this scene and scenes of a similar nature, and also 
information serving to establish the global spatial layout of the scene. Henderson 
and Ferreira suggest that gist can be thought of as the ‘general semantic 
interpretation’ of a visual scene. 
 Perhaps the most striking thing about gist is the speed with which we 
appear to extract it from visual stimuli. Various studies have suggested that gist 
can be picked up in as little time as 100 ms (Beeckmans, 2000; Biederman, 1981; 
Oliva, 2005; Potter, 1976; Rensink, 2000). Potter (1976) for example, found that 
even when the presentation times of singly presented pictures was short, at less 
than 120 ms, participants were still able to accurately detect them in a later 
recognition task.   
 The technique used by Potter to explore scene gist became known as 
Rapid Serial Visual Presentation (RSVP) (Potter & Levy, 1969; Potter, 1975, 
1976; Potter, 1999), in which a sequence of scenes (usually colour photographs) 
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are presented at rates roughly similar to eye fixations.  In Potter’s (1976) 
paradigm, the participants’ task was either to recall the pictures in a memory test, 
or to search for a target picture in a sequence.  Potter’s results demonstrated that 
even when targets had been indicated by verbal labels (instead of pictures) in the 
search condition, participants’ detection performance was far better than in the 
memory condition, even at fast presentation rates of less than 120 ms. Potter 
suggested that the gist of a scene could be abstracted within this time, but that the 
memory trace for these stimuli decayed rapidly. With regard to the accurate 
detection of targets that were only specified with a verbal label, Potter concluded 
that detection in the search condition was not dependent upon participants using 
the visual information associated with the target to accurately pick it out of a 
sequence. 
 Biederman’s (1981) work concerning gist abstraction also demonstrated 
participants’ ability to extract gist with stimulus presentation durations as little as 
100 ms. In a paradigm often used by researchers in the field of visual cognition, 
Biederman presented participants with a scene which was quickly replaced by a 
pattern mask. Prior to the scene appearing on the screen, a target label was 
presented to participants, with a spatial marker cue appearing just after the scene 
had disappeared. Participants were required to establish whether the target object 
had appeared in the location defined by the marker. The target label did not 
appear on every trial, and was not always consistent with the visual scene. 
However, Biederman found that participants were more accurate if the target 
label was consistent with the scene, and they were able to derive the gist from 
scenes at short presentation times of 100-200 ms. 
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 Such findings raise the question of how we are able to abstract the 
meaning of a visual scene so quickly, without forming adequate representations 
of everything in it. Rensink (2000) proposed three independent systems for the 
processing of visual information, of which gist was a part of the first. Before 
stable representations could be constructed by the second-level system, the 
‘volatile’ structures of the concurrent scene are extracted in the form of gist. 
Rensink suggested that this extraction of the overall meaning of a visual scene 
could then be used to direct one’s attention to objects of interest within the visual 
field. Once this has been achieved, the third-level system is able to facilitate the 
perception of objects.  
 Schyns and Oliva (1994) sought to further refine the time-course of gist 
abstraction, and found that the different types of gist from a hybrid of two 
overlaid scenes can be affected by presentation rates. In these studies, low spatial 
frequency (LSF) and high spatial frequency (HSF) images were combined to 
form a single ambiguous scene. The LSF image in this case was an image of a 
street in a busy city, and the HSF image was a hallway. Participants were asked 
to complete a categorisation task with these hybrid ambiguous images, where 
they were required to judge whether it matched a subsequent normal image (the 
target). Schyns and Oliva found that at presentation rates of 30 ms, participants 
performed matching based on the images’ coarse structures (the city scene), but 
at longer rates of 150 ms, matching tended to be based on fine structures (the 
hallway).  
 Dell’Acqua and Grainger (1999) provided a notable demonstration of the 
rapidity with which semantic information can be derived from visual stimuli. 
These authors’ work demonstrates the activation and overlap of representations 
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engendered by visual and linguistic information. In this study, participants were 
presented with line drawings of ‘artifactual’ objects (utensils, vehicles etc.) or 
natural kinds (mammals, vegetables etc.), which were identical, related or 
unrelated to a subsequently presented target word. Participants were required to 
make a judgement as fast as they could as to whether the word refers to 
something that is an artifactual object or a natural kind. These authors found that 
even with picture exposure durations as short as 17 ms, participants were able to 
categorise objects much faster when the objects were either identical or related, 
compared to when they were different from the targets. These findings suggest 
that unconsciously presented objects can activate semantic category information, 
even though they have received scant attention.  
Dell’Aqua and Grainger’s results indicate that word recognition can be 
facilitated or ‘primed’ with the prior presentation of a visual stimulus, even at 
presentation times so short, that participants report not having seen the them. 
Oliva & Torralba (2007) argue that an important facilitator of object recognition 
is context. If a target has been preceded by something which seats it within a 
contextual frame of reference, then responses to that target are primed. For 
example, participants' categorisation responses to a target (e.g. a loaf of bread) 
are facilitated if it has been preceded by an appropriate context (e.g. a kitchen 
counter). This is known as the scene consistency-inconsistency effect (Palmer, 
1975).  
In a recent finding supporting this notion of contextual priming, Green 
and Hummel (2006) discovered that the relative positions of objects to one 
another influences object perception. In their first experiment, participants were 
asked to respond as to whether the second picture in a two-picture sequence 
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(both presented for just 50 ms) matched a label given prior to that. For example, 
they might have been presented with the label ‘glass’, then a picture of a jug 
positioned as if it were to pour liquid into a glass, and then a picture of a glass on 
which they were to make their decision. The objects were related (as in the jug 
and glass case), unrelated (e.g. a key and a glass), interacting (with the jug 
positioned so as to pour liquid into the glass), not interacting (objects positioned 
with no interaction), positive (the second object matched the label) or negative 
(the second object did not match the label).  
Green and Hummel found that participants were significantly faster to 
respond when the jug interacted with the glass than when it did not. However, 
this performance disappeared when the ‘interacting’ objects were unrelated. In 
order to rule out any postperceptual account for their above data, Green & 
Hummel increased the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA, the time between the 
onset of the prime and the offset of the target) to 250 ms. These authors 
suggested that if the above results are due to postperceptual processing, then they 
should persist with longer SOAs. If, as the authors maintain, the effects are due 
to perceptual grouping, then these effects should be eliminated or significantly 
reduced at a longer SOA of 250 ms. As predicted, significantly less priming was 
evident for these stimuli at longer SOAs. 
These authors’ third experiment was designed to counter the argument 
that the effects arise from attentional cueing: It may be that the position of the 
jug forced participants’ attention to the position on the screen where they 
expected the second object to be. In this experiment the two objects were 
presented in the opposite order – so participants received the glass first, then the 
jug. The results reported for this third experiment point to perceptual grouping 
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rather than attentional cueing because if it was the latter, one would expect a 
striking difference between the results of experiments 1 and 3. As this was not 
the case, Green and Hummel were able to argue that functionally interacting 
objects are perceptually grouped and that, consonant with previous research, 
object recognition is at least in part driven by the context in which objects are 
presented.  
 
Semantic priming 
 
The role of context in studies of linguistic processing is perhaps even clearer, and 
the benefits provided by context for the interpretation of linguistic expressions is 
well documented (e.g. Tabossi, 1988; Williams & Colombo, 1995; Smith et al., 
1994). For example, Tabossi (1988) demonstrated priming effects for 
combinations of words where context in the sentences played an important part. 
Tabossi found that the target word ‘thorns’ was primed by sentences such as ‘the 
girl was pricked by a rose’, but not sentences such as ‘the girl smelled a rose’ or 
‘the girl was pricked by a wasp’. Here, the context of the sentence seemed to 
have a clear impact of facilitation on responses to related target words. In 
addition, Tabossi found that participants responded faster to the target word ‘fat’, 
when presented with an appropriate priming sentence such as ‘In order to follow 
her diet, the woman eliminated the use of butter’, than to either a neutral 
sentence: ‘Before paying, the man checked the price of butter’, or an 
inappropriate priming sentence: ‘In order to soften it, the woman heated the piece 
of butter’. Indeed, these findings have been supported by a number of studies 
(e.g. Andrews et al.,1993; Seidenberg et al., 1982) and crucially, there is also 
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evidence to suggest that these priming effects are not due to any one word in the 
sentence (e.g. Potter & Faulconer, 1979).  
 The combining of linguistically presented concepts has also been 
explored within a framework of conceptual combination and compositionality 
(Tabossi et al., 2008; Kamp & Partee, 1995). Language is compositional in that 
the formation of sentence structure is done so with a particular ordering of its 
constituent elements. Within this framework, the meaning of sentences is 
gleaned from, firstly, the individual meaning of the words that make up the 
sentence, secondly, the syntactic arrangement of the sentence, and thirdly, the 
context in which the sentence is provided to the listener or reader.  
Conceptual combination describes the ways in which one’s arrays of 
available concepts are combined to construct higher-order concepts and develop 
complex representations that encompass them. Estes and Glucksberg (1998) for 
example, found that semantic priming could account for the effect of context on 
the accessibility of the features of combined concepts. These authors provided 
participants with context passages, before asking them to make true/false 
judgments on subsequent probe and comprehension sentences. These authors 
found that participants were faster to make their responses when particular 
features of the sentences (requiring combination) were primed by the preceding 
context passages.  
As robust priming effects have been established from tasks of both object 
and word recognition, it is not surprising that the notion of a single store of 
semantic information for both visual and linguistic codes has been proposed 
(Chase and Clark, 1972). Vanderwart (1984) found that pictures prime words to 
the same extent as words themselves, which provides support for this single-code 
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view of semantic access. In Vanderwart’s paradigm, participants were presented 
with a word or a picture which preceded the presentation of a target word. The 
prime was either (i) an identical concept (e.g. apple-apple); (ii) semantically 
related (e.g. apple-pie) or (iii) unrelated to the target words (e.g. apple-lamp). All 
stimuli were presented visually, and participants were required to make a lexical 
decision on the targets. The single-code view would predict that, where identical 
concepts have been used, reaction times to the primes should be roughly the 
same. Where semantically-related concepts have been used however, the single-
code view would predict less facilitation than for identical concepts because in 
the latter case, the abstract code for the same concept will be activated by both 
the prime and the target. 
In fact, Vanderwart found this to be the case. Participants’ lexical 
decisions were the fastest for repetitions, the next fastest for related concepts, 
and the slowest for unrelated concepts. Crucially, this progressive facilitation as 
the prime became more related to the target was almost identical for both 
pictures and words, indicating that pictures prime words to the same extent as 
words themselves. These results suggest that not only do vision and language 
interact in both directions, but linguistic and visual information access a single 
semantic system, consonant with a single-code view of access to semantic 
knowledge. Later studies (e.g. Bajo & Canas, 1989) have also provided support 
for the activation of common semantic and phonetic representations for pictures 
and words. 
Although priming paradigms reveal something about the types of 
semantic information activated as a result of related linguistic or visual input, 
their impact has been diminished by a recurrent problem. Koriat (1981) was the 
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first to suggest that these effects may not be due to facilitation from the prime at 
all – It may be that the contextual ‘appropriateness’ of a prime could be retrieved 
after participants have been presented with the target. Koriat argued that the 
target ‘reactivates’ the prime, and it is only until both stimuli have been 
processed that a relation between them is established. Koriat referred to this 
facilitation from the target to the prime as backward priming. According to 
association norms, ‘baby’ is associated to ‘stork’, but ‘stork’ is not associated to 
‘baby’. Koriat found that, when asked to perform a lexical decision on the target 
for forward associations such as stork-baby, as expected, participants’ reaction 
times in a lexical decision task (LDT) were facilitated compared to controls. 
However, the same degree of priming was found for backward associations such 
as baby-stork, which is problematic for the traditional accounts of semantic 
priming.  
It is still not clear, however, whether these problems of backward priming 
are due to something intrinsic about priming itself, or something intrinsic about 
the task. Peterson and Simpson (1989) presented observers with a prime, and 
then a target on which they had to make either a lexical decision or complete a 
naming task. Words were either unidirectional (Stork-Baby) or bidirectional 
(Baby-Cry) associates, and were presented in either forward or backward orders. 
In Peterson and Simpson’s first experiment, participants made a naming response 
to the target, and in their second experiment, participants made a lexical decision. 
Forward priming effects were reported in both experiments, but only in the 
second experiment, where the lexical decision had been used, were there effects 
of backward priming. These results confirm Seidenberg, Waters, Sanders and 
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Langer’s (1984) finding that backward priming effects arise with the LDT, but 
not with naming tasks.  
 
Embodied cognition and affordances 
 
Priming effects are not limited to paradigms in which responses are made on the 
basis of previously seen stimuli. Recent evidence has demonstrated priming not 
to words or pictures, but to actions. If one recalls from previous discussion that 
we do not seem to build up detailed 3-D representations of our surroundings, 
then the fact that motor responses are facilitated as we process visual stimuli in 
priming paradigms seems consonant with such a view.  
 Embodied cognition seeks to redefine the nature of cognition, shifting the 
perspective away from a focus on abstract symbols onto ‘situated activity’ 
(Anderson, 2003), where processing is seen as part of one’s active participation 
in a rich, complex visual world. More specifically, the world around us is 
computed in terms of ‘patterns of possible interactions’ (Glenberg & Robertson, 
2000) that serve to aid the goal-directed behaviour of situated entities.  
 Much of the literature concerning embodied or ‘grounded’ cognition 
focuses on establishing the interplay of language, perception and action within a 
situated perspective. For example, objects’ orientations may have an influence on 
how they are processed due to the configuration of our own bodies (facing away 
from the object, right-handed or left-handed, and so on). Some researchers even 
go so far as to suggest what an object means to us is what that object allows us in 
terms of some kind of interaction (e.g. Glenberg, 1997). 
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In a study that perfectly illustrates this consideration of processing as 
conducted by active entity, Craighero, Fadiga, Umiltà & Rizzolatti (1996) found 
that participants’ performance on a grasping task was facilitated by a previously 
seen rectangle whose orientation matched that of the object to be grasped. Some 
of the most notable finds in the literature include those where the demands of the 
task do not even require the motor action to be carried out. For example, there is 
a large body of evidence which demonstrates the link between the activation of 
motor neurons involved with controlling tool use in monkeys and the activation 
of those same neurons when the same tool use is merely observed (Grafton, 
Fadiga, Arbib, & Rizzolatti, 1997; Murata, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, Raso, & 
Rizzolatti, 1997). Similarly, Tucker and Ellis (1998) reported that participants’ 
response times were facilitated if the response was made with the same hand as 
that which would be used to grasp a previously seen object (e.g. a teapot).  
Finally, Glenberg and Kaschak (2002) found that participants are faster to 
respond in a sensibility judgement task to sentences that describe an action either 
towards, or away from the body if the response requires them to make an arm 
movement in the same direction. For example, if they are required to make the 
judgement on the sentence ‘Open the drawer’, then they are quicker to respond if 
they need to make an arm movement towards their body. Participants were faster 
to respond to converse sentences such as ‘Close the drawer’, but only when the 
response requires them to make an arm movement away from the body. This is 
known as the ‘Action-Sentence Compatibility Effect’ (ACE). 
Closely tied with this notion of action priming is the argument that the 
activation of event knowledge is crucial to our understanding of the world 
around us (Glenberg, 1997; Barsalou, 2008). Indeed, some authors claim that we 
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process visual information in terms of a pattern of potential events or interactions 
with our surroundings. According to Glenberg (1997) what an object, event or 
sentence means to us is what we can do with it in terms of some kind of 
interaction.  
A central construct in Glenberg’s ‘situated’ approach to cognition is that 
of the affordance. Affordances are simply the types of interactions that an object 
or entity allows because of particular surfaces or features inherent in them (see 
Gibson, 1979). While these affordances reflect the different ways an object can 
be used, they also change in accordance with the context in which one uses it. 
For example, a glass affords being filled with liquid, but this affordance changes 
if the glass is left upturned.  
 Glenberg describes the notion of object affordances in relation to the 
theory of ‘mesh’. As our surroundings could be computed in terms of patterns of 
possible actions, these patterns can be integrated or ‘meshed’ together and 
brought to bear on our comprehension of the visual environment. These meshed 
action patterns are constrained by the types of things an object or entity affords 
with regard to a particular event. These patterns are also described as being very 
dynamic, and readily change in accordance with changing action patterns.  
This notion of meshing knowledge and representations is central to the 
work presented in this thesis. The combining of affordances forms part of the 
motivation for each current experiment: Do we readily combine semantic 
knowledge from two unrelated objects to form a composite representation of the 
event that, together, these items allow? This question is to be explored in detail 
in the work that follows. 
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Event knowledge and the visual world 
 
In the current work, the combining of semantic information and object 
affordances is assumed to give rise to the activation of relevant event 
representations. These event representations can be used to aid subsequent 
processing of stimuli that is associated with the activated event. Hommel, 
Müsseler, Aschersleben and Prinz (2001) installed the notion of event 
representation into their theory, encompassing representational domains, codes 
and systems. Within the ‘Theory of Event Coding’ (TEC), representations of 
events are assumed to be contained within a single representational domain, with 
information pertaining to any ‘to be-perceived’ or ‘to-be-generated’ event. These 
representations not only support perceptual systems, memory, and reasoning, but 
also action-based functions (such as action planning, control, and conduction). 
As a fundamental tenet of this theory is that perception and action 
representations are not stored separately, perceptual codes and action codes are 
said to prime one another because of their overlap in this single representational 
domain. Hommel et al. describe perception and action planning as ‘intimately 
related’ and able to give rise to an unimaginable number of interactions within 
our environment. 
Implications concerning the organisation of these types of event 
representations in memory were provided by McRae, Hare, Ferretti and Elman 
(2001). This research investigated the activation of verbs from nouns by way of 
event representations, and made use of typical agents, patients, instruments, and 
locations as primes. By ‘typical’, these authors mean the types of agents, patients 
and so on, that would typically be used for a particular event. For example, a 
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typical agent for the event ‘praying’ might be ‘nun’. These authors predicted that 
the nouns used would prime verbs associated with the event typically used in 
conjunction with whatever the noun refers to. McRae et al. gave participants 
nouns which they were to read to themselves silently. They were then asked to 
say the verb that appeared next as quickly and accurately as they could.  
As predicted, when naming verbs after typical agents (e.g. nun, praying), 
patients (e.g. dice, rolled), instruments (e.g. shovel, digging), and locations (e.g. 
arena, skating), participants were significantly faster in their naming responses, 
compared to when nouns which were not typical of their respective event were 
used. The results suggest that event memory is organised in such a way that 
when a particular object (or a word denoting an object) is seen, information 
corresponding to the types of events that it is typically used for, or in conjunction 
with, is activated.  
Another effective method for investigating the activation of event 
knowledge has been the use of tasks involving the ‘Visual World Paradigm’. The 
basic setup for this paradigm is to track participants’ eye movements over a 
concurrent visual scene as they hear a sentence referring to constituent elements 
of that scene. For example, Altmann and Kamide (1999) used a scene consisting 
of a boy, a cake, and various other distractor items. These authors found that, 
when participants’ eyes were tracked during the sentence ‘The boy will eat the 
cake’, more saccades were made to the cake during the word ‘eat’, than any other 
item. When ‘eat’ was replaced by something more general however, like ‘move’, 
participants did not show a preference for any particular item during the acoustic 
lifetime of this replacement word. 
 27
 This was, the authors argued, because the cake was the only edible item 
in the scene and participants were showing evidence of anticipatory eye 
movements. Rather then event knowledge being activated upon seeing a noun 
that could engage in, or be used for, a particular event (as in McRae et al.’s 2001 
experiment) here, participants are anticipating what could be referred to based on 
the affordances of the items in the scene – The cake is the only item which 
affords eating, and so this item is anticipated on the basis that the boy will eat 
something in that scene.  
This demonstration of anticipatory eye movements was expanded by 
Kamide, Altmann, and Haywood (2003). Utilising the same Visual World 
Paradigm, scenes were presented to participants that contained, for example, a 
man, a girl, a motorbike, and a fairground carousel. The idea here was that the 
man would be more likely to ride the motorbike, while the girl would be more 
likely to ride the carousel. Upon hearing the sentence ‘The man will ride the 
motorbike’, more eye movements were made towards the motorbike before the 
word ‘motorbike’ was actually heard. Similarly, when hearing ‘The girl will ride 
the carousel’, more eye movements were made towards the carousel before the 
acoustic onset of the word ‘carousel’. What distinguishes this experiment from 
the Altmann and Kamide (1999) experiment is that it shows the anticipatory eye 
movements were not simply a product of the association between the verb ‘eat’ 
and cakes, but they were born from the combination of that particular verb with 
its agent (the boy).  
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Current research 
 
The experiments to be presented and discussed in subsequent chapters will focus 
on many of the questions and considerations raised in this overview of 
supporting literature. We know that semantic information activated in sentence 
comprehension tasks can be combined to aid facilitation of a target, but is this 
type of operation exclusive to the linguistic domain, or can a similar process 
operating in the visual domain be established? If so, under what conditions (e.g. 
exposure durations, sequencing, task demands) would these effects be borne out? 
There is also the notion of causality, evident in many of possible interactions 
between objects, that warrants investigation: Do these representations code the 
changes in state of certain objects resulting from some form of causal-based 
interaction?  
The next chapter will present two experiments that both utilise a cross-
modal semantic priming paradigm to establish combinatorial effects operating 
upon visual stimuli. These effects refer to the combining of semantic information 
from two unrelated objects, and the resultant facilitation of responses to targets 
which represent a common event. In these experiments, participants’ response 
times in a lexical decision task will be measured to an auditory target such as the 
word ‘drink’. These targets will be preceded by sequentially presented pictures 
which, in prime trials, afford the event denoted by the target, such as with 
‘drink’, a bird and a puddle.   
Subsequent chapters will expand upon the notion of combinatorial 
semantics introduced in the following chapter, and these effects are to be 
established in purely visual paradigms. An attempt will also be made to elicit 
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these effects at shorter stimulus exposure durations, in experiments which 
provide participants with a causal event structure. Experiments are then to be 
presented which focus on the form with which these activated representations 
take.  
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Chapter 2 
 
The current chapter contains two experiments, both utilising a semantic priming 
paradigm to examine whether the affordances of visually presented items are 
routinely combined to form event-based representations, and what the time-
course of such a process might be. Firstly, literature relevant to the current set of 
experiments will be described. Secondly, the methodologies and findings from 
these experiments will be presented. Lastly, an examination of these findings 
with respect to their implications for related literature will be provided.  
To begin with, we know that combinations of words facilitate responses 
to a common related concept (Tabossi, 1988). And, as pictures appear to prime 
words to the same magnitude as words themselves (Vanderwart, 1984), a logical 
progression would be to investigate whether combinations of objects in a visual 
scene can facilitate activation of concepts related to the combination of items in 
the scene; i.e. over and above the activation of just individual object concepts.   
A study which could be considered the visual equivalent of Tabossi’s 
(1988) experiment was conducted by Altmann, Charles and Gennari (2005). 
Participants were presented with spoken verbs, each one preceded by one of 
three corresponding scenes (see figure 2.1). In each trial, participants were 
required to view one of the scenes (presented for 1750 ms), and then respond to 
the corresponding target in an auditory lexical decision task. There were three 
conditions, and although participants received stimuli from each condition, they 
were only presented with one of the three corresponding scenes for each target 
word.   
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Prime No-agent No-theme 
 
Fig. 2.1. An example of scenes corresponding to the target ‘drink’ in Altmann, 
Charles & Gennari’s (2005) study. 
  
The three scenes accompanying, for example, the target word ‘drink’ are shown 
in figure 2.1. The ‘prime’ condition consisted of a scene comprising a bird and a 
puddle (priming might occur in this case because the combination of the bird and 
the puddle affords a drinking event); the ‘no-agent’ condition was a scene of a 
boy and a puddle (‘no-agent’ because there was nothing in the scene that was 
likely to drink from the puddle); and finally, the ‘no-theme’ condition, 
comprising the boy and the bird (‘no-theme’ because there was nothing to drink 
from). It was predicted that the combination of the bird and the puddle in the 
prime condition would speed responses to the target ‘drink’, and there would be 
less facilitation when the puddle was presented with the boy (the ‘no-agent’ 
condition) or when the boy was presented with the bird (the ‘no-theme’ 
condition).   
The authors’ predictions held, and participants were significantly faster to 
respond when shown the scene with the bird and the puddle, compared to when 
the bird was shown without the puddle, or the puddle was shown without the 
bird. In this case, it was only the combination of the bird and puddle which 
activated a representation of a possible drinking event. As in many of the visual 
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world experiments, these findings indicate the overlap of representations 
engendered by the visual information in the scenes, and representations activated 
by the linguistic information conveyed by the target verbs. 
Although the interaction of vision and language is clear here, the 
mechanisms which allow such interplay are less apparent. Are these event-based 
representations activated within exposure durations similar to that of the time 
course of gist abstraction, and do these priming effects merely arise from 
strategic, rather than automatic processes, given the long exposure duration of 
1750 ms? (see McNamara, 2005). As we know, semantic priming has been 
observed even in cases where very short exposure durations of 17 ms are used, 
and participants do not report seeing the prime (Dell’Acqua & Grainger, 1999). 
Moreover, even when memory for rapidly presented pictures is not stable, 
conceptual information relating to them is activated (Potter, 1975; 1976). 
 
Experiment 11 
 
In addition to the conditions of ‘prime’, ‘no-agent’ and ‘no-theme’ used in the 
study conducted by Altmann, Charles and Gennari (2005), the present 
experiments used an additional baseline condition, in which experimental items 
were neither related to the target, nor related to each other. This provided an 
effective comparison for the other conditions, as no priming should be expected 
in this case at all. Also, in the other conditions, it may have been that priming 
was observed from just one experimental item on its own. So, in the example of 
                                                 
1 Experiment 1 was conducted as a partial requirement of the degree of MSc in 
Reading, Language and Cognition. Although data for this experiment were 
collected before the PhD course had begun, they have been included here for the 
sake of clarity.  
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‘drink’, priming may arise from seeing either the bird on its own, or the puddle 
on its own. In this baseline condition, however, there is nothing to potentially 
prime the target word. Figure 2.2 shows an example of the stimuli used in the 
current experiments for the target word ‘drink’. 
 
 
Baseline No-theme 
No-agent Prime 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.2. Stimuli presented in each condition for the corresponding target word, 
‘drink’. 
 
The stimuli in the current experiment were presented sequentially to participants 
(i.e. the bird first, then the puddle) because of a design issue with the Altmann, 
Charles and Gennari (2005) study. One reason posited by these authors as to why 
previously reported effects seemed to disappear with shorter stimulus exposure 
durations was that each object or entity to be processed was not presented in the 
centre of participants’ visual fields. For example, when a bird and puddle in a 
single scene was presented to participants for the event ‘drink’, the bird appeared 
to the right side of the puddle, requiring an additional saccade and fixation in on 
order to process all the required information in the scene. This may have resulted 
in a cost for the processing time of the scene.  
 34
In the current experiment, it was predicted that the combination of 
experimental items would facilitate participants’ responses to a related target 
verb in lexical decision.  As in the previous study, it is likely that less priming 
would be observed in the ‘no-agent’ and ‘no-theme’ conditions, whereas for the 
baseline, responses were expected to be slower than those in any of the other 
conditions. The combining of information is assumed to occur during the 
presentation of the second picture. Consequently, the duration of this second 
picture was manipulated (250 ms in Experiment 1; 100 ms in Experiment 2) 
while keeping the duration of the first display constant (2000 ms). 
 
Method  
 
Participants.  36 participants from the University of York student community 
took part in the experiment, and were given a sum of £2 for participating.  All 
were native English speakers and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
 
Materials 
 
Visual stimuli.  There were four picture pairs for each of the 28 target words, 
which represented the ‘prime’, ‘no-agent’, ‘no-theme’ and ‘baseline’ conditions 
(see appendix 1). For example, the picture pairs for the target ‘drink’, consisted 
of a bird and a puddle (the prime), a book and the puddle (‘no-agent’, there is 
nothing that will drink from the puddle), the bird and the book (‘no-theme’, there 
is nothing for the bird to drink from), and the book and a toothbrush (baseline, 
objects completely unrelated both to the target, and each other). Each target word 
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had its corresponding ‘prime’, ‘no agent’, ‘no theme’ and ‘baseline’ conditions. 
In addition, there were 112 filler pairs, each accompanied by either filler 
nonwords, adjectives or nouns. The items were downloaded from 
www.clipart.com, and were shown at a resolution of 640×480 on the 17” monitor 
of an Apple iMac computer.   
 Each participant saw all filler items but only one of the four 
corresponding experimental pairs for each target word. Participants were 
assigned to one of four groups, constructed using a Latin Square. For the ‘drink’ 
example, therefore, the first participant (assigned to group 1) would see the 
prime picture pair (bird and puddle), the second participant (assigned to group 2) 
would see the no agent picture pair (book and puddle), and so on. Thus, a total of 
28 experimental picture pairs and 112 filler picture pairs were shown to each 
participant. 
 
Auditory stimuli.  In addition to the 28 experimental verbs, 70 nonwords, 28 
nouns, and 14 adjectives were used in the current experiments. Target words 
were matched for length and frequency, and were recorded by a male native 
English speaker at a sample rate of 44,100 Hz and a 16 bit sound resolution. 
Participants heard all words through headphones, and responded to them with a 
button box. 
 
Procedure.  Participants were seated at a comfortable distance from the computer 
monitor, with the button box placed directly in front of them.  The participants 
were then told that they would see some images appear on the screen and, when 
they heard a word, they were to make a decision with the button box as to 
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whether the word was real or not.  A right button press was used to indicate ‘yes’ 
(the word was real), and a left button press was used to indicate a ‘no’ (the word 
was not real).  Participants were also instructed as to the importance of 
responding as quickly and accurately as they could. 
 
 
Fig. 2.3. Schematic of the trial procedure for the target ‘drink’. 
 
Figure 2.3 shows the procedure of an example trial, where +’s denote fixation 
crosses. Before each trial, the message ‘Press Key’ was displayed, and to move 
onto the next trial, either of the buttons on the box could be pressed. Any time 
this message was shown, participants could take a break if they needed one. On 
each trial, a fixation cross would appear first, and participants were required to 
fixate it.  Then the two pictures would be shown, separated by another fixation 
cross. A short time after seeing the stimuli, participants would hear the word they 
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were to make a decision on. There were 142 trials in total, including six practice 
trials, and the experiment lasted roughly 20 minutes. 
 
Results 
 
Table 2.1 shows the means and standard deviations for each of the four 
conditions, and figure 2.4 shows that, on average, participants responded fastest 
in the prime condition.  
 
 Prime No-agent No-theme Baseline 
M 712 760 761 787 
SD 146 191 219 197 
 
Table 2.1. Means and standard deviations for each condition, with second 
picture exposure durations of 250 ms. 
 
Analyses of response times for this and all subsequent experiments were 
conducted only on correct responses. A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect of picture pair type (F1(3, 105) = 4.06, p = .009; F22 (3, 
81) = 2.191, p = .113). Paired comparisons revealed significant differences 
between ‘prime’ and ‘baseline’ conditions (F1(35) = -2.85, p = .007; F2 (27) = -
2.32, p = .028); ‘prime’ and ‘no agent’ conditions (F1(35) = -2.54, p = .016; 
F2(27) = -1.90, p = .068); and ‘prime’ and ‘no theme’ conditions (F1(35) = -
2.44, p = .020; F2(27) = -2.26, p = .032).   
  
 
                                                 
2 Where test statistics are numerically labelled, 1 refers to by-subjects analyses 
and 2 refers to by-items analyses. 
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Fig. 2.4. Mean response times at 250 ms, with standard error bars. 
 
Although participants responded faster in the ‘no agent’ than the ‘no theme’ 
condition, faster in the ‘no theme’ than the ‘baseline’ condition, and faster in the 
‘no agent’ than the ‘baseline’ condition, these differences were not significant 
(all p>.05). 
 Participants’ accuracy in this and all subsequent experiments was 
measured in terms of the percentage of experimental trials in which the correct 
response was chosen (M = 89%, SD = 5%). To assess whether participants’ 
accuracy improved from the first half to the second half of trials, a one-way 
repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with a single factor of trial split 
(either the first or the second half). There was no difference in participants’ 
average number of correct responses between the first and second half of the 
experiment (p > .05).  
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In order to asses whether accuracy rates differed between condition, a 
repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with one factor of picture pair type 
(prime, no-agent, no-theme, or baseline), with a dependent variable of accuracy 
(number of correct responses across conditions). There was no main effect of 
picture pair type, and paired comparisons revealed no significant differences 
between conditions with respect to accuracy (all p > .05). Adjustments were 
made for all multiple comparisons using Bonferroni corrections. 
 
Discussion 
 
As predicted, participants were faster to respond in lexical decision when both 
presented pictures afforded the event denoted by the target word. To use a 
specific example for the event ‘drink’, faster responses were observed to the 
auditorially presented target verb “drink”, when it was preceded by pictures of a 
bird and a puddle, the combination of which affords a drinking event. Less 
priming was observed when there was no suitable agent to carry out the event 
(e.g. a bird), no suitable theme with which the event could take place (e.g. a 
puddle), or unrelated baseline objects were presented (e.g. a book and a 
toothbrush). On average, response times in the prime condition were 
significantly faster compared to every other condition.  
 These results can be interpreted with respect to the abstraction and 
combining of affordances from visually presented objects and agents. On 
priming trials, the agent in each case affords carrying out the event, and the 
theme affords having the event take place. Importantly, this combining of 
semantic information occurs across both the visual and linguistic modalities. 
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Continuing with the same example, it is assumed that upon seeing a puddle that 
has been preceded by a bird, a representation of drinking is generated. This 
representation overlaps with the representation engendered by the target word 
‘drink’, and lexical decision response times to the target are facilitated. This 
notion of overlapping representations is relevant to a single-code view of 
semantic access (Chase and Clark, 1972), and suggests that semantic information 
can be combined to form composite representations, regardless of the original 
source of the information (in this case words or pictures).  
 Although the current data provide a demonstration of combinatorial 
processes operating within a cross-modal semantic priming paradigm, it is 
unclear whether these effects can be attributed to automatic processes, or 
processes requiring strategic control. Faster, more implicit processing of visual 
stimuli is thought to be elicited at shorter SOAs of between 100-250 ms (Neely, 
1991), while longer SOAs of 600-1000 ms are thought to elicit more controlled, 
strategic processing (Sachs et al., 2008).  
 With respect to strategic processing, however, an attempt was made to 
establish whether the number of correct responses participants were making, 
increased from the first to the second half of the experiment. An improvement in 
accuracy in the second half of the experiment may have implicated the use of 
strategies (such as mnemonics, see Corbett, 1977; Neisser and Kerr, 1973; and 
chapter 6 for more discussion) to complete the task. Although in the current 
experiment effects of improvement were not found, the same accuracy analyses 
will be conducted in the experiments that follow.  
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For now, The SOA in the following experiment is to be reduced in an 
attempt to establish the automaticity (or lack thereof) of the effects reported thus 
far.  
 
Experiment 2 
 
This experiment is essentially the same as Experiment 1, except that second 
picture exposure durations were shortened from 250 to 100 ms.  
 
Method 
 
Participants.  48 participants from the University of York student community 
took part in the experiment, and each person was given £2 or course credit for 
participating.  As with experiment 1, all were native English speakers and had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
  
Materials. The same materials used in experiment 1 were used for experiment 2. 
 
Design.  The same design as experiment 1 was used for experiment 2.  
 
Procedure.  The procedure was also the same as in experiment 1, except for 
second picture exposure durations of 100 rather than 250 ms. 
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Results 
 
Table 2.2 shows the means and standard deviations for each of the four 
conditions with second picture exposure durations of 100 ms. Figure 2.5 shows 
the average response times for each condition.  
 
 Prime No-agent No-theme Baseline 
M 717 717 746 756 
SD 145 126 155 175 
 
Table 2.2. Means and standard deviations for each condition, with second 
picture exposure durations of 100 ms. 
 
Mauchly’s test revealed the assumption of sphericity had been violated (χ²(5) = 
23.83, p < .001), so the following test was corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser 
estimates of sphericity.  A repeated measures ANOVA revealed no significant 
main effect of picture type (F1(2.34, 110.03) = 1.99, p = .134; F2(3, 81) = 2.594, 
p = .058). 
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Fig. 2.5. Mean response times at 100 ms, with standard error bars. 
 
Participants did not respond any slower or faster as a function of picture type.  
Paired comparisons revealed no significant differences in response times 
between the conditions of ‘prime’ and ‘baseline’, ‘prime’ and ‘no agent’, ‘prime’ 
and ‘no theme’, ‘no theme’ and ‘no agent’, ‘no theme’ and ‘baseline’, and 
finally, ‘no agent’ and ‘baseline’ (all p > .0.5). 
Participants’ responses were, on average, very accurate (M = 90%, SD = 
4%), and there was no difference in accuracy from the first to the second half of 
the experiment (p > .05). In order to establish the effect of these conditions on 
accuracy rates, a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with one factor of 
picture pair type (prime, no-agent, no-theme, or baseline), with a dependent 
variable of accuracy (number of correct responses across conditions). There were 
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no differences between conditions with respect to accuracy (all p > .05). 
Adjustments were made for all multiple comparisons using Bonferroni 
corrections. 
 
General discussion 
 
In experiment 1, participants’ average response times to targets were 
significantly faster in the prime condition (where, for example, they might 
receive the bird and puddle items for the first and second pictures, respectively) 
compared to every other condition. In addition, there was a significant difference 
between average response times to prime and baseline items. When the exposure 
duration of second picture items was reduced from 250 to 100 ms in experiment 
2, there were no significant differences in participants’ average response times 
between any conditions.  
The significant differences between the prime and all other conditions at 
250 ms suggest that priming was not induced purely by one experimental item on 
its own, but by the combination of both. For example, for the target word ‘drink’, 
participants responded significantly faster when the bird was shown with the 
puddle (the ‘prime’ condition), than when either the bird was shown without the 
puddle (the ‘no-theme’ condition), or the puddle was shown without the bird (the 
‘no-agent’ condition).  
The results for experiment 2 suggest that at shorter exposure durations, 
there may not be enough time for participants to construct event representations 
from available item affordances. The nature of these experiments are such that 
any facilitation in responses to the target can only take effect once the 
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affordances of items have been successfully combined. Therefore, as the event 
representation in this case can be thought of as a composite of combined item 
affordances, the additional time needed in these experiments for facilitation to 
the target word is a reflection of the additional information that needs to be 
combined.  
There are three major implications of these results. Firstly, that these 
activated representations were rich enough to contain event-based information; 
secondly, that these combinatorial processes are likely to require more time to 
operate than those of gist abstraction; and thirdly, that semantic information is 
smoothly integrated from one picture to another, and is not simply replaced. 
To take the first implication, these results tell us something of the nature 
of these activated representations in that they appear to code event-based 
information (the types of events a given item can engage in) along with 
commonly activated semantic features of the item(s) in question. Functional 
interactions between objects and their facilitation of task-dependent targets have 
been established before (e.g. Green & Hummel, 2006), but what these current 
experiments indicate is that representations can be activated based on the types 
of interaction afforded by the combination of two semantically unrelated items. 
For example, a bird and a puddle are not semantically related, but the affordances 
of each are combined only through the event that links them (drinking).  
If one is to assume that recognition of these sequentially presented 
objects is necessary for these combinatorial processes to operate, then it is 
relevant that the processing requirements and time-course of gist abstraction 
appear to be different from those of object recognition. Loschky et al. (2007) 
argues that information abstracted in the form of gist is associated with holistic, 
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low-level properties as apposed to information pertaining to the recognition of 
the individual objects comprising a scene. Abstracting meaning in terms of 
object type is more effortful than abstracting meaning in the form of gist (Dobel, 
2007) and studies of gist abstraction emphasise the use of global spatial cues 
(such as layout of items) to establish the ‘identity’ of visual scenes (Henderson & 
Ferreira, 2004). Such cues are not available in the current set of experiments, and 
an ‘identity’ may be more difficult to attach to two objects linked only by the 
nature of their possible interactions with one another. In the current set of 
experiments, in order for the affordances of objects to be combined, the objects 
have to be recognised first. It is unlikely that without this crucial step these 
effects are unable to operate on our lexical decision on the target word.  
The last implication is that semantic information from one picture does 
not simply replace that of the previous one but they are combined via event-
based knowledge. Indeed, our experience of the visual world is not one of 
discrete, self-contained packets of information, but of fluid, seamless 
comprehension of our surroundings (Irwin, 1991). However, studies of 
information integration from one saccadic eye movement to the next suggest that 
although we rapidly combine separate sources of visual information, only a few 
representations are utilised at any one time, before being replaced by a different 
set of representations (Irwin, 1991). Of course, if semantic information 
pertaining to a previously seen item is replaced when a second saccade is 
executed, it is unclear how the combining of semantic information between 
objects in our visual environment would occur in the first place. 
Experiments serving to both establish and support semantic combinatorial 
effects in the linguistic domain are numerous (e.g. Tabossi, 1988; Glenberg & 
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Robertson, 2000; Andrews et al., 1993; Seidenberg et al., 1982; Potter & 
Faulconer, 1979). However, the current cross-modal paradigm may be an 
inconclusive demonstration of a similar effect operating in the visual domain. 
These experiments demonstrate priming based on overlapping representations 
constructed from the semantics inherent in the presented pictures and the 
semantics engendered by the target verb. In order to establish whether the 
combinatorial effects demonstrated in linguistic paradigms operate to the same 
degree in the visual domain, reliance on the LDT must be altered in favour of a 
purely visual task. Given that combinatorial effects have been established in the 
linguistic domain, the operation of these effects in a paradigm that utilises only 
visual information would indicate that these effects are not induced by linguistic 
stimuli alone, but are elicited to the same extent by visual objects. This is to be a 
focus of the experiments presented in the next chapter. These subsequent 
experiments shall also provide an investigation of the causal nature of these 
relationships between presented items.  
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Chapter 3 
 
The present chapter describes three experiments that build upon the findings 
presented in the previous chapter. It begins with an overview of those findings 
and their theoretical implications, and follows with the motivation for the new 
experiments. A novel paradigm will be presented and discussed that explores 
combinatory semantic processing through the priming of visual object 
recognition using a non-linguistic task. 
In experiment 1, participants were faster to respond to the word ‘drink’ in 
a lexical decision task if it had been preceded by a picture of a bird (the agent) 
and then a picture of a puddle (the theme). Crucially, if either the agent was 
shown without the theme or the theme was shown without the agent, response 
times were much slower. The verb ‘drink’ in this case is presumed to be primed 
by the combination of affordances derived from the bird and the puddle. The bird 
affords drinking from the puddle and the puddle affords being drunk from. These 
combined affordances are used to generate an event representation that 
corresponds to these abstracted affordances. This event representation overlaps 
with the conceptual structure that would ordinarily be activated on hearing the 
target ‘drink’. Priming in this case arises from some information pertaining to 
drinking becoming pre-activated from the prior generated event representation. 
This priming from the constructed event representation then contributes to the 
observed facilitation of response times to the verb.  
These findings offer support for the notion of a visual combinatorial 
process, and expand upon findings of a similar nature in the linguistic domain 
(e.g. Tabossi (1988), Potter & Faulconer (1979), see the ‘priming effects’ 
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subheading in the introduction for discussion). These studies reveal the 
importance of context in language processing and provide examples of the 
modulation of response times as a function of the amount of information that can 
be combined in sentential events. A similar process operating on both linguistic 
and visual stimuli implicates a mechanism common to both domains. The 
combining of information to form composite representations thus becomes a 
cognitive function fundamental to our comprehension of our surroundings, 
regardless of the source from which it comes.  
There are, however, two unresolved issues from experiments 1 and 2 that 
provide part of the motivation for the current experiment. First, these findings 
tell us nothing of the nature of the representations activated: Are the event-
representations coded in such a way as to include the specific agents and themes 
seen by the participant (thereby encoding the specific events afforded by those 
specific items), or are they more abstract, coded in terms of a general instance of 
the same event (that may be more independent of the specific items)? Second, 
the use of the lexical decision task is problematic for an account of a 
combinatorial effect arising purely from visual perception alone. Establishing the 
occurrence of this combinatorial process in the visual domain is essential if it is 
to be maintained that this effect is an integral part of our processing of the 
external environment.  
In addition to addressing the aforementioned issues concerning abstract 
representation and the use of language, the current paradigm allows deeper 
investigation of the causal structure of an event, and what the representations 
likely contain in terms of causal information. Causal structure can be thought of 
in this case as the identifiable segments of a causal chain and how these 
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segments are linked; more simply, a ‘who did what to whom’ sequence. Each of 
these points shall be discussed in turn, leading to a rationale for the current 
experiment that aims to address these issues.  
To take the first point, with respect to the nature of the activated 
representations there are two accounts of the data for experiment 1. Continuing 
with the ‘bird-puddle’ example introduced in the previous chapter, participants’ 
response times to the word ‘drink’ are either speeded because the word matches 
an activated representation of the bird drinking from the puddle, or because the 
activated representation concerns a general act of drinking (which could include, 
for example, drinking from a glass), and it is this that matches the semantics 
engendered by the word.  
 Colcombe and Wyer (2002) argue that generalised representations of an 
event may be activated if that event has been experienced repeatedly. In other 
words, for any given event, if one has extensive experiential knowledge of it, 
then the representations activated upon being confronted with it again, are likely 
to be more abstract. Similarly, Zacks and Tversky (2001) assert that a schema or 
‘script’ for a particular event may be created by repeated exposure to that 
particular type of event. These abstract representations do not contain 
information concerning what or who the participants in a particular event are, 
where the event takes place, or the amount of time the event uses from its 
inception to its completion.   
 A demonstration of the nature of these representations with respect to 
their level of generality could proceed as follows: If, in experiment 1, 
participants were constructing abstract representations of the intended events, 
then an appropriate test for this would be to have participants make judgements 
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on targets that are associated with an interpretation of the event that is not 
afforded by the objects in the scene. For example, if upon seeing a bird (the 
agent) and then a puddle (the theme), an abstract drinking representation is 
activated, response times to a concept (such as a glass) which affords a drinking 
event but not the specific kind of drinking that a bird would engage in, would be 
facilitated compared to a control. An appropriate control condition for these 
items would be something that is unlikely to interact with the theme (such as a 
boy for the bird and puddle example). The study described below employs just 
such items.  
 With respect to the use of lexical decision to probe the activation of these 
event-representations, the notion of a combinatorial semantic process introduced 
in the first chapter was presented on the basis that it represents an operation 
common not only to the linguistic domain, but to the visual domain also. 
However, the paradigm described in the previous chapter still utilised language 
as a basis for collecting response times and this becomes problematic for an 
account that aims to provide evidence for such an effect operating during visual 
processing and object recognition. 
The literature is replete with examples of two-way interplay between 
vision and language, particularly within the field of psycholinguistics 
(Henderson & Ferreira, 2004; Glaser, 1992). The mapping of language onto a 
visual event has been demonstrated with studies utilising the visual world 
paradigm (Altmann & Kamide, 1999; Kamide, Altmann & Haywood, 2003; 
Tanenhaus et al., 1995), and words and pictures have been shown to access a 
single semantic store for both types of information (Vanderwart, 1984; Chase & 
Clark, 1972). Given that language is seen to have such a facilitatory impact on 
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object recognition and visual perception, its elimination from the current 
paradigm is essential in order to establish the occurrence of uncontaminated 
combinatorial processes operating on visual stimuli alone.  
The current experiment will address this issue by using an artifact 
judgement task instead of a lexical decision task. The judgement is essentially a 
semantic categorisation task in which the participant is asked to make a decision 
on a target as to whether it is a man-made object or not (see Del’Acqua & 
Grainger, 1999). Participants will make this judgment on a visual target which 
represents an abstract instantiation of a particular event. So, for the bird and 
puddle example, participants would first be presented with a picture of a bird and 
a puddle and then they would be presented with a picture of a glass, upon which 
they will be required to make their artifact decision (see figure 3.1). The control 
for this example would consist of, for the first picture, a boy and a puddle, and 
for the second picture, the same target consisting of a glass. 
To continue with the same example, it is assumed that priming of the 
glass from a bird and a puddle will be due to the generation of a general 
representation of a drinking event from the combining of affordances from the 
first picture. The bird and the puddle in this case affords drinking, but not from a 
glass specifically. The glass would only be primed if the representation used to 
recognise the target encodes the event as an abstract instantiation of drinking in 
general, that encompasses any form of drinking, including from puddles and 
glasses. 
With respect to the methodology for this experiment, the artifact 
judgement task is used as an alternative to the lexical decision due to their 
relative similarity - the only main difference between the two is that the former 
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requires participants to make a decision on visual instead of linguistic stimuli. In 
addition, this task has been shown to be sensitive to priming by pictorial stimuli, 
and does not require explicit attention to the first presented picture.   
 
Prime condition 
 
Picture 1     Picture 2 
  
  
Control condition 
 
Picture 1     Picture 2 
 
 
  
 
 
Fig. 3.1. An example of the stimuli for the event ‘drink’. 
 
 
A final point to be discussed in advance of the study to be described below 
concerns the causal properties of visual events and the ways in which this 
information may be coded in the representations discussed in this section. In 
addition to the items used for experiment 1 (Henceforth referred to as ‘bird-
puddle’ items), new items will be used within the same paradigm, which are 
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endowed with causal information. The selection of these items is essentially 
capitalising on the fact that events usually involve a change in state in one or 
more of the constituent objects in a visual scene. 
 For these items (henceforth referred to as ‘knife-tyre’ items), participants 
will be presented with, firstly, a picture consisting of an object and an instrument 
that is capable of inducing a change in that object, for example, a knife and a 
tyre. Participants shall then be presented with the same object in a changed state, 
such as a burst tyre, and are required to make their artifact judgements on this 
target object (see appendix 2 for a list of bird-puddle and knife-tyre items). The 
control for these items shall consist of the same target, preceded by a picture of 
the target in its unchanged state and an instrument which is not capable of 
changing the target in any way (such as a ruler) (see figure 3.2). 
 Whereas the bird-puddle items do not have targets which are causally 
related to the prime (the glass, for example, is not associated in any way with the 
bird and puddle), the knife-tyre items have a causal structure: The tyre in the 
target picture target picture is burst because the previously presented knife and 
intact tyre allows bursting to take place. Therefore, within a single paradigm, the 
current experiment tests for a more generic event representation in the ‘glass 
target’ case, and a more object-specific event representation in the ‘burst tyre’ 
case.  
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Prime condition 
 
Picture 1     Picture 2 
 
 
Control condition 
 
Picture 1     Picture 2 
  
 
Fig. 3.2. An example of stimuli for the event ‘burst’. 
 
According to Zacks & Tversky (2001), a key feature of the  processing of an 
event’s structure is the perception of causality inherent in the event itself. These 
authors use a real-world account of the perception of event structure to discuss 
the fluid interplay of bottom-up and top-down processes operating during the 
processing of events and the activation of representations of those events. The 
use of these ‘causal’ items, below, is predicated on them providing a 
demonstration of the interaction during object recognition of bottom-up 
processes and top-down cognitive processing of perceptually significant 
configurations of objects.  
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 If one is to expect priming from cases where objects have been paired 
with instruments capable of causing a change in that object, one must 
acknowledge the relative contributions of both bottom-up and top-down 
processing in the comprehension of a given visual event. The items that will be 
used to explore causality within visual events are distinct from the items used for 
experiments 1 and 2, as these items provide cues as to the event’s causal 
structure. 
In a sense, it was an incomplete event that was presented to participants 
responding in experiments 1 and 2: there was no perceptible change in the target 
that could have been precipitated by the agent. In the current paradigm however, 
if participants are presented with a knife and a tyre, the causal structure of the 
event is constrained so as to allow very few resultant states in the target – the 
most plausible of which is the bursting of the tyre. Here, participants are able to 
make use of processing of the causal structure in the events presented to them: 
the last ‘segment’ of the causal structure of the event (for example, the burst tyre) 
is included in this case. This utilisation of causal event structure influences object 
recognition so that the processing is consonant with the constraints of the 
affordances of the objects in the first presented picture.  
Thus far, combinatorial effects have been demonstrated only in cases 
where an agent is depicted, a likely candidate for carrying out the event in 
question on each priming trial. However a crucial difference between these 
experiments and the knife-tyre portion of the current experiment is that for the 
latter, no agents will be depicted with the instruments and objects in first picture 
presentations. For events to be presented with inherent casual structure 
information (e.g. the knife bursts the tyre and the target is depicted as an object 
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in its end-state as a result of this bursting), a likely agent is not a necessary 
inclusion. For example, we know that, given a knife and a tyre, the tyre affords 
being burst, regardless of whether an agent is included in the scene. Furthermore, 
studies have demonstrated sensitivity to functional groupings of objects without 
the need of agents in visual scenes (e.g. Green and Hummel, 2006). It may be 
that in these studies, an agent’s involvement is implicit in the casual nature of 
event. The likelihood of there being a causal agent in a given event may be so 
high that its explicit inclusion is not necessary.  
So to reiterate the basic design of the current paradigm, there are two sets 
of items, one set seeking to address the distinction between abstract and concrete 
representations, and one seeking to investigate participants’ utilisation of causal 
structure information in their processing of visual events.  For this second set of 
items, causal information is derived from instruments and objects (such as a 
knife and tyre), based on the event these two items, together, afford (in this case, 
bursting). This priming of causal structure is then expected to facilitate responses 
to a target which corresponds to the resultant state of this causal event (such as a 
burst tyre). Both sets of items shall address the language task issue as for both 
sets, participants make an artifact judgement on the target, rather than a lexical 
decision. The current paradigm, although discussed briefly here, will be 
described in detail in the following ‘methods’ section.  
The bird-puddle items were included to tease apart the distinction 
between more general abstract representations, and the more concrete 
representations involving the constituent objects directly. However, the 
exploratory nature of this early experiment makes generating specific predictions 
concerning the bird-puddle items difficult. Either null or significant results in this 
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case would reveal insights into the nature of these representations: If there is no 
significant difference between conditions then it is likely that the representations 
activated in these paradigms contain information concerning only the affordances 
and potential interactions of the agents and themes presented in the first picture. 
If the opposite is the case, then support can be provided for a more abstract 
representation activated upon seeing certain combinations of objects. However, 
although no firm conclusions can generally be drawn from a null result, we shall, 
in the next chapter, address this issue and explore further this notion of object-
specific representations using a modified paradigm.  
Generating predictions for the knife-tyre items is much less exacting 
because the combinatorial arguments raised in this and the previous chapters are 
only supported with one outcome. It is predicted, therefore, that participants will 
be faster to respond in artifact judgement to a target in a changed state (e.g. a 
burst tyre), when it has been preceded by that item in its unchanged state and an 
instrument which is capable of bringing about this change in the target (e.g. an 
intact tyre and a knife). In terms of the processes that are assumed operate here, 
the affordances of the object and instrument are initially combined to form an 
event representation based on the event that, together, these items allow. This 
representation then primes the likely change in state based on the causal structure 
of the event. It is this priming of the target that would result in the facilitation of 
response times to this object. Although this can be taken as the principal account 
of the combinatorial effects described thus far, there is an alternative account 
based on integrative processes at the target, which is to be discussed in detail 
later.  
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The present section has provided a rationale for the current experiment 
based on findings from the previous experiment and also a desire to expand the 
scope of this work. Firstly, the current experiment shall investigate the nature of 
event representation with bird-puddle targets consisting of an object related to 
the abstract conception of the presented event (e.g. a glass for the event ‘drink’). 
The use of language shall be eradicated from the current experiment with the use 
of an artifact judgement task, and the causal nature of events shall also be 
exploited with the use of targets in changed states for the knife-tyre items.  
 
Experiment 3 
 
Method 
 
Participants. 40 University of York students participated in the experiment for 
half-an-hour’s course credit or £2. All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. 
 
Materials.  
 
Bird-puddle items: Experimental items.  Figure 3.1 shows an example of the 
stimuli used for the ‘drinking’ event within the bird-puddle items. The first 
picture in the prime condition consisted of an agent (e.g. a bird) with its theme 
(e.g. a puddle) and the second picture in the prime condition consisted of the 
target (e.g. a glass). The first picture in the control condition consisted of a 
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different agent (e.g. a boy) with the same theme (e.g. a puddle) and the second 
picture in the control condition consisted of the same target (e.g. a glass).  
There were 18 experimental bird-puddle items in total, and all targets for 
experimental items consisted of man-made objects. Participants saw all 
experimental items but primes and controls were rotated across lists. For 
example, participants assigned to list 1 saw 9 primes and 9 controls. Participants 
assigned to list 2 saw the other 9 primes and 9 controls. In other words, a prime 
in list 1 became a control in list 2 and so on. 
 
 
Bird-puddle items: Fillers.  Filler items for the bird-puddle set were designed so 
as to correspond to the experimental items. For example, 9 fillers were related 
objects, with animate entities (mirroring the 9 priming items seen in a given list) 
and the other 9 were unrelated objects with animate entities (mirroring the 9 
control items seen in a given list). Related objects might include things such as a 
policeman and handcuffs or an infant and a dummy, while unrelated objects 
might include an actress and a stapler or a pelican and a rugby ball. There were 
18 bird-puddle fillers in total and each ‘target’ consisted of natural objects. The 
18 knife-tyre experimental items and the 18 knife-tyre fillers were treated as 
fillers for the bird-puddle items. So in effect, there were 54 bird-puddle fillers in 
total.  
 
Knife-tyre items: Experimental items.  Figure 3.2 shows an example of the type 
of stimuli used for the knife-tyre experimental items. For the prime condition, the 
first picture consisted of an object in its unchanged state (e.g. an intact tyre) and 
an instrument (e.g. a knife), and the second picture consisted of the prior object 
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in its changed state (e.g. a burst tyre). For the control condition, the first picture 
consisted of an object in its unchanged state (e.g. an intact tyre) and a different 
instrument (e.g. a ruler), and the second picture consisted of the same target (e.g. 
a burst tyre). These control objects were also designed to be similar in shape and 
size to the priming objects. There were 18 experimental knife-tyre items in total 
and each target was a man-made object.  
 
Knife-tyre items: Fillers.  For the knife-tyre set, filler items also corresponded to 
experimental items in that they consisted of 9 related objects (mirroring the 9 
prime items seen by participants in a given list) and 9 unrelated objects 
(mirroring the 9 control items seen by participants in a given list). Related 
objects in this case might include things such as a table and a chair or a bowl and 
spoon, while unrelated objects might include a sofa and a rake or a computer and 
a spade. So there were 18 knife-tyre fillers in total and each ‘target’ consisted of 
a natural object. Just as with the other set of items, the 18 bird-puddle fillers and 
the 18 bird-puddle experimental items formed a total of 54 fillers for these knife-
tyre items.  
Participants were assigned either to list 1 or list 2. For the experimental 
items in list one, half of them were primes, and the other half were controls. For 
the experimental items in list 2, each prime for list 1 was a control in list 2, and 
vice versa. So for example, participant 1 may have seen a prime for the first trial 
and a control for the second, while participant 2 may have seen a control for the 
first trial and a prime for the second. All items were downloaded from 
www.clipart.com and were shown at a resolution of 640×480 on the 17” monitor 
of an Apple iMac computer.  
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Norming.  The items for bird-puddle and knife-tyre sets were normed using 
online questionnaires (see appendix 6 for instructions). These were designed to 
test for things such as the plausibility of events by asking participants how likely 
a particular event is to occur, given the combination of items provided. 
Participants made their choices on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 being ‘highly likely’ 
and 1 being ‘highly unlikely’. 21 different participants participated in answering 
the questions from each ‘bird-puddle’ questionnaire. The data from the norming 
studies will be described in the Results section below. 
 There were three different questionnaires for the bird-puddle items, each 
dealing with a different question, and participants were randomly assigned to one 
of these different versions. For Version 1, participants were required to make a 
choice as to how likely they thought an event (e.g. drinking) was to occur given a 
combination of objects (e.g. a bird and a puddle). This question was asked of 
participants so as to gauge how effective experimental items were in affording a 
particular event. If participants regarded a particular event to be ‘highly unlikely’ 
given a priming combination of objects, then it could be assumed that these items 
would not induce the activation of corresponding representations when presented 
to them in the semantic priming paradigm. 
For Version 2, participants were asked to indicate how likely they 
regarded an event to happen (e.g. drinking) given one of the targets (e.g. a glass). 
This question was necessary for the selection of appropriate targets. Again, if 
participants regarded events to be highly unlikely given a particular target, then it 
could be that these items would not effectively afford the event in question and 
so would need to be eliminated from the item set. 
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For Version 3, participants were asked to rate how likely an event would 
be to occur (e.g. drinking) given an agent (e.g. a bird). This question was asked 
in order to prevent the inclusion of items with which the representation of events 
could be activated by the agent alone. If priming were driven by the agent alone, 
then this would confound an account of such effects in terms of the combination 
of items in the first picture.  
Norming questionnaires for the knife-tyre items were also split by several 
questions. Version 1 sought to establish how plausible a given event was, given a 
particular combination of items. For example, they might have been presented 
with a knife and a tyre and they would be required to make a choice on a scale of 
1 to 7 as to how likely they thought that a particular event would occur in 
everyday life. As with the bird-puddle questionnaires, a choice of 7 indicated an 
event was ‘highly likely’ to occur, while a choice of 1 indicated an event was 
‘highly unlikely’ to occur.  
Version 2 for the knife-tyre items asked participants to rate how likely it 
is that a particular instrument (e.g. a knife) caused the state of a particular object 
(e.g. a burst tyre). This needs to be established because if participants are not 
sensitive to the affordances of the instrument then it is unlikely a representation 
involving the bursting of the tyre will be activated. As trials in the control 
condition for knife-tyre items consisted of different instruments (e.g. a ruler 
instead of a knife), half of the items on version 2 were priming combinations and 
the other half were control combinations. Items that were priming combinations 
on version 2 became control conditions on version 3, and vice versa.  
Version 3 was designed to establish the commonality of knife-tyre 
targets. Participants receiving this questionnaire were asked to rate how common 
 64
they thought a target object was in everyday life. Again, these ratings were to be 
selected from a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 denoting a ‘highly common’ item and a 
score of 1 denoting a ‘highly uncommon’ item. It is assumed that the 
commonality of targets will have an impact on their recognition, regardless of 
any event representations activated. 21 different participants participated in 
answering the questions from each questionnaire. 
 
Procedure.  Participants were seated at a comfortable distance from the computer 
monitor, with a button box placed directly in front of them. The participants were 
asked to sign consent forms and were then given onscreen instructions (see 
appendix 3)3. The instructions informed participants that they would see two 
images in each trial, and that when they see the second image they were to make 
a judgment as to whether they think it consists of something which is man-made 
or not man-made. They were to make this decision with the button box, and they 
were instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as possible. A right button 
press was used to indicate ‘yes’ (the second image is man-made), and a left 
button press was used to indicate a ‘no’ (the second image is not man-made).  
 Figure 3.3 shows a schematic of the trial procedure. First, a fixation cross 
appeared on the screen for 1000 ms. Then, the first picture appeared for 2000 ms 
followed by another fixation cross for 1000 ms. Finally, the second picture 
appeared and remained on the screen until one of the buttons on the button box 
was pressed.  
                                                 
3 The instructions required participants to concentrate on all items as there would 
be a short memory test when the experiment had finished. Upon debriefing, 
however, participants were informed that there would be no memory test, but 
that they were told this because the experimenter was wary of them simply 
ignoring the first picture.  
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Prime condition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 +  + 
 
 
1000 ms 2000 ms 1000 ms Until press… 
 
Control condition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 +  + 
 1000 ms 2000 ms 1000 ms Until press… 
  
 
Fig. 3.3. An example of the procedure for each trial. 
 
 
Before each trial, the message ‘Press Key’ was displayed, and to move onto the 
next trial, either of the buttons on the box could be pressed. Any time this 
message was shown, participants could take a break if they needed one. When 
the experiment had ended, participants were presented with debriefing 
information (see appendix 4.) Before participants began the experiment, they 
were presented with 4 practice trials. There were 72 trials in total, and the 
experiment lasted roughly 30 minutes. 
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Results 
 
Bird-puddle Priming.  Figure 3.4 shows that, on average, participants responded 
faster in the control condition (M = 1087, SD = 426) than the prime condition (M 
= 1143, SD = 461), and this difference was significant (F1(39) = 2.174, p = .036; 
F2(17) = 1.092, p = .290). Response times more than three standard deviations 
above the mean were replaced with the mean plus three standard deviations, and 
response times more than three standard deviations below the mean were 
replaced with the mean minus three standard deviations. However, altering this 
trimming from 3 to 4 standard deviations eradicates the difference between prime 
and control conditions (F1(39) = -.320, p = .077; F2(17) = -1.642, p = .119). 
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Fig. 3.4. Mean ‘bird-puddle’ response times for both conditions, with standard 
error bars. 
 
 
Participants’ responses were very accurate on average (M = 95%, SD = 5%) and 
there was no difference of average number of correct responses between the first 
and second halves of the experiment (p > .05). There was no difference between 
conditions with respect to accuracy (p > .05). 
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 Bird-puddle Norming.  Table 3.1 shows the means and standard deviations for 
ratings for each of the three different types of norming. The mean figure for 
‘Plaus (prime)’ represents the average rating out of 7 given to prime items for 
how likely an event (such as drinking) is to occur. The mean figure for ‘Target’ 
represents the average rating score out of 7 given to prime targets for how likely 
an event is to happen. Finally, the mean figure for ‘Agent’ represents the average 
rating out of 7 for prime agents for how likely an event is to happen. 
 
  Plaus (prime) Target Agent 
Mean 5.64 5.62 4.02 
SD 0.83 0.93 1.34 
 
Table 3.1. Means and standard deviations for each of the three norming types. 
 
Table 3.2 shows Pearson’s correlations between response times in the priming 
condition and each of the rating types. Negative correlations between response 
times and both plausibility ratings and agent ratings indicate that the more likely 
an event or the more likely an agent is to cause an event, the faster the response 
times. The only positive correlation in the table is that between response times 
for the prime condition and the ratings for targets. This indicates that the more 
likely an event is to happen given a target, the slower the response times are to 
that item. None of these correlations, however, are significant (all p > .05). 
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  Plaus (prime) Target Agent 
Prime RTs -0.175 0.246 -0.084 
Plaus (prime) ------- -0.359 -0.015 
Target ------- ------- -0.214 
Agent ------- ------- ------- 
 
Table 3.2. Pearson’s r values for correlations between bird-puddle prime 
condition response times and each rating type. 
 
Knife-tyre priming.  Figure 3.5 shows that, on average, participants responded 
faster in the prime condition (M = 1102, SD = 435) than in the control condition 
(M = 1189, SD = 488): (F1(39) = -2.843, p = .007; F2(17) = -1.640, p = .119).  
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Fig. 3.5. Mean ‘knife-tyre’ response times for both conditions, with standard 
error bars. 
 
Again, participants’ responses were very accurate on average (M = 90%, SD = 
4%) and there was no difference of average number of correct responses between 
the first and second halves of the experiment (p > .05). There was no difference 
between conditions with respect to accuracy (p > .05). 
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Knife-tyre Norming.  Table 3.3 shows the means and standard deviations for 
ratings for each of the three different types of knife-tyre norming. The mean 
figure for ‘Plaus (prime)’ represents the average rating out of 7 given to prime 
items for how plausible a given event is regarded to be. The mean figure for 
‘Plaus (control)’ represents the average rating score out of 7 given to control 
items for how plausible an event is. Lastly, the mean figure for ‘Commonality’ 
represents the average rating out of 7 given to targets in response to how 
common these items are deemed to be. The mean difference between plausibility 
ratings for prime and control items is significant (F(17) = 14.627, p<.001), 
indicating that given events would be more likely to occur if a priming 
combination was presented, compared to when a control combination was 
presented.  
 
  Plaus (prime) Plaus (control) Commonality 
Mean 4.92 1.84 3.97 
SD 0.83 0.69 1.13 
 
Table 3.3. Means and standard deviations for each of the three norming types. 
 
Table 3.4 shows Pearson’s correlations between response times in the priming 
and control conditions and each of the rating types. The only significant r value 
was between commonality and plausibility (prime) ratings. This positive 
correlation indicates that the more plausible an event in the prime condition, the 
more common its corresponding target is likely to be.  
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  Plaus (prime) Plaus (control) Commonality 
Prime RTs -0.09 0.08 -0.07 
Control RTs -0.24 -0.07 -0.05 
Plaus (prime) ------- -0.17 0.61* 
Plaus (control) ------- ------- -0.08 
Commonality ------- ------- ------- 
  *p<.05 
 
Table 3.4. Pearson’s r values for correlations between knife-tyre prime and 
control condition response times and each rating type. 
 
Correlations were also computed to establish whether the magnitude of the 
difference in RTs between the prime and control conditions was predicted by the 
magnitude in difference between rating scores for these conditions. A Pearson’s 
correlation between these differences was not significant, however (r = 0.04, p = 
0.866). 
 
Discussion 
 
For the bird-puddle items in this experiment, participants were significantly 
faster to respond in the control condition (e.g. picture 1: boy and puddle, picture 
2: glass), than they were to respond in the prime condition (e.g. picture 1: bird 
and puddle, picture 2: glass). The fact that results from this half of the stimuli ran 
contrary to the prediction may have been due to a flaw in the study concerning 
the items chosen to delineate this distinction between concrete and abstract event 
representations. Some of the control items were not appropriate examples of 
agents that do not afford interaction with presented objects. For example, 
although a boy is less likely to drink from a glass than an adult, it is more likely 
to drink from one than a bird. Perhaps a more appropriate design would be to 
 71
include another condition to which this control could be compared: for example, 
a man for the first picture (an agent who is the most likely to drink from the glass 
compared to the others) and a glass for the second. 
An indication that these results may be inconclusive comes from the fact 
that this significant effect of controls over primes disappears with a more 
conservative removal of outliers. Although this result appears to be 
unconvincing, a following experiment with more appropriate controls will be 
presented in a following chapter. This subsequent experiment will return to this 
issue of concrete and abstract representations with a stimulus set similar to the 
one used for the second half of the current stimulus set: the knife-tyre items. 
For the knife-tyre items, participants were significantly faster to respond 
in the prime condition (picture 1: knife and tyre, picture 2: burst tyre), compared 
to the control condition (picture 1: knife and ruler, picture 2: burst tyre). Priming 
to the target arises here from an activated representation of the event, depicted in 
its end-state by the target. This representation is constructed from the combined 
affordances of the instrument and object. More specifically, if participants are 
presented with a knife and a tyre the affordances of these items are combined to 
form an event representation based on the event that, together, these items afford: 
knives afford bursting and tyres afford being burst. This representation then 
primes the likely change in state based on the causal structure of the event. This 
priming of the target results in the observed facilitation of response times to this 
object.  
An important theoretical implication of the results for knife-tyre items 
concerns the aforementioned language-use issue raised from findings reported in 
the previous chapter. An advantage of the paradigm used for this experiment was 
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that it was free from any potential influence of language and the data reported in 
this chapter suggest the event representations were activated purely from the 
visual information inherent in the stimuli presented to participants. This is 
significant because although several studies suggest that semantic information is 
readily combined in the linguistic domain (see Tabossi, 1988, Potter & 
Faulconer, 1979, Andrews et al.,1993), the current set of experiments aim to 
demonstrate a similar process operating in the visual domain.   
It is important to mention, however, that although the paradigm contained 
no instances of language use, the participants were not prevented from labelling 
the stimuli themselves. In addition, the knife-tyre results from the current 
paradigm do not necessarily indicate that combinatorial effects are automatic 
processes of scene recognition and comprehension. An effective way to constrain 
the paradigm and induce automatic process is to reduce the exposure duration of 
the presented stimuli (Neely, 1991). The last experiment in this chapter will 
investigate this directly, in a paradigm where first picture exposure durations are 
shortened to 250 ms. 
A potential criticism of the items selected for the knife-tyre part of the 
experiment is that in some of the experimental trials, there may have been a 
semantic association between the instrument and the target. To take the example 
of the items for the ‘open’ event, participants were shown a picture of an open 
can, preceded by a picture of a closed can with a can opener. These items are 
problematic because the can opener is ‘for’ opening cans and it may be the case 
that participants are not combining the affordances of the two objects here, but 
are primed to the appearance of an open can because of the clear function of the 
can opener. As Adamo & Ferber (2009) note, representations consonant with an 
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instrument’s affordance are activated upon seeing that instrument. These authors 
go further by proposing that, upon seeing an instrument, a representation is 
generated in visual short-term memory, encompassing its affordances and the 
types of ‘surfaces’ it can affect. 
In order to eliminate this confound, the subsequent experiment shall use 
the same paradigm, but with these potentially problematic items removed from 
the stimulus set. In addition to these items being replaced by more suitable 
stimuli, two extra items were created, making the total number of experimental 
items 20. If these effects are being driven by such relationships between 
instruments and targets, then they should not be replicated in an experiment with 
more carefully controlled stimuli.  
 
Experiment 4 
 
Any items where a relationship between instruments and targets could be 
established were removed in this experiment, and replaced with items free of this 
potential confound. 11 items were replaced based on judgements of instrument-
object association. There was a clear distinction between suitable and 
problematic items, such that the stimulus set could readily be split based on 
assumptions of association. These new items were also normed for plausibility of 
events; the likelihood of instruments causing changes in targets; and the 
commonality of target items.  
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Method 
 
Participants.  30 University of York students participated in the experiment for 
half-an-hour’s course credit or £2. All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. 
 
Materials.  11 of the knife-tyre items used in experiment 3 were replaced (see 
appendix 5). Two additional items were included with these replaced items, 
making 20 items in total for this experiment. The fillers were identical to 
experiment 3, except for two additional related filler items (corresponding to the 
two new experimental items in the set). 
As before, all participants saw each item, but items were rotated across 
two lists. For example, a participant presented with items from list 1 would see 
10 primes and 10 controls, and another participant presented with list 2 items 
would see the other 10 primes and the other 10 controls.  
 
Norming.  Every item presented to participants in experiment 4 was normed 
using online questionnaires (see appendix 7 for instructions). There were three 
versions of these questionnaires, with each one asking a specific question 
concerning the items used for experiment 2 These questionnaires differed from 
those used in the previous experiment, as these questions focussed on events in 
terms of instruments and objects, as apposed to agents and objects.  
Version 1 concerned the plausibility of the events depicted by the items. 
For this questionnaire, participants were shown two pictures for each question, 
representing a certain event. They were then asked to make a decision on a scale 
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of one-to-seven as to how likely they thought the depicted event was to occur in 
everyday life, with ‘1’ denoting highly unlikely and ‘7’ denoting highly likely. 
For example, participants may have been shown a tyre and a knife for the first 
picture, and a burst tyre for the second. They were then asked to decide on the 
scale how likely they thought the bursting of the tyre would be to happen in 
everyday life. These questions were not presented to the participants in text (each 
‘question’ appeared as two pictures above the 7-point scale), but they were 
required simply to make the same decision for pair of pictures.  
Version 2 of the questionnaire concerned the likelihood of the instrument 
in each case causing the change in the target. Here the same scale was used, and 
again, a choice of ‘1’ represented highly unlikely, and ‘7’ highly likely. For 
example, participants may have been shown a burst tyre for the first picture, and 
a knife for the second. In this case, their decision should have been based on how 
likely they thought it was that the tyre was burst by the knife.  
Version 3 concerned the commonality of the target items. In this case, a 
choice of ‘1’ on the scale represented very uncommon, while a choice of ‘7’ 
represented very common. For example, participants may have seen a burst tyre, 
and were required to decide how common it would be to see this item in 
everyday life.  
 
Procedure.  The procedure for this experiment was identical to experiment 3. 
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 Results 
 
Figure 3.6 shows that, on average, participants responded faster in the prime 
condition (M = 981, SD = 269) than the control condition (M = 1067, SD = 324): 
F1(29) = -2.410, p = .023; F2(19) = 2.904, p = .009. As before, response times 
that were more than 3 standard deviations above the mean were replaced with the 
mean plus 3 standard deviations. Response times that were more than 3 standard 
deviations below the mean were replaced by the mean minus 3 standard 
deviations. Participants’ responses were very accurate (M = 90%, SD = 4%), and 
there was no difference between the first half and second half of the experiment 
with respect to accuracy (p > .05). There was also no difference between 
conditions with respect to accuracy (p > .05).  
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Fig. 3.6. Mean participant response times for both conditions, with standard 
error bars. 
 
 77
Norming.  Table 3.5 shows the means and standard deviations for ratings for 
each of the three questionnaire versions. The mean figure for ‘Plaus’ represents 
the average rating out of 7 given to prime items for how likely a given event is to 
occur. The mean figure for ‘Likelihood’ represents the average rating score out 
of 7 given to items for how likely an event is to occur, given the instrument 
which precedes it. Lastly, the mean figure for ‘Commonality’ represents the 
average rating out of 7 given to targets in response to how common these items 
are deemed to be.  
 
  Plaus (prime) Likelihood Commonality 
Mean 4.87 5.45 3.32 
SD 1.24 0.93 1.29 
 
Table 3.5. Means and standard deviations for each of the three norming types. 
 
Table 3.6 shows Pearson’s correlations between response times in the priming 
condition and each of the rating types. Negative correlations between response 
times for prime items and both the plausibility of events and the commonality of 
targets suggests that the faster the responses were, the more plausible the events 
were, and the more common the targets were. The significant correlation 
between event plausibility and likelihood indicates that the more plausible the 
events were deemed to be, the more likely it was deemed that the change in the 
target was brought about by the instrument.  
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  Plaus (prime) Likelihood Commonality 
Prime RTs -0.13* 0.06 -0.24* 
Plaus (prime) ------- 0.72* 0.02 
Likelihood ------- ------- -0.14 
Commonality ------- ------- ------- 
  *p<.05 
 
Table 3.6. Pearson’s r values for correlations between knife-tyre prime and 
control condition response times and each rating type. 
 
Discussion 
 
Participants in this experiment continued to respond significantly faster in the 
prime condition compared to the control condition. This indicates that these 
effects are not driven by participants’ construction of associations between 
instruments and targets, but are instead driven by a combining of affordances to 
construct appropriate event-based representations. As before, the events coded in 
these representations contain information concerning the causal nature of the 
occurrences depicted by the pictures. 
In this experiment, differences between conditions were significant in 
both by-participants and by-items analyses. The standard deviations of average 
participant response times were also smaller for this current experiment, 
indicating less variance in the time taken to respond to targets. Not only is this 
current set of items better controlled, but they are also more effective at bringing 
out the effects reported in these experiments.   
As mentioned previously, although these experiments do not make use of 
a linguistic task, the possibility that participants mentally label presented items 
cannot be dismissed. However, it should be possible to bias participants’ 
responses, to induce more automatic, rather than strategically controlled 
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processing (Sachs et al., 2008) As combinatorial effects have been observed even 
when the stimulus exposure duration is as short as 250 ms, this is a potential way 
to ‘tighten’ the conditions under which these effects are borne out. 
 
Experiment 5 
 
Short SOAs (stimulus onset asynchrony) in priming paradigms (e.g. 100-250 ms) 
are thought to elicit fast, more implicit processing of the stimuli, while longer 
SOAs (e.g. 600-1000 ms) encourage more controlled, strategic processing (see 
Sachs et al., 2008; Neely, 1991). Sachs et al. (2008) suggest that although more 
strategic processing may reflect the organisational structure of the items being 
processed, less conscious processing may reflect the operation of automatic 
processes operating earlier on, before the items have been categorised or 
arranged thematically.  
 In fact Rossi et al. (2001), using related and unrelated primes, have 
demonstrated activation of different regions of anterior cingulate cortex, 
depending on the type of SOA used (either short, at 200 ms, or longer, at 1000 
ms). This suggests that strategic or automatic processes are controlled by 
different brain areas, and can be induced with different paradigmatic constraints. 
Although combinatorial effects have been demonstrated in the current 
experiments under conditions generally considered to induce controlled 
processing, it is useful to establish whether these effects can also be induced 
under conditions thought to tap automatic processing.  
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Method 
 
Participants.  40 University of York students participated in the experiment for 
half-an-hour’s course credit or £2. All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. 
 
Materials.  The same items and materials from experiment 4 were used in 
experiment 5. 
 
Procedure.  The procedure for this experiment was identical to that of 
experiments 3 and 4, except for different exposure durations of the first presented 
pictures. First pictures in this experiment were presented for 250 ms, instead of 
2000 ms, and the duration of the second fixation cross was shortened to 100 ms. 
 
Results 
 
The slight difference between conditions (see figure 3.7) was only significant by-
items (prime: M = 835, SD = 456, control: M = 882, SD = 456; F1(39) = -1.425, 
p = .162; F2(19) = 2.115, p = .048). The same trimming of response times to 
three standard deviations above or below the mean was used for this experiment. 
Again, participants’ responses were very accurate (M = 96%, SD = 6%). There 
was no difference in accuracy from the first to the second half of the experiment 
(p > .05), and there was no difference in accuracy between conditions (p > .05). 
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Fig. 3.7. Mean participant response times for both conditions with first picture 
exposure durations of 250 ms, with standard error bars. 
 
Discussion 
 
Across stimulus items, responses were significantly faster to the prime, 
compared to the control condition. Across participants, however, this difference 
was not consistent. The fact that the difference in average participant response 
times was not significant may be due to individual differences among 
participants (such as differing processing speeds). Alternatively, a larger variance 
in participant responses times may be due to experiential differences, given that 
affordances are derived on an experiential basis. In addition, participants’ 
average response times in this experiment were significantly quicker compared 
to participant response times in the original ‘knife and tyre’ experiment 
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(experiment 3)4. This suggests that the shorter stimulus presentation times in this 
experiment were inducing participants to make their responses faster also.  
 Consonant with data from experiment 2 (lexical decision priming 
paradigm with 100 ms stimulus exposure durations), the combinatorial effects 
are considerably weaker when participants are not viewing the stimuli for as long 
as is necessary to construct event representations from item affordances.  
 
General discussion 
 
To summarise the results of experiment 3, for the bird-puddle items, although 
participants were significantly faster to respond in the control condition 
compared to the priming condition, the removal of outliers demonstrated that this 
effect was statistically fragile. For the knife-tyre items, participants were 
significantly faster to respond in the prime condition compared to the control 
condition.  
 This combinatorial effect observed for the knife-tyre items in experiment 
3 was replicated in experiment 4, where participants continued to respond faster 
to primes compared to controls. In this experiment, stimuli were controlled for 
associations between instruments and targets, and the stimulus set was also 
slightly larger. This replication of the original effect emphasises the robust nature 
of the current paradigm and provides a rationale for its continued use.  
 Experiment 5 used essentially the same paradigm, but with shorter 
exposure durations (250 ms) of the first picture in each trial. Objects were 
                                                 
4 Prime conditions: p = .02; control conditions: p = .01. 
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responded to faster in the prime condition than in the control condition, and 
although this was consistent across items, the by-participant analyses showed 
that participants were not consistently responding faster in the prime conditions 
than in the control conditions. This may have been due to individual differences 
among participants involving different processing speeds or respective 
experience with stimulus items. Participants in this experiment were also, on 
average, making faster responses than in the original ‘knife and tyre’ experiment, 
which may have diluted some of the differences between response times between 
the conditions. 
 
Bird-puddle items  
 
For these experiment 3 items, it was assumed that increased priming to a glass 
when participants were shown a bird and a puddle (compared to a boy and a 
puddle) would reflect participants’ recruitment of abstract representations, while 
the opposite would reflect the use of more concrete representations. 
The fact that participants responded faster to the bird-puddle items in the 
control condition, although puzzling, suggests that participants are not recruiting 
abstract representations of events to aid object recognition. These data did not 
appear to be statistically reliable, however, given their sensitivity to the precise 
trimming criterion used. But still, if one is to assume that when participants see a 
bird and a puddle, a representation of the bird drinking is activated, the delay in 
reaction times may be due to a mismatch between this representation and the 
representation activated by the glass. Instead of complementing each other, 
however, these representations may compete, leading to longer response times. 
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With respect to when participants see a boy and a puddle, if one assumes that a 
representation is activated only with an appropriate combination of items, there 
should be no pre-activated representation of drinking from the puddle when it is 
paired with the boy. So, recognition of the glass in this case is free from any 
influence of event representations and so reaction times are faster on these trials, 
compared to trials where event representations (birds drinking from puddles) are 
activated.  
 Notwithstanding the difficulties inherent in interpreting a null result (or a 
result in a direction opposite to that which was predicted), the results from these 
items suggest that the activated representations are unlikely to contain general, 
abstract information pertaining loosely to the initial objects presented to the 
participants. If they did, we would have expected to see a reliable priming effect, 
with responses in the prime conditions faster than the control conditions. What is 
more likely is that the representations code the concrete interactions between the 
agent and the theme, and it is this information that is used to aid comprehension 
of the visual event. Participants viewing events depicted by the combination of 
bird-puddle items are unlikely to have extensive experiential knowledge of them 
and within the context of Colcombe and Wyer’s (2002) account of event 
comprehension, participants are unlikely to draw upon abstract ‘scripts’ of events 
with which, although they have been observed before, the observer has not had 
direct experiential contact (such as a cow chewing grass).  
A potential criticism of the bird-puddle half of experiment 3 is that a 
more effective paradigm might be to compare ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ 
conditions in a similar experimental design. The targets in the ‘abstract’ case 
would consist of objects that afford the event but are not associated with any 
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interaction between agents and themes (e.g. a bird and puddle for the first 
picture, and a glass for the second), and targets in the ‘concrete’ case would 
consist of objects that appear as a result of some kind of interaction between the 
agent and theme (e.g. a bird and puddle for the first picture, and a smaller puddle 
for the second). Experiment 9 (chapter 6) utilises such items and expands this 
notion of concrete versus abstract representations.  
 
Knife-tyre items  
 
For the knife-tyre items in experiment 3, participants were significantly faster to 
respond in artifact judgements to targets in altered states when they were 
preceded by a combination of objects that afforded the state change, compared to 
when presented with control items that did not afford this alteration of the target. 
This effect was replicated in experiment 4.  
Priming to target objects is assumed to arise from the combined 
affordances of the instruments and targets in the first presented pictures. Not only 
is the event itself primed, but the likely end-state of the object in the first picture 
is primed also. Priming is not directly attributed to affordance information, 
however, but from a generated event representation corresponding to the types of 
interaction that could occur between the instrument and object in the first picture. 
The causal state of the target object (e.g. a burst tyre) is coded within the 
representation that is constructed prior to any processing of the target object 
occurs.  
Causal information is important for our perception of the external world 
and in part drives the formation of representations of events around us (White, 
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2006). Inferring causality from visual displays has been demonstrated 
extensively with the use of moving 2D displays. Michotte’s (1963) seminal work 
on causality and perception for example, suggested that a fast, stimulus-driven, 
automatic process operating on participants’ perception of moving blocks 
allowed them to infer a causal relationship between the two objects. Scholl and 
Tremoulet (2000) attribute this inference to the high-level perception of causality 
and animacy ‘making contact’ with lower-level processing of simple geometric 
shapes, devoid of any semantically relevant information.  
Of course, the stimuli used in the current experiment do not provide such 
a visually impoverished signal, but are, in addition to causal information, 
bestowed with rich semantics. The causality implied by these current stimuli do 
not come from motion as in the Michotte studies, but arise instead from the 
combined affordances of the objects in the first presented picture. Crucially, 
however, in the current paradigm the affordances from items can only be 
combined with respect to the event they both afford. The representation is 
essentially of an event that entails something being altered or changed in some 
way by the object that is beside it in the scene. It is this in this way that causality 
is represented in the current stimulus presentations.  
The findings from the knife-tyre items also hold implications for the 
study of object recognition. Participants in experiment 3 and 4 were constructing 
event representations on the basis of the knife and tyre (which together reflect the 
likelihood of an interaction between the two). Such an interaction most plausibly 
results in the tyre being burst, and this representation, constructed in response to 
the prime therefore facilitates recognition of the target. 
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This account of the data is based on the assumption that event 
representations are generated from combined affordances from the first picture. It 
is this representation that is then used to aid recognition of the target object: an 
object that represents the prior presented object in its end-state. However, there is 
another scenario which could be used to account for the knife-tyre data presented 
in the current chapter. This account presumes that the affordances of the 
instrument and object in the first picture are only integrated into an event 
representation upon seeing the target object in its end-state. This account 
assumes that no combining of affordances occurs upon seeing the first picture, 
but instead, that the target’s end state is ‘ratified’ by the prior presentation of 
relevant objects, and it is this which induces facilitation of responses to the 
target. This notion of integration of information at the second picture is to be 
investigated in an experiment presented in the next chapter.  
For now, however, the fact that combining objects to form an event 
representation impacts object recognition is perhaps not surprising. Zacks & 
Tversky (2001) make an interesting observation concerning object recognition in 
real-world circumstances. Usually, observers experience an exact event, 
happening at a specific time, only once, while experience with objects allows 
repeated viewings, re-examinations and a wide range of other experiential 
contact. These authors argue that our perceptions of events are driven by 
conceptual expectations and prior knowledge of what that particular event might 
entail. It seems beneficial, therefore, to make use of causal structure information 
in comprehending an event as we may not be able to exploit repeated, 
concentrated visual examinations of it to facilitate visual processing. 
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Representations containing causal properties are thus recruited in order to 
compensate for the likely temporally transient nature of the unfolding event.  
 
Shortened exposure durations  
 
In experiment 5, participants responded faster in the priming condition (e.g. a 
knife and tyre for the prime, and a burst tyre for the target), compared to the 
control condition (e.g. a knife and ruler for the control, and a burst tyre for the 
target). This difference was only significant in a by-items analysis (differences in 
response times averaged across items), however. A larger variance in 
participants’ response times across conditions seems to have induced a slightly 
weaker effect and may have been due to differences in participants’ respective 
experiential knowledge. Also, this more constrained paradigm has elicited faster 
responses in each condition compared to previous experiments, again a likely 
result of the reduced exposure duration of first pictures in each trial.  
 According to Neely (1991), stimuli presentations times of 250 ms or less 
is short enough to tap automatic processes, while longer durations (600-1000 ms) 
elicit strategic control over stimulus processing. These strategies include 
attempts to develop relations between every first and second picture (although 
relations can be established during prime trials, participants would not expect 
these relations on every trial because of the inclusion of control trials and a large 
number of fillers). Strategic methods of completing the task such as rule 
development were kept to a minimum in the current experiments due of the large 
number of filler items – a small number of primes compared to filler items is 
assumed to reduce demand characteristics (Brown & Besner, 2002; Neely, 
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Keefe, & Ross, 1989). Also, it would be unlikely for strategic control to account 
solely for the results in experiment 5 as the combining of affordances still seem 
to be borne out in a more constrained paradigm, albeit with slightly weaker 
effects.  
 
The experiments described in this chapter serve to expand upon the original 
findings concerning the combining of semantic information from two objects and 
its subsequent facilitation of object recognition. In addition, these experiments 
demonstrate the construction of representations containing event and causality-
based information. These effects are also elicited with the use of modified time 
parameters, although to a lesser extent, betraying perhaps a more stressed object 
recognition process.  
There are, however, two assumptions of these data that provide the basis 
for experiments to be described in the next chapter. Firstly, if priming is driven 
by the combining of affordances from both items in the first picture, then no 
priming should arise in cases where an instrument is shown on its own, and any 
facilitation must occur from the integration of affordances with the target after 
the target has been viewed. Secondly, if priming is driven by a ‘bursting tyre’ 
event, then no priming should arise in cases where the target is shown as 
unchanged (e.g. an intact tyre).  
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Chapter 4 
 
In the previous chapter, three experiments were presented, using a novel 
paradigm which sought to constrain the conditions under which combinatorial 
effects could be elicited. For the first two experiments, participants were 
significantly faster to respond in an artifact judgment task to a target object in a 
changed state (e.g. a burst tyre) when they were presented with preceding objects 
whose combined affordances suggested a particular event (e.g. a knife and tyre 
suggesting bursting). The stimuli in these studies comprised visual depictions of 
physical objects which, coupled with the artifact judgment task, eradicated the 
possible influence of linguistic information. The previous paradigm was also 
modified to ensure no associations could be made between targets and prior 
presented objects (regardless of the instrument it was paired with), and in an 
attempt to distinguish between automatic and strategic processes, first picture 
presentation times in the third experiment were shortened from 2000, to 250 ms. 
However, in this last experiment, a difference between prime and control 
conditions was only observed in a by-items analysis. 
 Thus far, these results have been interpreted in terms of the construction 
of event representations from the combined affordances of the objects presented 
in the first display. These representations aid recognition of the target object in 
the second display, resulting in a facilitation of response times to the target. 
Discussion of previous experiments has also focused on the notion that it was not 
one sole item from the first display driving the priming we saw in these cases, 
but both items in that display together. However, an alternative account 
introduced in the previous chapter is that recognition of the target is not driven 
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by combinatorial processes at the first picture, but is instead driven by integrative 
processes at the target.  
 Using the trial items for the concept ‘burst’ as an example, the integrative 
account would run as follows: The object and instrument in the first picture (i.e. 
the knife and the intact tyre) are processed and the affordances of these items 
stored in short-term memory. Crucially, however, these affordances are not 
combined to form a representation of the event that these items afford. Instead, 
upon viewing the burst tyre target, the representation of that target includes the 
fact that it is burst and that something must have caused it to be in this state (cf. 
the causality implicit in linguistic expressions such as “the boat sank” which 
naturally continue “…an iceberg ruptured its hull” or “it had been torpedoed” – 
in effect, the verb “sank” begs the question “why?”). The availability in memory 
of a potential instrument that caused the bursting affords the integration of the 
knife and the intact tyre (reflecting the initial state of the tyre) with the burst tyre 
(reflecting its final state). Thus, it is not so much that the burst tyre is recognised 
faster, but rather the fact of it being burst is understood faster. 
Hence, according to this account, the representations of the original knife and 
tyre in the first display need not be combined into an event representation 
encoding the prior and successive state of the tyre – rather, the two objects are 
integrated through subsequently seeing the burst tyre, which affords their 
integration. 
This account will be tested in the following experiment by presenting 
participants with some trials in which first pictures depict just a single object – 
corresponding to the instrument (knife) in the preceding studies, with no other 
object (e.g. the tyre) accompanying it. These conditions are to be contrasted with 
 92
others in which first pictures contain instruments paired with alterable objects 
(i.e. as in the original studies; a knife paired with a tyre). If priming effects 
obtain in cases where first pictures contain a knife and a tyre, rather than a knife 
alone, the integration account would be considered untenable. Past results would, 
in this case be attributed to the combining of affordances to create an event 
representation that, in effect, anticipates the subsequent target object.  
 Targets are also to be manipulated in the following experiment. 
Continuing with the same example, if the knife and the tyre are activating a 
representation of a burst tyre based on their combined affordances, a facilitation 
of response times should not be observed for cases where the target is left in its 
intact state – unchanged by the instrument in the first picture. Thus, experimental 
targets in the following experiments are to be either in their end-state (as if 
altered by preceding instruments), or left unchanged in their intact state.  
 
Experiment 6 
 
Figure 4.1 shows an example of the items used in the current experiment. The 
first condition contains the familiar priming condition used in previous 
experiments. In this condition, the knife, as before, is presented with the intact 
tyre, and the target is a depiction of this same object in its altered state. In the 
current experiment, any facilitation in this condition could be compared to a 
second condition in which the tyre is left unaltered by the instrument presented in 
the first picture. In this case, the event appears not to have occurred and so any 
event representation activated upon seeing the first picture cannot be exploited 
for the purposes of driving facilitation of response times to the target.  
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The third condition consists of, for the first picture, an instrument (the 
knife) divorced from its corresponding object (the tyre), with the ‘missing’ object 
in its altered state for the target. In the event presented for this condition, the 
instrument could only be interpreted as changing the target after the target itself 
has been viewed. According to Zacks and Tversky (2001), objects in semantic 
priming paradigms can be viewed by the observer either taxonomically or 
partonomically. The organisation of taxonomic information allows for reasoning 
concerning the properties of a particular object. For example, ‘Ford’ is a member 
of the category ‘car’ and we can infer that if a Ford is a car then it will contain 
wheels. Partonomic organisation is hierarchical, in that objects can be arranged 
by relations or parts and subparts. For example, observing legs enables one to 
infer standing (whether this be human legs or table legs).  
In the current experiment, a knife can be viewed taxonomically as a tool, 
and we can infer at the partonomic level that the presence of a sharp blade allows 
for a number of different interactions with it, including slashing, stabbing, 
cutting and so on. So, at stimulus exposure durations used in the current 
experiment, participants are able to glean a considerable amount of information 
from these instruments (whether they are presented on their own or not) upon 
their being presented.  
In the last condition, the first picture depicts a knife without the 
corresponding object from the other conditions (e.g. the intact tyre), and the 
second picture depicts this object in its unaltered state. This condition essentially 
contains two constraints in that the instrument is not paired with its 
corresponding object, and the target is left unaltered. This condition can therefore 
be considered a baseline for the other conditions. 
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Fig. 4.1. An example of stimuli used in each condition for the concept ‘burst’. 
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Method 
 
Participants. 60 University of York students participated in the experiment for 
half-an-hour’s course credit or £2. All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. 
 
Materials. This experiment used the same 20 experimental items as experiments 
4 and 5 (see appendix 5), and the fillers were altered slightly to take account of 
the fact that, for the first presented pictures, some of the experimental trials had 
an object and an instrument for the first picture (prime-change and prime-intact 
conditions), and others had just an instrument (instrument-change and 
instrument-intact conditions). As before, half of the trials required a ‘manmade’ 
response and half required a ‘not manmade’ response. There were four 
conditions, and each participant was presented with all 20 experimental items, 
five from each condition. 
 Each participant was assigned to one of four groups. Participants in each 
group would be presented with five experimental items from each condition, and 
these items were rotated across groups. For example, participants assigned to 
group one would be presented with the ‘prime-change’ stimuli for the concept 
‘burst’, while participants assigned to group 2 might see the ‘prime-intact’ 
stimuli for this same concept.  
 
Procedure. The procedure for this experiment was identical to that of 
experiments 3 and 4.  
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Results 
 
Table 4.1 shows the means and standard deviations for each of the four 
conditions, and figure 4.2 shows that, on average, participants did not respond 
any faster as a function of the type of picture presented.  
 
 
Prime-
change 
Prime-
intact 
Instrument-
change 
Instrument-
intact 
M 998 938 971 981 
SD 520 420 347 445 
 
Table 4.1. Means and standard deviations for each condition. 
 
A two-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted, with one factor of 
picture 1 tyre (either: prime with knife and tyre, or knife alone) and a second 
factor of picture 2 type (either: altered targets such as a burst tyre, or unaltered 
targets such as an intact tyre). There were no significant main effects of picture 1 
type (F1(1, 59) = .080, p = .778; F2(1, 19) < .001, p = .997), or picture 2 type 
(F1(1, 59) = .913, p = .343; F2(1, 19) = .463, p = .504). There was no interaction 
between picture 1 and picture 2 type (F1(1, 59) = 1.459, p = .232; F2(1, 19) = 
4.303, p = .052) and none of the differences between conditions were significant 
(all p > .05). Average accuracy rates for participants were recorded (M = 90%, 
SD = 5%) and there was no difference between the first and second halves of the 
experiment with respect to the number of correct responses made (p > .05). There 
were no main effects of picture 1 or picture with respect to participants’ accuracy 
rates, and no differences between conditions, with accuracy as the dependent 
variable (all p > .05).  
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Fig. 4.2. Average participant response times in each condition. Error bars 
represent standard error. 
 
Discussion 
 
There were no significant differences between any of the conditions in 
experiment 6. Conditions in experiment 6 in which instruments were presented 
with no corresponding alterable object were predicated on their being able to test 
an alternative to the combinatorial account previously reported data. According 
to an integrative account of the data, priming effects from previous experiments 
are not attributed to the development of event representations from the combined 
affordances of two stimulus items. Rather, priming arises from an integration of 
relevant information after the target has been viewed. 
 Unfortunately, no conclusions can be drawn from the null results of the 
current experiment, with regard to this alternative integration account. The next 
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experiment, however, will attempt to test this account again, with a simpler 
design, and with less of the design problems that are to be discussed below. 
Firstly, this lack of priming observed in the current experiment may have 
been due to some general design problems which are to be discussed below. 
However, there is another perhaps more plausible explanation, and that is the 
differences between the numbers of items included in pictures between trials. For 
example, the prime-change and prime-intact conditions each had two items in the 
first pictures, while the instrument-change and instrument-intact conditions both 
had just one.  
In cases where two items in one picture are presented to participants, it 
may simply be more demanding for the visual system to process two as opposed 
to one stimulus item. Studies of scene gist, for example, provide compelling 
evidence that scenes consisting of a large number items are more costly (in terms 
of the time-course of scene recognition) to process than a scene comprising just 
few items (Oliva, 2005). Object search paradigms have been shown to be 
sensitive to the amount of visual information contained within each stimulus 
presentation (Biederman et al., 1988), and differences in memory load due to the 
number of presented stimuli affects processing of the target (Sabb et al., 2007; 
Lavie et al., 2009).  
Lastly, a design problem with the current experiment may also have 
contributed to the observed null results. As there were four conditions in the 
current experiment, but only 20 items, there may not have been enough power in 
the experimental design to reveal the combinatorial effects described so far. This 
issue is to be examined in the general discussion section of this chapter, but for 
now, the following experiment is to consist of two conditions, with the same 20 
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experimental items. This design has participants observing 10 experimental items 
and 10 control items in each experimental setting.  
 
Experiment 7 
 
Experiment 7 essentially splits up the preceding experiment into its ‘prime-
change’ and ‘instrument-change’ conditions (see figure 4.1), and focuses on the 
notion of integrative processes at the target accounting for differences in 
response times, rather than combinatorial processes at the first picture. Figure 4.3 
shows an example of the trial procedure for the concept burst, for both 
conditions. The experimental design of the current experiment is such that more 
power is available to reveal any effects. So, with just two conditions in this 
experiment, the changed instrument/intact instrument manipulation (‘prime-
intact’ and instrument-intact’ conditions in the previous experiment) has been 
removed in favour of a more simplified design. However, it is important to 
mention that because experiment 7 effectively reuses two of the experiment 6 
conditions in a simpler paradigm, it is still subject to the potential confound of 
unequal stimulus items across conditions.  
As discussed previously, the processing demands may be much higher for 
trials in which two items are presented in the first picture instead of one. For 
example, regardless of whether significant effects reported previously were due 
to integrative processes upon seeing the target (as apposed to combinatorial 
process at the first picture), an imbalance between the numbers of stimulus items 
in first pictures may be contributing to processing speeds of the target. If we 
assume that information from the first picture in each trial is retained in short-
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term memory, then the memory load for one item in a scene should be much less 
than for two, and so the processing of the target may be more costly in the 
second, two item case, because more information is held in short term memory 
during the processing of target.  
 
 
 
Fig. 4.3. An example of the trial procedure in each condition for the concept 
‘burst’. 
 
Method 
 
Participants. 30 University of York students participated in the experiment for 
half-an-hour’s course credit or £2. All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. 
 
Materials. This experiment used the same 20 experimental items as experiments 
4, 5 and 6 (see appendix 5). The fillers for this experiment were altered slightly 
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so as to correspond to the experimental items. For example, some of the first 
picture filler items had only one item in the ‘scene’ to reflect the experimental 
cases where instruments were presented without a corresponding alterable object. 
There were 2 conditions, and each participant was presented with all 20 
experimental items, 10 from each condition.  
Participants were assigned either to group one or group two, and 
experimental items were rotated across groups. For example, a participant 
responding in group one might receive the ‘prime’ items for the concept ‘burst’ 
while group two participants might receive ‘control’ items for this concept. 
 
Procedure. The procedure for this experiment was identical to that of the 
previous experiment.  
 
Results 
 
Figure 4.4 shows the average response times to targets for each condition. There 
was no difference between the two conditions (prime: M = 931, SD = 279; 
control: M = 933, SD = 299; F1(39)<1; F2(19)<1). Accuracy rates across 
participants were high (M = 96%, SD = 4%), and no improvement effects were 
observed from the first to the second half of the experiment (p > .05). In addition, 
there was no influence of condition on participants’ accuracy, with no difference 
between conditions with a dependent variable of accuracy (p > .05).  
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Fig. 4.4. Average response times for both conditions. 
 
Discussion 
 
Participants on average responded only slightly faster in the prime compared to 
the control condition, and this difference was not significant. If priming in 
previous experiments is being driven principally by the event representation 
constructed upon combining the affordances of previously seen items, it appears 
problematic that there is no apparent facilitation over a condition where such 
representations cannot be recruited.  
 The conditions in experiment 7 were used to test the assumption that 
priming in previous experiments was due, not to combinatorial processes at the 
first picture, but integrative processes at the target. We know that priming effects 
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have been achieved using primes with an instrument and object which are 
conducive to a particular event (albeit with different controls to those used in the 
current experiment). So for the second condition in experiment 7 to elicit similar 
average response times is certainly not inconsistent with an integration account if 
one assumes that priming obtains in both conditions. However, as these data are 
null, this experiment is still inconclusive.  
 The next experiment aims to, again, establish how these priming effects 
are borne out, and also to address an issue concerning the lack of an adequate 
control condition, which is discussed below. Experiment 8 will consist of two 
conditions – a prime in which (for the concept ‘burst’) a sole knife would be 
presented, with a burst tyre for the target. And a control in which a sole ruler 
would be presented, with, again, a burst tyre for the target.  
 If, in the current experiment, priming effects were elicited form the sole 
knife condition, then average response times to these items would be expected to 
be faster than a control with a sole knife for the prime. With respect to the 
integration account, a burst tyre can be integrated with a knife (the knife provides 
a causal explanation for the state of the burst tyre), but a ruler cannot. 
Another issue that is to be addressed in the next experiment is that the 
previously reported priming effects may have arisen in part from the control 
items. This is based on the assumption that facilitation of response times is not 
driven solely by priming from experimental items, but is also driven by 
inhibition from the controls. For instance, if participants are presented with a 
ruler and an intact tyre for the first picture, it is unlikely that any event 
representation could be generated from the combination of these items’ 
respective affordances, including that of a bursting event. However, upon seeing 
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the burst tyre, participants’ response times may be inhibited by a ‘checking’ of 
the target against information concerning the preceding picture held in short-term 
memory. The slower response times in this case arise from the additional time 
taken to match the target to the prior presented scene. Any such matching 
process can be thought of as mentally revisiting the previously seen items to 
ensure no event could have been possible, given their pairing.  
Support for this explanation is based on the fact that both facilitation and 
inhibition are commonly implicated in semantic priming paradigms (Neely, 
1991). As McNamara (2005) notes, facilitation and inhibition operating in 
semantic priming paradigms are typically inextricably linked and as yet, no 
paradigm has successfully teased the two apart.     
Every condition used in experiments 6 and 7 contain first picture items 
which are able to interact with the target in some way. If we are to assume that 
average response times to the target are facilitated in each of the conditions in 
experiment 6 and experiment 7, a control condition containing an instrument 
which is unable to alter the target (and thus inhibit response times to the target) 
may be an imperative inclusion in subsequent paradigms for eliciting such effects 
as reported thus far.  
As mentioned previously, the conditions used in experiment 7 contained 
an unequal number of items across conditions. In order to eliminate any potential 
confound of differing constraints on visual processing, the subsequent 
experiments shall ensure the amount of visual information remains constant 
between conditions.  
 
 105
Experiment 8 
 
Experiment 8 reintroduces a control condition consisting of an object and an 
instrument which is unable to instigate a change in the target. Figure 4.5 shows 
an example of the trial procedure for the concept ‘burst’. First pictures for the 
prime condition in this case consist of an instrument without its corresponding 
object, and for the control condition, an instrument (also with no corresponding 
object) that is infelicitous to a given event.  
 As this experiment has the same number of items in first pictures across 
conditions, and only two conditions, it does not suffer from a lack of 
experimental power (from the ratio of conditions to items) or the previously 
discussed confound concerning differing amounts of visual information across 
conditions. If priming from instruments alone is occurring in previous 
experiments, we would expect facilitation here to be evident in the prime 
condition, resulting in significantly faster response times to the target. 
 
Method 
 
Participants. 30 University of York students participated in the experiment for 
half-an-hour’s course credit or £2. All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. 
 
Materials. Again, the same 20 experimental items as the previous four 
experiments were used, and the fillers were constructed so as to reflect these 
items. None of the filler trials contained two items in the first picture as none of 
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the experimental items did either. Just as in previous experiments, participants 
were assigned to one of two groups and the prime or control trials were rotated 
between them. Again, participants responding in either condition received 10 
prime trials and 10 control trials. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.5. An example of trial procedure for the concept ‘burst’, for both 
conditions. 
 
Procedure. The procedure for this experiment was identical to that of the 
previous experiment. 
 
Results 
 
Figure 4.6 shows the average response times to targets for both conditions. There 
was no difference between prime and control conditions (prime: M = 1020, SD = 
462; control: M = 1023, SD = 393; F1(29)<1; F2(19)<1). Participants responses 
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were, on average, very accurate (M = 94%, SD = 5%) and no improvement 
effects, or a difference between conditions with respect to accuracy, were 
observed (all p > .05).  
 
800
850
900
950
1000
1050
1100
1150
1200
Prime Control
Pic type
RT
 
Fig. 4.6. Average response times for both conditions. 
 
General discussion 
 
The current chapter has presented three experiments, none of which have 
provided any statistically favourable results (at least in terms of the predicted 
outcomes). Each of these experiments will be discussed in this section in turn, 
with a summary of results for each, and a discussion of the data with reference to 
relevant literature.  
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Integration processes at the target?   
 
In experiment 6, four conditions were presented to participants (see figure 4.1). 
First pictures in these conditions consisted either of objects and an instrument 
that could change that object in some way, or instruments with no corresponding 
object. Conditions where instruments were presented on their own were used to 
test an alternative to the combinatorial based account of previous data: That 
facilitation of response times is due to an integration of information both from 
the target and the preceding picture, but only after the target has been viewed. 
The targets for these conditions consisted of objects either in their end-states or 
still in their intact states. If causal properties were coded within event 
representations, priming should have only been observed in cases where targets 
were presented in their end-states. 
 The null results form experiment 6 make it difficult to draw any 
conclusions concerning the integration account, and it was unclear in this 
experiment whether there was enough power in the design to elicit the desired 
effects. As there were four conditions in the experiment, but only 20 items, this 
resulted in participants seeing only five experimental items from each condition. 
The small number of items relative to conditions is more likely to elicit Type II 
errors (Doan, 2005) and it is imperative this confound is avoided in the 
experiments that follow. For subsequent experiments, a two-condition design 
evades this problem, or if more conditions are necessary, additional stimulus 
items need to be constructed.  
 Another issue with experiment 6, which is also apparent in experiment 7, 
is that there was no appropriate baseline to which the other conditions could be 
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compared. Semantic priming is a relative measure and so any facilitation is only 
apparent when compared to a neutral baseline. The ‘baseline’ conditions in 
experiments 6 and 7, however, were not neutral as two objects were presented to 
participants which could still plausibly interact with one another (e.g. a knife and 
an intact tyre). A more appropriate baseline would consist of entirely unrelated 
objects. In fact, several researchers have favoured the use of a simple array of x’s 
and other symbols in a word-based semantic priming paradigm for their baseline 
conditions (e.g. Neely, 1976; Posner & Snyder, 1975b).  
 
Inhibition from controls?  
 
In experiment 7, two conditions were presented to participants (see figure 4.3) in 
a simplified paradigm that aimed to test the integration account discussed 
previously. In the first condition, participants were first presented with an intact 
object and an instrument that is capable of altering that object in some way (e.g. 
a knife and an unburst tyre), and for targets, they were presented with objects in 
their altered state (e.g. a burst tyre). In the second condition, the same targets 
were shown to participants, but these were preceded by instruments on their own 
(such as a knife). If the facilitation of response times reported for previous 
experiments was due to combinatorial effects occurring at the first picture, rather 
than integrative processes occurring at the target, then participants should have 
responded significantly faster in cases where instruments were presented with 
objects in the first picture. This difference was expected because, according to 
the combinatorial account, participants are able to construct event representations 
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to aid recognition of the target, based on the combined affordances of the 
instrument and object in the first picture.   
 There was, however, no significant difference between prime and control 
conditions in experiment 7. Assuming that priming obtained in both conditions 
(and hence no significant difference between them), the data for experiment 7 are 
consistent with an integration account of previously reported effects. If this 
account follows, the knife is just as effective as the knife and the tyre at 
facilitating recognition of the burst tyre. However, as these results were null and 
there may not have been enough items in these experiments to elicit the desired 
effects, these results are still inconclusive. While experiment7 sought to establish 
which account better explains the reported priming effects with a simplified 
paradigm, the difference between conditions in this experiment was also not 
significant.  
A common feature of experiments 6 and 7 is that every condition 
contains an instrument which could plausibly interact with the target in some 
way. Perhaps previously reported effects were due, not solely to facilitation in 
the prime condition, but either to inhibition from the control, or both facilitation 
from the prime and inhibition from the control operating in parallel (Posner & 
Snyder, 1975b).  
So, in experiment 7, it was unclear whether there was facilitation in either 
condition, or a lack of inhibition in the control condition. Neely (1976) suggests 
that a key factor in determining the respective contributions of facilitation and 
inhibition in semantic priming paradigms is the neutrality of the baseline and, as 
mentioned previously, the first pictures used for the control condition in 
experiment 7 were certainly not unrelated to the target. In fact, for a baseline to 
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be considered purely neutral, it must be neither related nor unrelated to the target 
(Posner & Snyder, 1975b). Unfortunately, the use of such stimuli is untenable in 
the current paradigm, due to the nature of the inherent causal structure of the 
presented event. Also, a typical problem with purely neutral baselines is that they 
are not considered to have the same ‘alerting’ properties as other stimuli 
(McNamara, 2005), and so do not stimulate the visual system in the same way 
that a more relevant stimulus would.  
 Inhibition and facilitation are typically difficult to tease apart in semantic 
priming paradigms (McNamara, 2005; Neely, 1976), but facilitation is more 
likely to operate on response times at shorter SOAs. As the SOAs used in the 
experiments that contain more suitable controls (instruments which are unable to 
affect change in the target) are fairly long (3000 ms), it is likely that a degree of 
inhibition is operating on participants’ responses in these cases. However, 
although weaker, a by-items difference in experiment 5 (first picture presentation 
times of 250 ms, a total SOA of 350 ms with the 100 ms fixation cross) was 
revealed at a shorter SOA. So it is still unclear as to whether inhibition is a sole 
contributing factor to the significant differences reported in previous chapters. 
What is most likely is that, consonant with Neely’s (1976) findings, there is a 
degree of facilitation from the prime (that increases with shorter SOAs) and a 
degree of inhibition from the controls (that decreases at shorter SOAs).   
 
Memory load?  
 
Experiment 8 had participants responding to a prime condition in which the 
instrument that affords altering the target was shown on its own, with a target in 
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its end-state, and a control condition in which an instrument which is unable to 
affect change in the target is shown, with an altered object for the target. For 
example, on a priming trial, participants may have been presented with a knife 
for the first picture, and a burst tyre for the target. And for the control condition, 
the first picture may have been a ruler, with a burst tyre presented for the target 
(see figure 4.5 for a schematic example of the trial procedure).  
In experiment 8, visual information was controlled across conditions, an 
adequate control was used, and none of the items were repeated within trials. If 
inhibition from controls is a contributory factor in the facilitation of response 
times in this paradigm, then significantly faster response times should have been 
observed for the control condition in this case. However, there was no significant 
difference between the two conditions.  
An interesting implication of experiment 8 was that, with regard to the 
integration account discussed previously, these data are inconsistent with the data 
reported for experiment 7. If it is to be assumed that in experiment 7, integrative 
processes at the target are responsible for priming obtaining in both conditions, 
then in experiment 8 we would expect responses to a prime with a sole knife to 
be significantly aster than responses to a sole ruler. So, while experiment 7 is 
consistent with an integration account of the data (albeit with a null result), 
experiment 8 is inconsistent with the same account. 
An additional issue concerning the experiments presented in this chapter 
concerns the amount of visual information presented to participants across trials. 
As facilitation in the original ‘knife and tyre’ experiment has been replicated 
twice (albeit with weaker effects at shorter SOAs) it may be the case that other 
comparison conditions are simply given an unfair ‘advantage’. 
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In experiment 6 for example, of the conditions compared to the prime 
condition, two had less visual information for viewers to process, and one was 
subject to problems concerning the repeating of stimuli. Priming effects arising 
from presenting the same stimulus item to participants more than once, referred 
to as  ‘identity priming’ (see Bruce & Valentine, 1985; Zipse et al., 2006), is 
thought to elicit stronger priming effects than those obtained through 
associations or links between items. It is, unfortunately, unclear whether the 
results reported in this chapter were contaminated by identity priming, given that 
there were no reported significant differences between any conditions in any 
experiment. Nonetheless, the notion of identity priming is related to the data 
presented in the next chapter, and is to be discussed further, below. With respect 
to the amount of visual information presented to participants in experiment 7, the 
comparison condition for the prime contained only one item in the first picture, 
and so again contained less visual information for them to process. So, if we 
assume that a knife and intact tyre / burst tyre condition (the ‘original’ prime 
condition) facilitates participants’ responses, it may be that any perceived 
facilitation from instruments on their own is due to the amount of visual 
information held in short-term memory rather than the activation of any 
facilitatory event representations.  
The role of memory load in semantic priming paradigms is well 
established (Beer & Diehl, 2001; Belke, 2008; Sabb et al., 2007), and responses 
to targets are often facilitated in tasks requiring less visual information to be held 
in working memory, compared to tasks in which the processing demands 
increase load on working memory. Sabb et al. (2007), for example, contend that 
processes involved with semantic priming are constrained by a limited-capacity 
 114
system, and that an increase in working memory load (dictated by a larger 
number of stimulus items on ‘high load’ trials) decreases behavioural semantic 
priming. The assertion behind these authors’ work is that, due to the sharing of 
resources between working memory and semantic processing systems, this more 
efficient processing leads to faster behavioural responses if fewer stimulus items 
or features need to be processed.   
Differing amounts of memory load from differing numbers of items 
across conditions may also have ensured its influence in the current paradigm 
because of the nature of the instructions given to participants: They were asked 
to attend carefully to every picture presented to them as there would be a 
memory test once the first phase of the experiment was complete. Although this 
instruction was used to avoid participants simply ignoring the first presented 
pictures (their task was to make decisions only on second pictures, after all), it 
may have strengthened any influence of differing visual information and memory 
load in the current experiments.  
In experiment 8, visual information was controlled across conditions, but 
the condition with the knife presented on its own could not benefit from 
comparatively easier processing compared to the condition with the ruler. With 
regard to the experiments presented in the current chapter, faster responses in 
cases where an instrument is shown on its own may be due to a visual 
information confound, except for conditions which contain repeated items and so 
are subject to identity priming. According to this view, increased facilitation 
from identity priming is more beneficial to the processing of the target compared 
to any benefit gained from a reduction in visual information.  
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To summarise, no significant differences between any conditions were observed 
for experiments 6, 7 and 8. While certainly lending a degree of ambiguity to the 
results presented in previous chapters, there are a number of inherent problems 
unique to these current experiments which may help explain their findings. One 
of the properties which perhaps lends the largest amount of uncertainty to 
previously presented data is that of the relative contributions of inhibition and 
facilitation in semantic priming paradigms. However, these two factors seem to 
be modulated only by SOA, are difficult otherwise to separate, and still do not 
provide any edifying discernments concerning causality, affordances, and the 
mental representation of events.  
Some of the current experiments were also subject to problems arising 
from a small number of items relative to the number of conditions, and identity 
priming of the object in the first picture to the target. While experimental power 
can be guarded against by employing a more carefully controlled experimental 
design, the notion of identity priming provides an interesting implication: if 
identity priming occurs only when the repeated stimulus is exactly the same as 
the prime (Neely, 1976), this suggests that the representation constructed upon 
initial processing of this stimulus is specific to the item seen. The nature of event 
representations with respect to their degree of ‘concreteness’ was examined 
initially in experiment 3 (see Chapter 3). For this experiment, participants were 
required to make an artifact judgement for targets which suggest the event 
depicted in the first picture, but only in an abstract sense. For example, 
participants may have been presented with a bird and a puddle for the first 
picture (depicting the event ‘drink’) and were required to make their decisions on 
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a glass (for drinking, but not the type of drinking expected of the agent in the 
first picture).  
If identity priming is an impacting factor in the current experiments, it 
may be indicative of something central to the nature of the semantic priming 
elicited by these experiments. This notion is concurrent with the idea that the 
representation activated upon seeing, for example, a knife and a tyre, is a 
representation of bursting which is specific to these items. If this is indeed the 
case, then we should expect no priming in a similar paradigm which contains, for 
the target, a tyre as before, but one which is clearly different from the tyre 
presented in the first picture. The experiments in the next chapter seek to 
examine this idea, and further elucidate the nature of the event representations 
activated in the paradigms described thus far. 
The problems with the current set of experiments shall be avoided in 
subsequent paradigms by ensuring that, firstly, the number of stimuli presented 
to participants in each group for each condition is large enough to elicit the 
intended effects; that secondly, the number of stimuli is controlled between 
conditions; thirdly, that items are not repeated on given trials; and lastly, that 
control items are infelicitous to a given event (i.e. unable to affect change in the 
target).  
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Chapter 5 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter, a single experiment is presented which seeks to expand upon 
findings reported previously concerning causal structure in event sequences, the 
combining of affordances from objects in visual scenes, and the generation of 
event-based representations from these combined affordances. These previous 
findings suggest that observers of visual scenes are sensitive to the affordances 
of constituent objects, to the extent that a felicitous combination of affordances 
from an instrument and an object (e.g. a knife and a tyre) prime the likely change 
in state of the object (e.g. a burst tyre). An infelicitous combination of 
affordances from an instrument and object (e.g. a knife and a ruler), however, 
does not prime the same change in state (e.g. a burst tyre). The ruler in this 
infelicitous combination does not afford bursting the tyre and so that particular 
event is not primed. 
 It is assumed that this priming is due to the generation of event-based 
representations congruent with the types of affordance inherent in the presented 
stimuli. After their construction, these representations are recruited to aid 
recognition of the changed-state targets. For example, if the observer is presented 
with a wall and a sledge hammer, the affordances of the items (the wall affords 
having a hole knocked in it and the sledge hammer affords knocking holes in 
things) are combined to form an event representation of the hammer knocking a 
hole in the wall. With this representation still active upon processing of the 
target, the target’s recognition is then facilitated.  
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 In addition, these effects are unlikely to arise from integrative processes 
occurring when the target is viewed. This alternative account, discussed at length 
in the previous chapter, assumes that once a target such as a burst tyre has been 
recognised, the cause of its alteration is easier to ascertain if a prior presented 
context matches it (such as with a knife and an intact tyre), compared to when it 
does not (such as with a ruler and an intact tyre). This integration of information 
may be instigated by the fact that the target is in its non-canonical state, thus 
requiring a causal explanation. Although an instrument on its own, such as a 
knife, can be considered the most direct causal explanation for a burst tyre (as 
apposed to a knife with an intact tyre) there was no observed difference between 
a condition containing a sole instrument for the first picture, and a condition 
containing an instrument with an intact object.   
 In an attempt to expand the implications of the current results reported 
thus far, the experiment presented in this chapter aims to support the assumption 
that activated representations in the current paradigms are object-specific. In 
other words, the event representation activated for a pair of objects would 
contain information specific to the items seen, rather than information pertaining 
to the category of item, or a more abstract instantiation of a depicted event. 
 
Representational codes 
 
An obvious omission in the above combinatorial account of the data, and indeed, 
in much of the work focussing on representational accounts of behavioural 
findings (Block, 1983), is an indication of the way in which the representation is 
coded from the presented items. Are the affordances from instruments and 
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objects derived from concurrent items directly, or from those items’ respective 
categories? The category ‘knife’ might include such affordances as ‘affords 
gripping’, ‘affords bursting’, ‘affords throwing’, and so on. Similarly, the 
category ‘tyre’ might include affordances such as ‘affords rolling’ or ‘affords 
bursting’. However, there may be specific affordances associated with a 
particular example of an object, independent of its category. For example, the 
category ‘knife’ might prime ‘bursting’, but what happens when the particular 
example of a knife observed has a blunt blade? Thus, it is important to establish 
whether the representations activated from instruments and objects are specific to 
these items, independent of the category to which they belong.  
If we assume that targets in the current set of experiments are primed 
based on the combined affordances of the prior presented instrument and object, 
then object-specific representations would only manifest with ‘tokens’ of the 
same ‘type’ for the target, but not for different tokens of the same type. If we use 
the example of a knife and an intact tyre for the first presented picture, the intact 
tyre can be the same tyre as the target (albeit in its unaltered state). Or, it could 
be a different token of the same tyre – a tyre which, although still affords being 
burst by the knife, looks different from the intact tyre and is clearly not the same 
object.   
Figure 5.1 shows an example of the trial procedure for experiment 9. The 
first two conditions consist of a prime and a control, with ‘same-token’ targets 
(the targets in this example are the same tyres as the intact version presented with 
its instrument in the first picture). The last two conditions consist, again, of a 
prime and a control, but with ‘different-token’ targets (the targets for these 
conditions are slightly different to the object presented in the first picture).  
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 Prime (a) 
 +  + 
1000 ms 2000 ms 1000 ms Until press…. 
Control (a) 
 +  + 
1000 ms 2000 ms 1000 ms Until press…. 
Prime (b) 
 +  + 
1000 ms 2000 ms 1000 ms Until press…. 
Control (b) 
 +  + 
1000 ms 2000 ms 1000 ms Until press….  
 
Fig. 5.1. Example of the trial procedure for experiment 9. 
 
Maintaining the assumption that event representations activated in the current 
paradigms are object-specific, differences between prime and control conditions 
are expected, but only when same-token rather than different-token targets are 
presented. So, facilitation of response times to the target is only expected in the 
‘prime a’ condition, as this is the only case where the representation generated 
from the affordances of the instrument and object can be used to aid recognition 
of the target. In the ‘control a’ and ‘control b’ conditions, appropriate event 
representations cannot be constructed from first picture items, and in the ‘prime 
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b’ condition, recognition of different-token targets cannot be aided by 
representations consisting of different objects in intact states.  
 
Perceptual grouping and the graspability of objects 
 
An indication as to whether event representations contain low-level object-
specific information independent of their high-level ‘global’ properties can be 
attained from studies of the functional grouping and ‘graspability’ of objects, and 
their influence on visual processing. Green and Hummel (2006) found that 
objects arranged so as to interact with one another were grouped perceptually, 
based on their mutually supportive function. Participants were required to make a 
decision as quickly and accurately as they could, as to whether the second picture 
in a two-picture sequence (e.g. a glass) matched a label given at the start of each 
trial. However, on some trials the first picture (e.g. a jug) was arranged so as to 
interact with the glass (e.g. arranged to afford pouring) and on others, it was 
arranged so as to not afford the event (e.g. positioned with the spout in the 
opposite direction to the rim of the glass). These authors found that participants 
were significantly faster to make their decisions on trials where the objects were 
arranged functionally, compared to when they were not.  
Crucially, the non-interacting jug in this example still affords pouring. 
With regard to the interacting jug, however, it is only in its combination with an 
appropriately oriented glass that it affords pouring over and above what it affords 
in terms of its category. Its affordances are now specific to the object itself and 
its functional arrangement with other sequentially presented objects. These 
results suggest that, if the specific arrangement of objects is important in deriving 
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these effects, then the specific object token may important also. In Green and 
Hummel’s experiment, the event representation generated upon seeing the two 
pictures includes object-specific, or ‘token’ information, as apposed to solely 
general or ‘type’ information (see Kanwisher, 1987; 1991, Gajewski & 
Henderson, 2005, Chun, 1997).  
Other studies have produced similar results with objects to which very 
little semantic knowledge is attached. Symes, Ellis and Tucker (2007) found that 
when objects to which no semantic ‘object actions’ could be attributed (such as a 
cylindrical rod) were oriented with edges readily ‘graspable’, participants were 
faster to make feature-based decisions relevant to the presented objects. Symes et 
al. attributed these effects to what they term ‘pure physical affordances’ (PPAs): 
Properties of visual objects which serve to afford action, independently of any 
semantic association. Observers in these experiments process what the 
concurrent object affords in terms of relevant actions, as apposed to processing 
what this particular class or category of object affords. These experiments 
suggest that, when processing a particular item, information pertaining to the 
object’s potential for future interaction tends to concern token-specific, rather 
than token-type information. This type-token distinction is a fundamental tenet of 
the experiments presented in the current chapter, and forms the basis of the 
discussion concerning these experiments. 
 
Object-specific representations and the visual world 
 
The notion of object-specific event-based representations, however, seems 
counterintuitive to accounts of change blindness and incomplete representational 
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codes of our visual surroundings (Simons and Levin, 1997, Rensink, 2000), and 
efficient or ‘cheap’ visual processing (Clark, 1999). Perhaps the most persuasive 
evidence that we do not build up rich, detailed representations of our visual 
surroundings comes from studies of change blindness. Relevant to the type-token 
distinction, small token changes to objects within a visual scene often go 
unnoticed if changes are made within a saccade. Mandler and Parker (1976), for 
instance, found that observers of a visual scene would not readily detect token 
changes to objects within a scene (for example, a mug changing to a different 
mug), but they would detect object-type changes (such as the mug changing to a 
plate).  
 It is likely, however, that in the observation of a scene encompassing 
multiple objects, arranged in front of a background, one typically makes several 
fixations in order to process the required information in the scene (Irwin et al., 
1995). Very little detailed visual information is maintained from fixation to 
fixation, however (Henderson, 1997), and representations are not typically 
accumulated, but formed ‘when needed’ (White, 2006). Moreover, the inclusion 
of a background has shown to have facilitatory or inhibitory (depending on the 
contextual appropriateness of the background) effects on object recognition 
(Boyce & Pollatsek, 1992, Eriksson, 1989). 
In the case of the current experiments, the presented scenes are 
simplified, do not contain backgrounds, and likely do not require as many 
fixations to process all the relevant information. In a complex scene, if allowed 
enough time, the eyes will make several fixations to objects, but representations 
from multiple objects will not accrue due to the processing constraints of visual 
short term memory (vSTM). According to Irwin (1991, 1996), the capacity of 
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vSTM is only about three to five unique objects. Similarly, information specific 
to the mug in Mandler and Parker’s (1976) experiment is likely diluted by 
subsequent fixations to other objects, constrained by the capacity of vSTM. This 
dilution, thought to be analogous to visual masking (Campbell & Wurtz, 1978), 
is a common feature of visual information processing during saccades (Irwin et 
al., 1995; Irwin, 1991).   
In the current experiments, the event representations constructed from 
these simple scenes are likely to be specific to the objects in the scene, including 
any specific features of those objects (shape, colour, size, and so on). In the 
absence of contextual information such as a background, observers tend to focus 
more on component features of the objects (Biederman, 1987). Information 
pertaining to context in this case can be considered the way in which these 
objects are able to interact with each other, given their combined affordances 
(see Green & Hummel, 2006). An explanation for why information is typically 
not accumulated from different objects within a scene was offered by Irwin 
(1991). It may simply be that there is no internal visual buffer with which to 
store these accrued pieces of information from successive fixations. Such a 
buffer may be obsolete in the current experiments, however, due to the small (at 
least in comparison to Irwin’s stimuli) number of items in each presented scene.  
 
Current experiment 
 
The experiment presented in the current chapter is a test of the assumption that 
the representations activated in these paradigms are based on token-specific 
codes, rather than more abstract, token-independent codes. The first and second 
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conditions will contain the prime (e.g. a knife and tyre) and control (e.g. a ruler 
and tyre), and the target for these conditions will be an end-state object (e.g. a 
burst tyre). The third and fourth conditions will contain the same items but the 
targets shall consist of different tokens of the same type of end-state objects (see 
figure 5.1 for an example of the trial procedure). For example, the target for 
conditions 3 and 4 might contain a burst tyre, but with a token change (e.g. a 
burst, but slightly different tyre to the one presented initially with the knife).  
As there are four conditions in the current experiment, to use the same 
stimuli as previous experiments would mean that participants only receive 5 
experimental items for each condition. To increase the power of the experimental 
design and avoid committing a type II error, the stimulus set has been expanded 
from 20 to 40 items. So, participants in the current experiment will receive 10 
experimental items from each condition.  
 
Experiment 9 
 
Method 
 
Participants. 60 University of York students participated in the experiment for 
half-an-hour’s course credit or £2. All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. 
 
Materials.  Participants were assigned to one of four different groups. Each 
group received all 40 experimental items, 10 from each condition (see figure 
5.1). Items were rotated across lists using a Latin Square, so participants assigned 
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to group 1 might see the ‘burst’ concept in the ‘prime a’ condition, while 
participants in group 2 would see this concept in the ‘prime b’ condition, and so 
on. Filler trials were designed to correspond to the experimental items: first 
pictures consisted of two items. As before, half of the trials required ‘man-made’ 
responses, and half required ‘not man-made’ responses. All the experimental 
trials required ‘man-made’ responses. There were 160 trials in total, and the 
experiment lasted roughly 30 minutes. 
 
Procedure.  The procedure for this experiment was identical to that of the 
previous experiment (Experiment 8, chapter 4).  
 
Results 
 
Figure 5.2 shows that, on average, participants responded the fastest in the prime 
condition, compared to other conditions. A two-way repeated measures ANOVA 
was conducted with one factor of picture type (either prime or control) and a 
second factor of target type (either the same or different). Main effects of picture 
type (F(1, 59) = 4.860, p = .031; F2(1, 39) = 4.060, p = 0.49) and target type 
(F(1, 59) = 4.201, p = .045; F2(1, 39) = 3.448, p = .071) were revealed, but there 
was no interaction between picture type and target type (F1(1, 59) = 1.135, p = 
.291; F2(1, 39) = .175, p = .678). Planned comparisons revealed significant 
differences between ‘prime a’ and ‘control a’ conditions (prime condition with 
same-token targets compared to control condition with same-token targets (F1(1, 
59) = 4.668, p = .035; F2(1, 39) = 4.211, p = .047)); ‘prime a’ and ‘prime b’ 
conditions (prime condition with same-token targets compared to prime 
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condition with different-token targets (F1(1, 59) = 4.690, p = .034; F2(1, 39) = 
2.629, p = .113)); and ‘prime a’ and ‘control b’ conditions (prime condition with 
same-token targets compared to control condition with different-token targets 
(F1(1, 59) = 7.496, p = .008; F2(1, 39) = 4.302, p = .045)).  
Accuracy rates remained high for this experiment (M = 96%, SD = 4%), 
and there was no improvement from the first to the second half of the experiment 
(p > .05). In order to asses whether accuracy rates differed between condition, a 
two-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with one factor of picture 
type (either prime or control) and another factor of target type (either same or 
different), with a dependent variable of accuracy (number of correct responses 
across conditions). There were no main effects of picture type (F1(1, 59) = .280, 
p = .599; F2(1, 39) = .335, p = .566) or target type (F1(1,59) = .032, p = .858; 
F2(1, 39) = .089, p = .767), and there was no interaction between the two (F1(1, 
59) = .301, p = .585; F2(1, 39) = 1.068, p = .308). Paired comparisons revealed 
no significant differences between conditions with respect to accuracy (all p > 
.05). Adjustments were made for all multiple comparisons using Bonferroni 
corrections. 
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Fig. 5.2. Average response times for each condition, with standard error bars. 
 
Discussion 
 
Participants were significantly faster to respond in an artifact judgement task to 
targets in the prime, compared to the control condition, but only when targets 
were same–token objects. For example, responses to a burst tyre were facilitated 
when this same tyre was shown in its intact state beside a knife, but this 
facilitation was not evident for responses to different-token targets. In addition, 
response times were significantly faster in the ‘prime a’ condition (e.g. knife and 
intact tyre with same-token targets), compared to every other condition. These 
findings suggest that representations activated upon seeing the primes are 
specific to the particular objects shown. With respect to the accuracy data, 
participants’ accuracy was no more or less likely to be higher depending on the 
condition, and participants did not appear to improve from the start to the end of 
the experiment.  
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 Causal structure and scene comprehension.  These data carry implications for 
the study of visual scene comprehension, object recognition, and the types of 
representation generated and utilised for the processing of visual scenes. 
Typically, the representations constructed upon viewing a visual scene are said to 
contain very little specific perceptual details, and it is only the basic semantics 
inherent in the constituent objects which are encoded in these representations 
(Grimes, 1996). Even when task demands encourage observers of visual scenes 
to form representations based on interactions or events between two objects, the 
information retained from the scene is considered to be sparse, with only simple 
spatial, and object-type information being encoded in these cases (Gilchrist, 
Humphreys & Riddoch, 1996). 
One implication of these previous findings is that the observers of these 
scenes are forming general, abstract representations of them, much like a schema 
or ‘script’ of an event (see Ferretti et al., 2001; Rumelhart, 1980; Shank & 
Abelson, 1977), containing object-type rather than token-type codes. The current 
data refute this notion of representational coding, however, and demonstrate the 
coding of token information within event-based representations.  
Possible mitigating factors in this interpretation of the current data are 
that of causality and object state changes. The current experiment essentially 
presents two types of event. In same-token cases the causal structure of the event 
is kept constant, with targets representing the ‘end-state’ of the depicted event. 
Instruments in this case are attributed with precipitating the change in state of the 
target object. In different-token cases, however, the causal structure of the event 
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is disrupted, leaving the generated event representation unable to operate on 
target recognition.  
This disruption of causal structure is discussed by Hommel (1998), within 
a framework encompassing the notions of episodic binding and code confusion. 
Hommel suggested that repeating certain features in a visually presented event 
binds them together in a single episodic representation (see also Kahneman et al., 
1992 and van Dam & Hommel, 2010). This episodically-bound representation is 
automatically retrieved if one or more of the bound features are viewed again. 
Importantly however, if the repeated stimulus does not entirely match the 
features of the episodically-bound representation, then confusion between the 
two competing codes occurs, resulting in a processing cost for the presently 
viewed stimulus.  
With respect to the current experiment, code confusion may occur 
between the slightly different target and the prior presented object. When 
participants were viewing a knife and an intact tyre, for example, code confusion 
may operate when a burst tyre is presented for the target when its features do not 
completely match that of the prior seen tyre. This notion of code confusion is 
also relevant to results presented in the previous chapter in which inhibition from 
control conditions was discussed as a contributory factor to the observed 
differences between prime and control conditions. According to Hommel’s 
(1998) account, inhibition from controls in previous experiments would arise 
when, for the first picture, an object is paired with an instrument which is unable 
to change it (such as a ruler with an intact tyre) and, for the target, that same 
object in its altered state (such as a burst tyre). 
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Experiment 3 (see chapter 3) broached this issue of violations of the 
causal structure of events. In this experiment, participants were required to make 
an artifact judgement on a target (e.g. a glass) which represented an abstract 
instantiation of an event suggested by an agent and a theme (e.g. a bird and a 
puddle). As with the current experiment, less facilitation to the targets was 
observed in experiment 3 because the causal structure of the events had been 
violated. Using the above example, a representation of a drinking event is 
assumed to form upon seeing a picture of a bird and a puddle. This 
representation, however, is unlikely to encode a general drinking event 
(encompassing different forms of drinking), but instead appears to contain 
information specific to the type of drinking that could occur, given a bird and 
puddle. The concrete nature of this representation was such that it could not be 
utilised for the processing of the target (the glass). Furthermore, in order for 
causal event structure to be disrupted in the first place, token-specific 
information would have to be retained from the initial activated representation. 
 
Distal and proximal events.  The current data is also informative with regard to 
how the presented scenes are temporally coded. Events that are processed as 
occurring concurrently are typically represented by more concrete, low-level 
event codes (Wakslak et al., 2006). If an event is represented as being not of 
one’s ‘direct concurrent experience’, then representational codes tend to be more 
general or abstract. Wakslak et al. (2006) refer to events which have occurred in 
the past or are due to occur in the future as ‘psychologically distant’ and argue 
these types of event tend to be represented by high-level construals: Essential, 
abstract and global features of presented scenes. The more distal an event is 
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considered to be, also depends on how far away from the observer that event is 
considered to be occurring, or whether the event is happening to the observer or 
to someone else.  
If participants in the current experiment are generating representations of 
events which contain low-level construals (local features, concrete event codes), 
then it is likely that these events are also coded as occurring concurrently. More 
broadly, if events are considered to be ‘happening in front of us’ we are able to 
derive concurrent information from it and tend to process it using a concrete 
processing orientation (Wakslak et al., 2006). In addition, objects within scenes 
are often subject to differing processing orientations depending on how the event 
is temporally coded. For example, objects belonging to situations that are 
considered to be future occurrences tend to be represented using broader, type 
rather than token categories, compared to situations that are considered more 
proximal (Liberman et al., 2002; Liberman et al., 2007).  
 
Grounded cognition and simulation.  The data presented in the current chapter 
hold implications for several theoretical frameworks, and some tenets of these 
frameworks can be used to clarify the account of the data presented in this 
chapter. Where the current data serve to supplement these works, and where 
these works can inform the current account of the data will be discussed in the 
sections that follow. Firstly, Barsalou’s (2003) theory of ‘situated simulation’ 
assumes that category information does not form the main component of visual 
scene representations, but is instead used as a form of ‘scaffold’ for the current 
representation to graft event codes onto. This category information is not coded 
as general ‘type’ information of a particular scene, object or entity, but is instead 
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thought to consist of re-enactments or ‘simulations’ of previously experienced 
events. These simulations are coded as sensory-motor states (defined as patterns 
of neural activation) and form part of a single representational domain, 
underlying both sensory-motor and conceptual processing. Importantly, 
representations of our visual environment are seen as dependent on context and 
highly dynamical. Sensory-motor simulations are fitted to the requirements of the 
current action-based situation. In other words, depending on one’s current goals 
or situational context, these simulations can change dynamically, rather than the 
same representation being activated over and over for each corresponding event.  
Situated simulation, with its roots in grounded cognition (see Barsalou, 
1993; 2008) is an apt theoretical construct to apply to the current data because of 
its focus on the interplay between perception and action. Grounded cognition 
does not view action and perception as being handled by separate, modular 
systems, but are instead viewed as residing within a single cognitive system 
which serves both. This common representational system makes use of 
combinations of partial re-enactments of sensory-motor states, visual percepts 
and conceptual processes. 
As the current data presented in this chapter suggest, it is not a general 
representation of an event which is abstracted from the current scenes and 
subsequently used to facilitate recognition of the target. Rather, from a situated 
perspective, a sensory-motor state of the depicted event already held in the 
observer’s memory (as a result of previous experiential contact with the 
concurrent objects and derived knowledge as to the objects’ respective 
affordances) is activated. This is then used in conjunction with a representation 
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of the concurrent scene, with this concurrent representation including low-level, 
global, and token-specific information. 
Each observed event is not processed independently of available 
knowledge structure; additional knowledge and goal-based directives are brought 
to bear on the comprehension of the concurrent event. This notion is associated 
with ecological approaches to vision and the derivation of affordances from 
available objects and entities in our visual environment. 
 
Ecological vision and affordances.  Ecological vision provides a framework for 
the theory of affordances and the cognitive underpinnings of visual scene 
perception and object recognition. Ecological vision, as a precursor to more 
recent accounts of perception and action, forgoes the notion of representational 
cognition in favour of a more ‘direct vision’ approach (see Gibson, 1977). Put 
simply, this approach assumes one’s perception of the world is derived directly 
from the senses, rather than from any internal representation. Nonetheless, more 
recent efforts have been made to tie some of the proposals of embodied cognition 
(a strongly representational field) with that of a central construct of the 
ecological approach – the affordance (e.g. Hirose, 2002).  
The current data supplements the notion of the affordance as a theoretical 
construct: The affordances of instruments and objects in the depicted events are, 
as before, derived without the need of an agent to bring about the change in state 
of the target object. But, as mentioned previously, the affordances derived from 
stimuli in the current paradigm are likely specific to the objects presented. The 
affordances are not merely coded as whatever a particular category of object 
allows – knives usually afford bursting, but not in a specific case if the blade 
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happened to be blunt. It is these specific details about the objects in question 
which serve to influence the nature of affordances derived from the event 
sequence.   
Although the ecological framework upon which the notion of affordances 
rests represented an attempt to challenge representational theories (which had 
come to dominate the field at the time this approach was proposed), the current 
work is presented as cognitively representational in its descriptions and accounts 
of the data. Although the affordance can inform the account of the data presented 
here, observers’ comprehension of visual scenes and recognition of objects in the 
current experiments is taken to require the construction and utilisation of 
appropriate event representations.  
 
Theory of event coding.  Finally, several ideas advocated by proponents of the 
theory of event coding (TEC) (Hommel et al., 2001) augment the findings 
presented in this chapter. This theory provides an account of the mental 
representation and coding of events in our visual environment, with a focus on 
perception and action planning.  
 TEC, in a core principle shared by grounded cognition, regards both 
perception and action to be managed by a common representational domain. It 
also makes use of the Gibsonian construct of affordances. However, this 
framework for understanding our computation of the world around us also 
utilises the concept of the ‘feature code’. Feature codes refer to features of an 
event that can be local5, as in the colour or shape of constituent objects within a 
                                                 
5 Or ‘proximal’ to use Hommel et al.’s (2001) terminology, although this is not 
to be confused with the notion of proximal event codes discussed earlier in the 
chapter. 
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scene, or more complex, such as time and change, or the ‘sit-on-ableness’ of a 
surface (Hommel et al., 2001).  
The notion of feature codes clarifies our account of the processes 
operating within the current paradigm as it offers an explanation as to the nature 
of information sharing within a single representational domain, capable of 
managing sensory-motor, perceptual, conceptual and action codes derived from 
perceived events. According to TEC, one event code can consist of a multitude 
of different feature codes, each representing a different facet of the perceived 
event. This notion of event codes being broken into many feature codes serves to 
provide a functionalised picture of the representational organisation of event 
codes.  
Breaking down event codes into feature codes allows for suggestions as 
to how information is integrated and combined within a single representational 
store. For example, the notion of ‘feature binding’ has been proposed for 
explaining the synchronisation of separate, but supportive, feature codes (e.g. 
Abeles 1991; Singer 1994; Treisman 1996). Feature binding is a mechanism that 
integrates feature codes based on the same event. Separate features of an object 
(e.g. red, round) are selected and integrated to form ‘correct’ combinations of 
features from objects within a scene (Treisman, 1996).  
Crucially however, any use of feature codes, feature binding or 
representational domains is ultimately required for action planning. In the 
paradigms presented and discussed within this thesis, facilitation of response 
times to a target can be thought of as one by-product of the ‘readying’ of certain 
representations for action planning and, of course, the resulting action. What 
links event comprehension and the retention of object-specific details is the need 
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of feature codes for action planning. It is because neural architecture involved 
with action planning is activated upon seeing these ‘events’ that object-specific 
information is coded within the event representations in the current paradigm. In 
cases where no event structure can be abstracted from a visual scene (such as in 
change blindness studies), representations required for action planning are not 
being recruited. Action planning, although tangential to the current discussion, is 
the ‘next stage’ that is not accounted for by the current data.  
 
Further research.  Possibilities for future research focussing on the notion of 
object-specific representations reside in investigations of object affordances and 
graspability. As mentioned previously, the graspability of an object, even when 
no semantic information is associated with it, influences the types of event 
representation that can be generated from it.  
 If, as has been proposed in the account of the current data, event 
representations contain detailed causal information specific to the objects seen, 
then the paradigm can be constrained further to take account of the angle of some 
of the object surfaces. For example, previous discussion of graspability implies 
that if, in the current paradigm, the handle of the knife in the trial for the ‘burst’ 
concept was angled so as to be ungraspable by a right handed viewer (this was 
not methodologically controlled in the current experiment), priming effects 
would be eradicated as the affordances of the knife have been altered. Again, in 
this case knives still afford bursting, but this particular object’s arrangement does 
not allow the event to be so readily carried out.  
 A similar investigation of object angle was conducted by Yoon and 
Humphreys (2010). These authors found that right-handed participants were 
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significantly faster to make a decision as to whether two objects commonly go 
together (such as a pan and a spatula), when these objects were held in 
appropriate hands by a protagonist (e.g. the spatula in the right hand and the pan 
in the left), than when they were not.  
The proposed paradigm differs from this design, however, in that it 
moves away from functional groupings, using items which are not commonly 
found together and so there is less available semantic information for observers 
of the event to draw on (it is crucial to the current experiments that is it only with 
a particular combination of unrelated objects that priming arises). The proposed 
paradigm, therefore, is constrained further by including objects that are not 
semantic associates and also by excluding a depicted agent suitable for carrying 
out these events. The proposed paradigm would therefore seek to establish these 
types of effects operating in a highly constrained task environment.  
 
This chapter has presented an experiment demonstrating priming effects with a 
distinction between same-token and different-token targets. In applying the 
notion of simulation to the current findings, a proposal for the types of 
mechanisms and knowledge structures involved in processing the stimuli in the 
current paradigm has been proposed. Sensory-motor states held in the observer’s 
memory are used in conjunction with token-specific information derived from 
the depicted event. The current data also clarify the notion of the affordance, 
supporting subsequent representational theories that suggest a given object’s 
affordances are not relegated to its category, but are malleable depending on the 
event context. The current chapter has sought to demonstrate, and then define, 
representational processes operating on available affordances in a paradigm 
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which manipulates type-to-token changes between objects. Finally, the construct 
of feature codes applied within TEC elucidates our understanding of the current 
data by regarding the event code as broken up into several feature codes, each 
containing information specific to the objects observed within a concurrent 
event.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter is intended, firstly, to provide an outline of background literature 
most pertinent to the current work, and to reiterate the main aims of the thesis. 
An overview of current empirical findings is then to be provided, with discussion 
of the theoretical implications of these results. And lastly, the limitations of the 
current work and potential future research directions are to be discussed.  
There were two primary aims of the work presented in this thesis. The 
first of these aims was to establish whether it was possible to observe 
combinatorial processes in the visual domain similar to those observed in studies 
of language comprehension. The second was to establish the types of 
paradigmatic constraints under which these effects are borne out. These 
constraints include manipulating stimulus presentation times, the roles of 
concurrent objects, and the causal structure of visually presented events.  
 Language studies that established combinatorial semantic processing 
during sentence comprehension provided an impetus for the development of the 
current visual paradigms: Although the combining of semantic information from 
different words within sentences had been demonstrated in several studies (e.g. 
Tabossi, 1988; Potter & Falconer, 1979), a similar combining of semantic 
information from pictures of semantically unrelated objects had not been 
demonstrated. 
 Tabossi’s (1988) study concerning the role of context in sentence 
processing determined that priming to certain words can be achieved with one 
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particular combination of words within a sentence over another. For example, 
she found that participants were primed to the word ‘thorn’, upon seeing the 
sentence ‘the girl was pricked by a rose’. Here, the words ‘pricked’ and ‘rose’ 
are combined to form a representation of the event ‘pricking’. In this sentence, 
although the word ‘thorn’ is not used, it is primed based on the combined 
semantic knowledge engendered by the words ‘rose’ and ‘pricked’. Crucially, 
however, when participants were presented with sentences which do not contain 
the necessary combination of words, less priming was observed. For example, 
‘thorn’ was not primed by the sentence ‘the girl smelled a rose’ because it did not 
contain the word ‘pricked’, and similarly this target was not primed from the 
sentence ‘the girl was pricked by a wasp’6, as it did not contain the word ‘rose’. 
 In addition to semantic access, some paradigms have focussed on the 
abstraction of semantic information from collections of objects, encompassing a 
visual scene. Gist, typically considered to be the ‘general semantic interpretation’ 
of a visual scene (Henderson & Ferreira, 2004) can be abstracted in 
approximately 100 ms (Potter, 1976; Rensink, 2000). The rapidity with which 
gross semantic information can be gleaned form a visual scene is an indication 
that that this process operates early on in the processing of a visual scene, and 
that complete representations of visual stimuli do not need to be formed in order 
to ‘make sense’ of what we are seeing.  
 Priming effects from words or pictures and the abstraction of scene gist 
are now well established within the literature concerning sentence and scene 
comprehension. Important additions to these studies, however, have been those 
                                                 
6 This original experiment was conducted in Italian and, as a result, some of the 
translated stimulus sentences sound slightly strange. In English, for example, one 
would not typically use the word ‘pricked’ here but ‘stung’ instead. 
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seeking to establish a link between perception and action. These experiments 
demonstrated priming, not to words or pictures, but to bodily actions, and were 
typically provided through a framework of embodied, or grounded cognition. 
Glenberg and Kaschak (2002) for example, developed several experiments that 
demonstrated an effect they termed the ‘Action-Sentence Compatibility Effect’ 
(ACE). The experiment in which the ACE was introduced had participants 
making sensibility judgements to sentences that described actions either towards 
the body (such as ‘open the drawer’), or away from the body (such as ‘close the 
drawer’). Participants were faster to make their judgements if, in responding, 
they needed to make a congruent arm movement. For example, responses to the 
sentence ‘open the drawer’ were faster if participants were required to make their 
response using an arm movement towards the body. These results are consistent 
with an embodied interpretation of visual processing in that the world around us 
is computed in terms of patterns of possible interactions (see Glenberg, 1997). 
 Recent methodology for exploring these notions of event representation, 
affordances, and the link between perception and action includes investigations 
of eye movements. Eye movements are used as, among other things, an indicator 
of semantic access and the activation of event knowledge. Typically, the ‘visual 
world paradigm’ tracks participants’ eye movements over a concurrent visual 
scene as they hear a sentence referring to elements of that scene. For example, 
Altman and Kamide (1999) presented participants with a scene in which a boy is 
sat beside a cake and a few other distractor items. These authors found that, as 
participants heard the sentence ‘the boy will eat the cake’, more saccades were 
made to the cake during the word ‘eat’, than any other item. However, when the 
word ‘eat’ was replaced with a different word, such as ‘move’, participants did 
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not show any preference for an item within the scene during the acoustic lifetime 
of that word.  
The authors concluded from this finding that, due to the cake being the 
only edible object in the scene, participants’ eye movements reflected an 
anticipatory process based on the affordances of different objects within the 
scene. Specifically, the cake is the only item which affords eating, and so this 
item is anticipated on the basis that the boy will eat something in the scene. This 
eye movement experiment demonstrates the combining of affordances from two 
separate entities within a visual scene, based on the context offered by the 
auditory sentence. In this experiment, the affordances of the agent (the boy) are 
combined with the affordances of one of the most likely ‘interactable’ objects 
(the cake) based on our knowledge that an eating event is to occur.  
Many eye movement studies provided an account of the interplay 
between vision, language and action, and it is maintained in this thesis that this 
interplay is crucial for action planning and conduction within our environment. 
The empirical studies reported in this thesis demonstrate combinatorial effects 
that are assumed to be an initial stage in the processing of a stimulus for future 
interaction.  
 
Overview of empirical findings  
 
The experiments presented in this thesis established combinatorial effects 
operating in the visual domain, demonstrated observers’ sensitivity to causal 
structure within depicted events, and revealed the object-specific nature of the 
representations generated from objects presented within an event sequence. 
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Objects referred to in the context of the current set of experiments are entities 
upon which an instrument can instigate some form of change.  
Experiments 1 and 2 explored the basic notion of combining semantic 
information from the affordances of different objects within a scene. Participants 
were presented with a sequence of pictures that in some cases suggested a 
particular event (such as a bird and a puddle for a ‘drinking’ event). Participants 
were significantly faster to make a lexical decision on an auditory word (e.g. 
‘drink’) in this condition, compared to when the agent appeared without an 
appropriate theme (such as a bird with a book), when the theme appeared without 
an appropriate agent (such as a puddle and a book), or baseline unrelated objects 
were presented (such as a book and a toothbrush). When the exposure duration of 
first pictures in the sequence was shortened, this effect was eradicated.  
These findings indicate sensitivity to the affordances of constituent 
objects within a scene. These results also suggest that it is only with a 
combination of items that is felicitous to a particular event (such as a bird and 
puddle for the event ‘drink’), that the event is primed. As these effects 
disappeared when shorter exposure durations of 100 ms were used, there may not 
have been enough time in these cases for event-based representations to be 
constructed from the available object affordances. In addition, these results 
suggest that, in order for priming to obtain from the visual domain to the 
linguistic domain, aspects of the visual representation (generated from the bird 
and puddle) must overlap with aspects from the language representation 
(generated from the target verb).  
Experiments 3, 4 and 5 represented the first inclusions of causal 
information in the current paradigms, and served to constrain the paradigm 
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further by using a purely visual task (an artifact judgement). In these 
experiments, participants were presented with ‘priming’ stimuli, consisting of an 
object and an instrument which is able to bring about some physical change in 
the object (e.g. a knife and a tyre), and ‘control’ stimuli, consisting of an object 
and an instrument which is unable to bring about a change in the object (e.g. a 
ruler and a tyre). Participants were required to make a judgement as to whether a 
subsequently presented target object (objects in their changed states such as a 
burst tyre) was man-made or not.  
Participants were significantly faster to make artifact judgements in the 
prime, compared to the control condition. In order to establish the time-course of 
combinatorial effects and claim for automatic rather than strategic processes 
operating on these stimuli, the exposure duration of first presented pictures was 
reduced. Combinatorial effects in this case were severely diminished, with a 
significant difference between conditions observed only for by-items analyses.  
These findings suggest that the event-based representations generated in 
these experiments contain information pertaining to the causal structure of the 
event. The causal structure of the depicted events can be thought of as the 
collected segments of an event which establish the role of respective items within 
a scene. For example, the knife and intact tyre suggest a future event of bursting, 
and the burst tyre represents the result of this event. These findings also suggest 
that combinatorial processes may not be solely automatic, but may require an 
element of strategic processing in order for them to operate.  
Experiments 6, 7 and 8 sought to expand upon these findings by testing 
two basic assumptions of the previous experiments: That it is only with a 
felicitous combination of objects that priming to a related changed-state target 
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occurs; and that participants are sensitive to the causal information contained 
within presented events. Participants in experiment 6 were presented with stimuli 
from four different conditions. In the first condition, items consisted of an object 
paired with an instrument capable of changing it (the basic priming condition 
used in experiments presented in previous chapters), and for the target, this same 
object in its end-state (as if altered by the instrument). The second condition 
consisted, again, of an object paired with an instrument which is able to instigate 
a change in the object, but an object in its intact state for the target (here, there is 
no change between the initial presented object and the target). The third and 
fourth conditions were identical to the first and second, except that the first 
presented pictures contained instruments on their own, without any objects. 
There were, however, no significant differences between any of the conditions in 
this experiment. A plausible explanation is that the previously reported effects 
were due at least in part to inhibition from the controls (see Neely 1991).  
Experiment 7 reflected an effort to reduce the number of conditions due 
to the relatively small stimulus set used for experiments discussed so far. 
Experiment 8 explored the notion of inhibition from the control with a single first 
picture object. There were no significant results from these two experiments.  
Finally, experiment 9 tested the assumption that the representations 
activated in the current paradigms were object-specific. Participants were 
presented with primes and controls (an object and instrument felicitous to an 
event, and an instrument and object infelicitous to an event, respectively), and 
were required to make an artifact judgement on changed-state targets. The first 
two conditions essentially contained the prime and control condition from the 
original ‘knife and tyre’ experiment (experiment 3), with the same changed-state 
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objects from the targets (e.g. a burst tyre). The third and fourth conditions of this 
experiment contained exactly the same, except the changed-state targets 
appeared to be slightly different objects to those seen initially in the first 
presented picture, representing a different instantiation of the same event. 
Although this experiment contained four conditions, the stimulus set was 
doubled to maintain power in the experimental design. Using the example of the 
knife and the tyre, participants were primed to burst tyres but only to same-token 
targets (e.g. the same tyre as was seen in the first picture, although in its burst 
state). When responding to different- token targets (e.g. a burst tyre, but a 
different tyre to the one presented in the first picture), participants were unable to 
utilise the representation activated upon seeing the first picture (as it contains a 
different token of the same type) and so responses to the target in this case were 
facilitated much less.  
 
Implications for vision 
 
These findings indicate something fundamental about the way in which we 
process the world around us. Perhaps most importantly, these data suggest that 
semantic information is readily combined from objects in our visual environment 
so as to further comprehend our surroundings. Not only can these pieces of 
information be combined from objects that are not semantically associated (such 
as a knife and a tyre), but they appear to be combined based on what these 
objects afford in terms of some kind of interaction with it, or interaction with 
another object or entity. This abstraction of relevant information is closely tied to 
the notion of affordances: What an object means to us is what we can do to 
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interact with it or what it can allow in order to interact with something else 
(Glenberg, 1997).  
Although our perceptual experience of the visual world is one of a 
consistent, stable environment, our eyes make roughly 3-5 saccades per second, 
with very little information retained between each fixation (Rensink, 2000; 
Milner & Goodale, 1995). In addition, compete mental representations of visual 
surroundings are never formed. Instead, information is used from the 
environment as and when it is needed, there is no internally represented mental 
‘picture’ of our environment to draw upon. 
This notion of abstracting information from our visual environment 
‘cheaply’ (Clark, 1999) can be expanded by the findings presented in this thesis, 
in particular its focus on combining affordances from separate objects to form a 
composite representation based on the event that, together, these items afford. 
From an event-based perspective, the notion of cheaply using available visual 
information is informative when one assumes the information abstracted from 
concurrent visual scenes aids both our perception of it and also our interaction 
with it. To clarify, much of our interpretation of the visual environment resides 
within our interface with it. It informs both perception and action, and 
affordances reflect a link between the two. As interaction with one’s 
environment forms such an important part of our comprehension of the objects 
and entities around us, it is unsurprising that efficient visual processing 
encompasses the ways in which objects can be utilised for actions or events.  
The likelihood that the visual system attempts to use available 
information as efficiently as possible suggests that, in doing so, it is not laden 
with irrelevant information that is not required to aid our perception of, and our 
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interaction with, the visual environment. And, as evidenced by the work 
presented here, an important part of this efficient use of visual and semantic 
information is the combining of affordances from objects in our environment, 
aiding both the perception of visual scenes and our real-time interaction with 
them. 
Another implication of the current findings is that a process common to 
the linguistic domain (combining of semantic information from separate sources) 
appears to operate in a similar way in the visual domain. This commonality 
between the two domains may reflect a single mechanism responsible for 
combining semantic information across any modality. As we typically 
experience things in our surroundings from several modalities, our 
comprehension of the external environment needs to be flexible and dynamic, 
requiring attention to several different sources, regardless of modality. The 
notion of a ‘combinatorial’ mechanism common to both linguistic and visual 
domains corresponds to Chase and Clark’s (1972) assertion that in order to 
comprehend language or visual scenes, a single store of semantic knowledge is 
drawn upon (but see Paivio, 1986). The semantic priming literature contains 
several behavioural effects indicating the likely use of a single semantic store, 
utilised for both linguistic and visual stimuli (e.g. Vanderwart, 1984; Bajo & 
Canas, 1989). With regard to the current set of experiments, a combinatorial 
effect is demonstrated which bears striking similarity to effects reported in 
language studies which seek to establish processes involved with the 
comprehension and processing of text.  
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Implications for event representation 
 
The representations generated from object affordances in the present experiments 
are rich enough to contain event-based information. Along with recognising 
individual objects within a scene, additional processing time allows for the 
generation of representations containing event information pertinent to the 
specific affordances of concurrent objects and instruments. The event-based 
information coded within these representations can be thought of as the types of 
events a given object or entity can engage in. Sensitivity to functional groupings 
of objects has been demonstrated before (e.g. Green & Hummel, 2006), but these 
current experiments indicate that representations concerning the interaction 
between two items can be generated purely from the affordances of these objects 
which, crucially, are semantically unrelated. For example, birds and puddles or 
knives and tyres are not semantically related pairs of objects, but they are linked 
in terms of what their respective affordances allow (drinking and bursting, 
respectively). 
Another implication of the observed difference between the token-
specific (same target) and the token-type (slightly different target) conditions is 
that the representations constructed from object affordances are specific to the 
objects seen and do not reflect global features of these objects’ categories. In 
terms of the representations constructed from visual scenes, it is generally 
assumed that they include very little specific perceptual details of concurrent 
objects and entities (Grimes, 1996). Even when the demands of the task 
emphasise interactions, the information retained from the scenes is very simple, 
with basic spatial and object-type information coded within the representation 
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(Gilchrist et al., 1996). These findings suggest that the representations generated 
from these scenes contain general, abstract representational codes, much like 
those described in theories using such constructs as schemas or scripts (e.g. 
Ferretti et al., 2001; Rumelhart, 1980; Shank & Abelson, 1977). Although these 
representations are often said to contain object-type, rather than token-type 
codes, the representations engendered in the current experiments appeared to 
code token information within event structure. Also, the modulation of 
facilitation of responses to targets was clearly demonstrated based on an account 
of violations of causal structure within the depicted events. In experiment 9 
(chapter 5), for example, same-token conditions (e.g. a knife and intact tyre for 
the first picture and the same burst tyre for the target) present cases where the 
causal structure of the event is constant. In these conditions, targets represent 
‘end-states’ of the concurrent event, and instruments are attributed with causing 
the change seen in the target object. Conversely, in different-token conditions 
(e.g. a knife and tyre for the first picture and a different burst tyre for the target), 
the casual structure of the event is violated, and any representations generated 
from the initial picture are unable to facilitate recognition of the target.    
 
Implications for grounded cognition  
 
The abstraction of relevant information from visual scenes carries implications 
for the interaction between perception and action. The findings reported in this 
thesis support the Glenbergian notion that what an object means to us is ‘what 
we can do with it’ in terms of some kind of interaction (Glenberg, 1997). The 
data presented in this thesis emphasise the affordance as an important 
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intermediary between our percept of a visual object and our subsequent 
interaction with it. The findings in this thesis provide an experimental account of 
the way in which objects and potential interactions and causal relationships 
between them are processed within our visual environment. One detail which 
resides outside the scope of this thesis is the potential mechanism responsible for 
combining semantic information from one object to the next. The current studies 
provide an adequate demonstration of this process at work, but they do not 
uncover any means for its occurrence. This shall be discussed later as a limitation 
of the current work.  
For now, the abstraction of affordances is presented in this thesis as a 
critical stage in the processing of visual stimuli for subsequent interaction. 
Importantly, event representations are generated in the current set of experiments 
without the need of an agent that would be likely to carry out the particular 
action demanded of the event. As agents represent a common entity in depictions 
of events in virtually any medium, the fact that they are not needed for the 
construction of events involving an object and an instrument suggests that 
observers of the current visual scenes regard the stimuli, at least in part, as a 
concurrent event. In addition, the affordances of these instruments and objects 
are combined without the use of any semantic information linking the two. The 
two items are linked only in terms of what their combined affordances allow 
them to do in terms of a common event.    
The current data suggest that, during our processing of visual stimuli, the 
affordances from constituent objects can be abstracted, and then combined and 
used for processing subsequent stimuli. Although this results in facilitation of the 
recognition of target objects, priming is attributed to the preparation of actions 
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necessary for interaction with concurrent objects. This assertion is consonant 
with a core principle of TEC, in that perceptual processes are associated with 
action planning.  
Lastly, the demonstration of object-specific representation activation in 
these current paradigms supports the notion of dynamic event codes that change 
depending on current goals or context (see Barsalou, 2003). From a situated 
perspective, object category information is assumed to consist of re-enactments 
of previously experienced events in the form of sensory-motor states, rather than 
general ‘type’ information. These representations are seen as highly dynamical 
and are readily altered so as to fit concurrent goals or events. More specifically, 
rather than a single ‘template’ representation being generated for each 
corresponding event, patterns of neural activity change dynamically according to 
the nature of the concurrent goal, action or event.  
 
Implications for scene gist and object recognition 
 
There are two major implications of the current data for gist abstraction. The role 
of gist in the current set of experiments can be separated into two possible 
scenarios. In the first case, gist abstraction may not be operating on the current 
stimuli at all. The affordances of different items within the scenes are combined 
and very little else occurs. Alternatively, gist abstraction may occur before the 
affordances of items within a scene can be combined.  
 Although gist abstraction differs in representational content to 
representations of object affordances, it is likely given the rapidity and 
automaticity with which gist is abstracted from scenes that this process operates 
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upon the current stimuli. However, it is unclear at what point the combining of 
object affordances occurs, given the time needed for gist abstraction to take 
place.  
If the combining of information from one object to another occurs in a 
faster, or similar time window to gist abstraction then there might not be enough 
‘room’ for gist abstraction to take place. However, the combining of affordances 
from separate objects appears to take longer than the abstraction of gist from a 
visual scene. Experiments 2 and 5 both utilised shortened stimulus exposure 
durations, and both required the combining of information from presented 
objects. Combinatorial effects in these cases were severely weakened and, as we 
know, gist can be abstracted within 100 ms (Potter, 1975; 1976). These results 
suggested that the combining of affordances from these items takes longer to 
complete than was given to participants. It is unlikely therefore, that 
combinatorial processes are operating instead of gist abstraction in this time 
window.  
Gist abstraction seems to be an automatic process, a gleaning of the 
‘identity’ of a given scene, and likely occurs whenever such scenes are viewed. 
In early studies of gist abstraction, pictures were presented to participants at rates 
roughly similar to eye fixations. Even at such short exposure durations, 
participants were able to detect the same pictures in a later memory test or pick 
them out of a picture sequence. According to Rensink (2000) gist abstraction 
occurs early on in the processing of a visual stimulus, before stable 
representations of the stimulus can be constructed. Basic semantics inherent in 
the to-be-processed stimulus, referred to by Rensink as ‘volatile structures’, are 
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used to glean the overall meaning of a scene from the available information, and 
one’s attention can then be directed to objects of interest within the visual field.  
These findings suggest that gist abstraction is a common process 
operating early on in the processing chain, with little to no strategic control. The 
fact that this process occurs in less than 100 ms reflects the automatic nature of 
this process (Potter, 1976). Thus, with regard to the current experiments, it is 
likely that gist abstraction is an initial stage in the processing of visual scenes, 
with affordance combining occurring later in the processing chain. 
Another implication of the current data concerns the relative 
contributions of facilitation and inhibition in semantic priming paradigms. In the 
current experiments, the combinatorial effects appear to be based on both 
facilitation from primes and inhibition from controls. For example, experiment 7 
(chapter 4) had participants responding in an artifact judgement task to 
conditions in which each instrument on experimental trials was capable of 
causing a change in the subsequently presented target object. Null results in this 
experiment were attributed to the lack of a control condition in which an 
instrument was shown that could not alter the target in any way. This was based 
on the assumption that priming effects were due, at least in part, to a ‘mismatch’ 
of representations generated from first pictures to targets, resulting in slower 
reaction times to the target.  
Although this account appeared inconsistent given the results of 
subsequent experiments, this notion of inhibition from controls was raised again 
in relation to results obtained from experiment 9 (chapter 5). Here, participants 
were presented with either an instrument and object in its intact state, and the 
same object in its end-state for the target, or an instrument and intact object, but a 
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slightly different token of the same type of object for the target. As predicted, 
participants were significantly faster to respond in an artifact judgement to 
targets that were the same as previously seen objects, only in their end-states, 
compared to targets which shared some, but not all of the features of the prior 
presented intact object.  
Hommel’s (1998) work concerning episodic binding suggests that 
repeating objects in semantic priming paradigms, but with slightly different 
features, causes ‘code confusion’ between two generated representations. 
Applying the notion of code confusion to experiment 9, a mismatch between 
representations generated from the presentation of a knife and intact tyre for the 
first picture, and a slightly visually different burst tyre for the target, may have 
induced inhibition of response times in this experiment. Unfortunately, it has 
proven difficult to establish with any degree of certainty, the relative 
contributions of facilitation and inhibition on a given priming paradigm 
(McNamara, 2005). However, this issue is somewhat elucidated by work 
suggesting that facilitation increases at shorter SOAs, while inhibition decreases 
at shorter SOAs (See Neely, 1991). 
 
Limitations of the current work 
 
With regard to the current work, there is one major theoretical limitation and 
three methodological limitations. Firstly, although combinatorial processes 
operating on visual scenes used in the current paradigms have been demonstrated 
and discussed clearly, a potential mechanism responsible for this type of 
processing has not been clearly defined. Secondly, the use of non-masked 
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semantic priming paradigms restricts the type of claim that can be made 
concerning the time window in which this process operates. Thirdly, although 
efforts have been made to develop a purely visual paradigm, participants could 
not have been prevented from linguistically labelling the stimuli themselves, thus 
recruiting linguistic information in order to complete the task. And lastly, as 
participants were encouraged to remember presented stimuli, they could not have 
been prevented from developing mnemonic strategies in order to complete the 
task. Each of these limitations will be discussed, with consideration of potential 
improvements that could be made to the current paradigms.   
The data presented in this thesis suggest that as our eyes move around our 
visual environment, the affordances of various objects are not only abstracted, 
but are combined to form representations that guide any interaction with our 
environment. It is maintained that this process of combining separate sources of 
semantic information is central to the planning and execution of actions. 
Moreover, affordance abstraction is established as a process that mediates 
between the perceptual and action planning systems. However, although a 
combinatorial process has been demonstrated in the current work, its description 
relies heavily on theoretical constructs such as the affordance and representation.  
Unfortunately, although efforts could be made to localise this process in 
the brain using imaging methodology, this would still not give any clearer 
indication of the cognitive architecture directly responsible for such 
combinatorial effects. The current data are not sufficiently informative to allow 
consideration of such architecture and, therefore, an account of combinatorial 
processes based on a representational approach to visual semantics is offered in 
the current work.  
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In terms of the methodological limitations of the current experiments, the 
choice of an unmasked paradigm is perhaps one of the most significant. Visual 
pattern masks are often used in semantic priming paradigms to limit the amount 
of time available for processing the stimuli (see Wiens, 2006). Visual masks 
usually consist of a checkerboard or a similar pattern, and are typically presented 
between the offset of the prime and the onset of the target.  
Pattern masks were not used in the current experiments because of 
concerns regarding the weakening of effects, and the effectiveness of such a 
method for constraining processing. Enns and Di Lollo (2000) contend that one 
of the main uses of pattern masking is not to restrict the amount of time spent on 
the processing of a particular stimulus, but is instead used to control the level of 
difficulty in the experimental task. As the effects reported in the current work 
appear in many cases to be fairly fragile (see chapter 4), increasing the difficulty 
of the task may have diluted any potential effects.  
Another methodological concern with the current experiments is that, 
although the combinatorial effects established in the current experiments are 
assumed to operate upon purely visual stimuli, participants’ utilisation of 
linguistic information to aid memory cannot be avoided. In an effort to ensure 
participants did not simply ignore the first picture in the two picture sequence, 
they were told that they would be undertaking a short memory test once the main 
phase of experimentation was over. There were no paradigmatic constraints 
ensuring participants in the current experiments were not labelling stimuli in an 
effort to retain the information they were presented with. Some previous studies 
required participants to tie processing capacity to an arbitrary task before 
responding to a target, such as counting aloud backwards (e.g. McNulty et al., 
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1994; Kelsey et al., 1999). However, if such a strategy were employed in the 
case of the current experiments, it would simply be replacing the use of an 
undesirable system in a visual task (e.g. linguistic systems), for another (e.g. 
numeric systems). In addition, along with constraining the types of systems that 
can be engaged in a particular task, using this method of tying up processing 
capabilities, the potency of the original priming may be diluted.  
Another method to constrain processing would be to shorten stimuli 
exposure durations, pulling processing away from strategic to automatic 
processes (Sachs et al., 2008). However, as evidenced by current experiments in 
which shorter stimulus exposure durations were used, these combinatorial effects 
are weakened under a more constrained time window. Moreover, as work on 
representational cognition progresses, the view of the brain as housing discrete, 
modular systems is shifting in favour of a more distributed, linked system, where 
the influence of various cognitive systems may be inextricably linked and almost 
impossible to tease apart. Consequently, although a visual effect has been 
demonstrated that appears to be analogous to the combining of semantic 
information from different sources of linguistic information, the methodology 
involved with its demonstration is unable to rule out the use of linguistic 
information to complete the demands of the task. 
Another possibility during these experiments is that participants were 
developing mnemonic strategies whilst viewing the experimental stimuli. 
Participants may have been encouraged to utilise such strategies because in each 
of the experiments they were expected to remember the stimuli as well as they 
could, as there would be a short memory test when the main experimental phase 
was over (see appendix 3). The influence of the use of mnemonic strategies in 
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studies of memory, semantic priming, and sentence comprehension are numerous 
(Richardson, 1995; Corbett, 1977; Higbee, 2004), and serve to illustrate an 
alternative account, based on demand characteristics, of the priming observed in 
the current experiments. 
The development of mnemonic strategies is related to the integrative 
account of the current data, discussed previously. The integrative account is 
presented as an alternative to the combinatorial semantic process assumed to 
occur during the processing of the stimuli. This account suggests that facilitation 
to targets is not caused by priming from the combination of items in the first 
picture, but that the target’s altered state (e.g. a burst tyre) is confirmed given the 
items that precede it (e.g. a knife and a tyre). Crucially, this integration of items 
only occurs after the target has been presented.  
A mnemonic strategy for remembering the initial objects (for later 
utilisation on the processing of the target) might involve consciously tying a 
story to each pair of items seen on the screen. For example, as mnemonics often 
rely on easily attributable associations between features or items, when presented 
with a knife and a tyre participants could tie a personal experience, amusing 
story, or rhyme to the observed objects (Higbee, 2004). It is, however, unclear 
whether there would be enough time for participants to develop these 
associations in the course of an experimental trial, for each pair of items seen.  
While this issue cannot be ruled out as a potential contributory factor in 
the current experiments, participants’ accuracy was taken to be an indication of 
improvement throughout the experiment. If mnemonic strategies were being 
employed by participants during the viewing of these stimuli, one would expect 
an improvement from the first to the second half of the experiment. However, 
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although accuracy data was reported for each of the experiments, there were no 
observed improvement effects. Additionally, mnemonic techniques would be 
more effective for prime trials as the associations between primes and targets are 
more transparent. However, there were no differences between conditions in 
terms of the number of correct responses on experimental trials in any of the 
current experiments. These points provide evidence that mnemonic strategies 
were not used as a basis for experiment completion. In addition, the large number 
of fillers to experimental items ensured that the nature of the task was kept as 
obscure (barring the requirements of the experiment) to participants as possible.  
 
Further research 
 
There are two main avenues of future research. The first concerns the 
aforementioned contributions of automatic and strategic processing in the present 
paradigms. Although weaker combinatorial effects have been demonstrated for 
causal paradigms with shorter exposure durations (the ‘knife and tyre’ 
experiments with first picture durations of 250 ms), due to the fragile nature of 
the observed effects, the exact time course of these processes is still unclear. 
Additionally, stimulus exposure durations have not been manipulated for 
experiments with expanded stimulus sets. As combinatorial effects were stronger 
for later experiments that had better controlled conditions and twice as many 
stimulus items, timing manipulations could be used within the same paradigm to 
address this time course issue.   
 The current experiments could also be supplemented by studies seeking 
to explore the role of the graspability of objects within the current paradigms. 
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The angle of graspability of objects in the current experiments was not 
systematically controlled, although this has been established as a factor 
influencing affordance abstraction and the priming of actions. Yoon and 
Humphreys (2010), for example, found that participants make significantly faster 
decisions as to whether two objects ‘go together’ or not, when these objects were 
held by protagonists than when they were not. The current paradigms do not 
need agents to carry out the events, but current experiments could be altered to 
take account of the angle of graspability, and ensure it is consistent over all 
presented stimuli. Alternatively, an experiment could be developed in which the 
graspability of objects is manipulated, with right-handed participants responding 
to some stimuli arranged so as to be interactable by right-handed observers, and 
some to be interactable by left-handed observers. These suggestions and the 
proposed experiment above are the two main ways in which the work presented 
in this thesis could be developed further.  
 This thesis has presented findings seeking to establish combinatorial 
effects within semantic priming paradigms. The current experiments demonstrate 
observers’ sensitivity to the affordances of objects in a visual scene, and the 
combining of this semantic information to form relevant representations. These 
representations contain information regarding the event that is allowed by the 
combined affordances of previously presented stimuli. In addition, these effects 
have also been demonstrated operating in purely visual paradigms, and evidence 
has been provided for the object-specific nature of these event representations.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 – Experiments 1 and 2 items 
 
Target word   Picture 1    Picture 2 
 
‘Break’   Boy with ball (prime)   Vase 
    Umbrella (no agent)   Vase 
    Boy with ball (no theme)  Umbrella 
    Umbrella (baseline)   Rose 
‘Build’    Boy with spade (prime)  Sandcastle 
    Padlock (no agent)   Sandcastle 
    Boy with spade (no theme)  Padlock 
    Padlock (baseline)   Wheat 
‘Catch’   Dog (prime)    Stick 
    Sword (no agent)   Stick 
    Dog (no theme)   Sword 
    Sword (baseline)   Dolphin 
 ‘Chase’   Cat (prime)    Bird 
    Skull (no agent)   Bird 
    Cat (no theme)   Skull 
    Skull (baseline)   Rake 
‘Chew’   Cow (prime)    Grass 
    Mirror (no agent)   Grass 
    Cow (no theme)   Mirror 
    Mirror (baseline)   Waterfall 
‘Drink’   Bird (prime)    Puddle 
    Book (no agent)   Puddle 
    Bird (no theme)   Book 
    Book (baseline)   Toothbrush 
‘Drive’   Farmer (prime)   Tractor 
    Coat hanger (no agent)  Tractor 
    Farmer (no theme)   Coat hanger 
    Coat hanger (baseline)  Spider 
‘Eat’ 1    Frog (prime)    Dragonfly 
    Corkscrew (no agent)   Dragonfly 
    Frog (no theme)   Corkscrew 
    Corkscrew (baseline)   Hydrant 
 ‘Feed’ 1   Horse (prime)    Woman hay 
    Clock (no agent)   Woman hay 
    Horse (no theme)   Clock 
    Clock (baseline)   Paper 
‘Gnaw’   Dog (prime)    Bone 
    Keys (no agent)   Bone 
    Dog (no theme)   Keys 
    Keys (baseline)   Beehive 
‘Juggle’   Juggler (prime)   Balls 
    Hour glass (no agent)   Balls 
    Juggler (no theme)   Hour glass 
    Hour glass (baseline)   Wrench 
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‘Jump’    Man on horse (prime)   Small wall 
    Sofa (no agent)   Small wall 
    Man on horse (no theme)  Sofa 
    Sofa (baseline)   Panda 
‘Lift’    Woman (prime)   Child reach 
    Bridge (no agent)   Child reach 
    Woman (no theme)   Bridge 
    Bridge (baseline)   Feather 
‘Load’    Man with boxes (prime)  Van 
    Fan (no agent)    Van 
    Man with boxes (no theme)  Fan 
    Fan (baseline)    Snake 
‘Munch’   Boy (prime)    Crisps 
    Rope (no agent)   Crisps 
    Boy (no theme)   Rope 
    Rope (baseline)   Pond 
‘Peck’    Pigeon (prime)   Grain 
    Pan (no agent)    Grain 
    Pigeon (no theme)   Pan 
    Pan (baseline)    Zebra 
‘Play’    Cat (prime)    Ball of wool 
    Toilet (no agent)   Ball of wool 
    Cat (no theme)   Toilet 
    Toilet (baseline)   Sunflower 
‘Pull’    Child on sledge (prime)  Mother 
    Torch (no agent)   Mother 
    Child on sledge (no theme)  Torch 
    Torch (baseline)   Raindrops 
‘Push’    Woman (prime)   Child in pram 
    Microphone (no agent)  Child in pram 
    Woman (no theme)   Microphone 
    Microphone (baseline)  Vegetables 
‘Repair’   Mechanic (prime)   Car 
    Tape measure (no agent)  Car 
    Mechanic (no theme)   Tape measure 
    Tape measure (baseline)  Maple leaf 
‘Sell’    Seller (prime)    Fish 
    Tree (no agent)   Fish 
    Seller (no theme)   Tree 
    Tree (baseline)   Ice 
‘Serve’   Waiter (prime)   Buffet 
    Pencil (no agent)   Buffet 
    Waiter (no theme)   Pencil 
    Pencil (baseline)   Balloon 
‘Skip’    Girl (prime)    Skipping rope 
    Basket (no agent)   Skipping rope 
    Girl (no theme)   Basket 
    Basket (baseline)   Lizard 
‘Smell’   Girl (prime)    Flowers 
    Boat (no agent)   Flowers 
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    Girl (no theme)   Boat 
    Boat (baseline)   Screw 
‘Spin’    Spider (prime)    Web 
    Plunger (no agent)   Web 
    Spider (no theme)   Plunger 
    Plunger (baseline)   Molehill 
‘Stroke’   Girl (prime)    Giraffe 
    Pegs (no agent)   Giraffe 
    Girl (no theme)   Pegs 
    Pegs (baseline)   Peanut 
‘Trap’    Spider (prime)    Fly 
    Scissors (no agent)   Fly 
    Spider (no theme)   Scissors 
    Scissors (baseline)   Lilly pads 
‘Wear’    Woman (prime)   Long coat 
    Lamp (no agent)   Long coat 
    Woman (no theme)   Lamp 
    Lamp (baseline)   Pinecone 
 
Appendix 2 – Experiment 3 bird-puddle and knife-tyre items 
 
Bird-puddle items 
 
Event    Picture 1    Picture 2 
 
‘Blow’    Musician & trumpet (prime)  Whistle 
Zebra & trumpet (control)  
‘Bounce’   Man & basketball   Trampoline 
    Giraffe & basketball 
‘Break’   Boy with a bat & window  Vase 
    Woman with racket & window 
‘Build’    Boy & building blocks  Digger 
    Stork & building blocks 
‘Carry’   Undertaker & coffin   Rucksack 
    Ballerina & coffin 
‘Catch’   Dog & stick    Bb glove 
    Rat & stick 
‘Chew’   Cow & grass    Sweets 
    Gymnast & grass 
‘Cut’    Woman with knife & cake  Scissors 
    Man with bottle & cake  
‘Drink’   Bird & puddle    Glass 
    Boy & puddle 
‘Eat’    Frog & dragonfly   Plate 
    Boy & dragonfly 
‘Hang’    Gardener & hanging basket  Noose 
    Rhinoceros & hanging basket 
‘Lick’    Girl & ice cream   Stamp 
    Peacock & ice cream   
‘Lift’    Mother & baby   Crane 
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    Toddler & baby 
‘Play’    Cat & ball of wool   Football 
    Frog & ball of wool 
‘Push’    Mother & pram   Wheelbarrow 
    Pig & pram 
‘Shake’   Mexican & maracas   Salt pot 
    Soldier & maracas    
‘Spin’    DJ & turntable   Spinning top 
    Baby & turntable 
‘Trap’    Spider & fly    Spring trap 
    Dog & fly 
 
Knife-tyre items 
 
Event    Picture 1    Picture 2 
 
‘Bowl’    Bowling ball & pins   Scattered pins 
    Wreath & pins 
‘Burst’    Knife & tyre    Burst tyre 
    Ruler & tyre 
‘Crack’   Hammer & brick   Cracked brick 
    Syringe & brick  
‘Cut’    Scissors & paper   Cut paper 
    Glasses and paper 
‘Drink’   Straw & glass of juice   Empty glass 
    Cigarette & glass of juice 
‘Inflate’   Pump & deflated balloon  Infl. balloon 
    Bin & deflated balloon 
‘Iron’    Iron & crumpled shirt   Straight shirt 
    Basket of flowers & crumpled shirt 
‘Mend’   Tape & broken broom   Mend. broom 
    Tennis ball & broken broom 
‘Open’    Can opener & closed can  Open can 
    Remote control & closed can   
‘Paint’    Paintbrush & fence   Painted fence 
    Fly swat & fence 
‘Pour’    Bottle of wine & glass  Glass of wine 
    Pepper mill & glass 
‘Screw’   Screw driver & panel without screw Screw panel 
    Dart & panel without screw 
‘Shoot’   Gun & target    Target holes 
    Hairdryer & target 
‘Slice’    Bread knife & bread   Sliced bread 
    Rolling pin & bread 
‘Smash’   Baseball bat & window  Smashed win. 
    Rolled carpet & window 
‘Spray’   Aerosol can & wall   Sprayed wall 
    Hourglass & wall 
‘Unlock’   Key & closed lock   Open lock 
    Magnifying glass & closed lock  
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‘Write’   Pen & blank sheet of paper  Filled paper 
    Ladle & blank sheet of paper 
 
Appendix 3 – Instructions for knife and tyre causal structure experiments 
 
In this experiment, a cross will flash up on the screen (+) and you are required to 
move your eyes to it. Then, a picture will appear on the screen, before being 
replace with another cross. After the cross has disappeared a second picture will 
appear on the screen and you are required to make a decision as to whether you 
think the object on the screen is a man-made object or not.  
 
If you think it IS man-made, then press the ‘yes’ key. If you think it is NOT man-
made, please press the ‘no’ key.  
 
Man-made objects will include things such as tables and chairs, musical 
instruments, household objects and so on. Objects that are not man-made might 
include such things as trees, rocks or outdoor scenes.  
 
Please try to make this judgement AS QUICKLY AND ACCURATELY AS 
POSSIBLE.  
 
After you press a button, the message ‘press key’ will appear. Just press the ‘yes’ 
button to go to the next trial – The first picture will appear and, just to remind 
you, when the second picture appears, please make a decision as to whether you 
think the picture shows something man-made or not. If you think it does press 
the ‘yes’ key and if you think it doesn’t press the ‘no’ key.  
 
DON’T WORRY – There will be an opportunity to practice! 
PRESS ANY KEY TO READ THE NEXT (AND FINAL) PAGE OF 
INSTRUCTIONS… 
 
 
You can take a short break any time you see ‘press key’, but don’t forget to press 
‘yes’ to advance to the next picture pair. 
 
There will be a short practice session, and the experiment is quite short. 
 
After the experiment is finished, there will be a second phase in which we shall 
test your memory for the pictures from the fist phase. Don’t worry, you will get 
further instructions about this after you have completed the experiment. For now, 
just try to make sure that you attend to the picture as you perform the task. 
 
If you have any questions, please ask the experimenter, otherwise… 
PRESS ANY KEY TO CONTINUE ONTO THE PRACTICE SESSION… 
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Appendix 4 – Debriefing information for knife and tyre casual experiments 
 
THAT’S THE END OF THE EXPERIMENT 
 
In this experiment, we wanted to look at whether we could encourage, or ‘prime’ 
your responses to the second picture in each trial, based on what you saw before 
it. On some trials, a picture would be presented to you which suggests a 
particular event (such as bursting, smashing, knocking and so on). We believe 
that these particular combinations of objects in these pictures will speed your 
reaction times to the picture that comes after it, if it is associated. 
 
Actually, there is no memory test. You were told about this at the start because 
the experimenter was worried about participants simply ignoring the first picture. 
 
Thank you for taking part. 
 
Appendix 5 – List of items for experiment 4, including new and replaced 
items 
 
D = different 
 
Event   Picture 1    Picture 2 
 
‘Assemble’  Glue & toy robot parts (prime a) Assembled toy 
   Ornament & toy parts (control a) Assembled toy 
   Glue & toy robot parts (prime b) D assem. toy 
   Ornament & toy parts (control b) D assem. toy 
 
‘Bind’   Elastic band & pencils  Bound pencils 
   Cog & pencils    Bound pencils 
   Elastic band & pencils  D bound pencils 
   Cog & pencils    D bound pencils 
 
‘Blow’   Dynamite & house   Blown-up house 
   Cake & house    Blown-up house 
   Dynamite & house   D blown-up house 
   Cake & house    D blown-up house 
 
‘Build’   Bucket with trowel & bricks  Built wall 
   Bell & bricks    Built wall 
   Bucket with trowel & bricks  D built wall 
   Bell & bricks    D built wall 
 
‘Burst’   Knife & tyre    Burst tyre  
   Ruler & tyre    Burst tyre 
   Knife & tyre    D burst tyre  
   Ruler & tyre    D burst tyre 
 
‘Carve’  Chisel & stone block   Carved block 
   Lolly pop & stone block  Carved block 
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   Chisel & stone block   D carved block 
   Lolly pop & stone block  D carved block 
 
‘Chop’   Axe & chair    Chopped chair 
   Bowl & chair    Chopped chair 
   Axe & chair    D chopped chair 
   Bowl & chair    D chopped chair 
 
‘Clean’  Sponge & dirty window  Clean window 
   Parcel & dirty window  Clean window 
   Sponge & dirty window  D clean window 
   Parcel & dirty window  D clean window 
 
‘Crack’  Hammer & brick   Cracked brick 
   Syringe & brick   Cracked brick 
   Hammer & brick   D cracked brick 
   Syringe & brick   D cracked brick 
 
‘Cut’   Scissors & paper   Cut paper 
   Glasses & paper   Cut paper 
   Scissors & paper   D cut paper 
   Glasses & paper   D cut paper 
 
‘Demolish’  Wrecking ball & statue  Wrecked statue 
   Boat & statue    Wrecked statue 
   Wrecking ball & statue  D wrecked statue 
   Boat & statue    D wrecked statue 
 
‘Draw’   Pen & pad    Scribbled pad 
   Spear & pad    Scribbled pad 
   Pen & pad    D scrib. pad  
   Spear & pad    D scrib. pad 
 
‘Fill’   Hose pipe & watering can  Filled can 
   Scarf & watering can   Filled can 
   Hose pipe & watering can  D filled can 
   Scarf & watering can   D filled can 
 
‘Fuel’   Gas can & motorbike   Bike w fumes 
   Perfume bottle & motorbike  Bike w fumes 
   Gas can & motorbike   D bike fumes 
   Perfume bottle & motorbike  D bike fumes 
 
‘Hang’   Peg & shirt    Hung shirt 
   Crisps & shirt    Hung shirt 
   Peg & shirt    D hung shirt 
   Crisps & shirt    D hung shirt 
 
‘Install’  Battery & torch   Torch w light 
   Packet of biscuits & torch  Torch w light 
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   Battery & torch   D torch light 
   Packet of biscuits & torch  D torch light 
 
‘Iron’   Iron & crumpled shirt   Straight shirt 
   Basket & crumpled shirt  Straight shirt 
   Iron & crumpled shirt   D str. shirt 
   Basket & crumpled shirt  D str. shirt 
 
‘Knock’  Sledge hammer & wall  Wall w hole 
   Fishing net & wall   Wall w hole  
   Sledge hammer & wall  D wall w hole 
   Fishing net & wall   D wall w hole 
  
‘Light’   Lighter & candle   Lit candle 
   Sweet & candle   Lit candle  
   Lighter & candle   D lit candle 
   Sweet & candle   D lit candle 
 
‘Mend’  Tape & broken broom   Mended broom 
   Tennis ball & broken broom  Mended broom 
   Tape & broken broom   D mended broom 
   Tennis ball & broken broom  D mended broom 
 
‘Open’   Secateurs & wire fence   Fence with hole 
   Trowel & wire fence   Fence with hole 
   Secateurs & wire fence   D fence with hole 
   Trowel & wire fence   D fence with hole 
 
‘Pack’   Clothes & open suitcase   Bulging suitcase 
   Keyboard & open suitcase  Bulging suitcase 
   Clothes & open suitcase   D bulging suitcase 
   Keyboard & open suitcase  D bulging suitcase 
 
‘Paint’   Wet brush & fence   Painted fence 
   Fly swat & fence   Painted fence 
   Wet brush & fence   D painted fence 
   Fly swat & fence   D painted fence 
 
‘Place’   Shoes & open shoebox  Closed shoebox 
   Bone & shoebox   Closed shoebox 
   Shoes & open shoebox  D closed shoebox 
   Bone & shoebox   D closed shoebox 
 
‘Polish’  Cloth & dirty ornament  Polished ornament 
   Hat & dirty ornament   Polished ornament 
   Cloth & dirty ornament  D pol. ornament 
   Hat & dirty ornament   D pol. ornament 
 
‘Pop’   Pin & balloon    Popped balloon 
   Diary & balloon   Popped balloon 
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   Pin & balloon    D popped balloon 
   Diary & balloon   D popped balloon 
 
‘Scratch’  Knife & car    Scratched car 
   Phone & car    Scratched car 
   Knife & car    D scratched car 
   Phone & car    D scratched car 
 
‘Screw’  Screw driver and panel  Panel with screw 
   Dart & panel    Panel with screw 
   Screw driver and panel  D pan. with screw 
   Dart & panel    D pan. with screw 
 
‘Seal’   Small book & envelope  Sealed envelope 
   Brick & envelope   Sealed envelope 
   Small book & envelope  D sealed envelope 
   Brick & envelope   D sealed envelope 
 
‘Sharpen’  Stanley knife & pencil  Sharpened pencil 
   Chocolate bar & pencil  Sharpened pencil 
   Stanley knife & pencil  D sharp. pencil 
   Chocolate bar & pencil  D sharp. Pencil 
 
‘Shatter’  Cricket bat & mirror   Shattered mirror 
   Coffee pot & mirror   Shattered mirror 
   Cricket bat & mirror   D shattered mirror 
   Coffee pot & mirror   D shattered mirror 
 
‘Shoot’  Gun & bottle    Broken bottle 
   Clip & bottle    Broken bottle 
   Gun & bottle    D broken bottle 
   Clip & bottle    D broken bottle 
 
‘Shovel’  Trowel & litter   Pile of litter 
   Radio & litter    Pile of litter 
   Trowel & litter   D pile of litter 
   Radio & litter    D pile of litter 
 
‘Slash’   Knife & hanging bucket  Fallen bucket 
   Brush & hanging bucket  Fallen bucket 
   Knife & hanging bucket  D fallen bucket 
   Brush & hanging bucket  D fallen bucket 
 
‘Smash’  Baseball bat & window  Smashed window 
   Rolled mat & window   Smashed window 
   Baseball bat & window  D smash. window 
   Rolled mat & window   D smash. window 
 
‘Stack’   Fork-lift truck & boxes  Stacked boxes 
   Bench & boxes   Stacked boxes 
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   Fork-lift truck & boxes  D stacked boxes 
   Bench & boxes   D stacked boxes 
 
‘Stitch’  Needle, thread & torn teddy  Stitched teddy 
   Mask & teddy    Stitched teddy 
   Needle, thread & torn teddy  D stitched teddy 
   Mask & teddy    D stitched teddy 
 
‘Sweep’  Broom & newspaper pages  Swept pages 
   Door & newspaper pages  Swept pages 
   Broom & newspaper pages  D swept pages 
   Door & newspaper pages  D swept pages 
 
‘Wrap’   Toy truck & wrapping paper  Wrapped present 
   Paper bag & wrapping paper  Wrapped present
   Toy truck & wrapping paper  D wrapped present 
   Paper bag & wrapping paper  D wrapped present 
 
 
Appendix 6 – Experiment 3 norming questionnaire instructions 
 
Bird and puddle norming instructions, version 1 (plausibility) 
 
Please read the following instructions carefully 
before starting the experiment   
 
Instructions  
In this experiment, you will see either one or two objects and immediately below, a question 
asking how likely it is that something could happen. The following is an example: 
 
 
How likely is shouting to occur?    
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7   
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 If you think that shouting is highly likely given the mother and child, then you would select a 
high number on the scale. If you think it is unlikely to happen at all, then you would select a low 
number on the scale. A selection of ‘4’ means that it is no more or less likely for that thing to 
happen. A ‘7’ would mean that it would be almost certain to happen, and a ‘1’ that it would be 
almost certain it would not happen.  
There is no right or wrong answer. We are simply interested in what you think 
about the likelihood of these events (e.g. climbing) given the objects shown. If 
the sentence had been ‘how likely is it that climbing would occur’, then it would 
make sense to give a lower ‘score’ to this case than to the shouting case, as 
shouting is more likely to occur here than climbing.  
Questions in the experiment will look exactly as they do above, but with a large 
gap in between the picture and the selection buttons. There will also be two 
practice pictures before you start the experimental trials, and it shouldn't take any 
longer than 45 minutes to complete.  
 
Your personal details  
After the actual experiment ends, you will see a section asking for details about yourself. We 
would be grateful if you could give a valid email address so that we can contact you if we have 
any questions about your answers, and so that we can contact you if you have won the prize 
draw!  
In the field marked "Region" we would like you to give us an indication of the region you grew 
up in, so that we have an idea of the type of English you speak (we would like this information in 
case there are differences between dialects!).  
The personal data you give us is used only for scientific purposes. We will not give any of this 
information to anyone else (including other research groups), nor will we report any information 
in any way that can be identified with you.    
 
And finally...  
Taking part in this experiment is entirely voluntary! You should feel free to cancel the 
experiment at any point if you don't want to continue.  
Once again, thanks for your interest in taking part. You can start the experiment proper by 
clicking on the start button below.  
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Bird and puddle norming instructions, version 2 (likelihood, target) 
Please read the following instructions carefully 
before starting the experiment   
 
Instructions  
In this experiment, you will be asked how likely it is that something will happen given the picture 
that appears immediately below the question. The following is an example:  
 
How likely is it that drinking would occur?    
 
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7   
 
If you think that drinking is highly likely given this glass, then you would select a high number 
on the scale. If you think it is unlikely to happen at all, then you would select a low number on 
the scale. A selection of ‘4’ means that it is no more or less likely for that thing to happen. A ‘7’ 
would mean that it would be almost certain to happen, and a ‘1’ that it would be almost certain it 
would not happen.  
For the above example, glasses are used for drinking and it would therefore be 
appropriate to select a high number (even a ‘7’). If, on the other hand, the 
sentence had read ‘how likely is it that biting would occur’, a sensible selection 
would have been ‘1’ as the act of biting given the glass is highly unlikely. There 
are no right or wrong answers. We are simply interested in what you think about 
the likelihood of these events (e.g. drinking) given the objects shown.  
Questions in the experiment will look exactly as they do above, but with a large 
gap in between the question and the picture. There will also be two practice 
pictures before you start the experimental trials, and it shouldn't take any longer 
than 45 minutes to complete.  
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Your personal details  
After the actual experiment ends, you will see a section asking for details about yourself. We 
would be grateful if you could give a valid email address so that we can contact you if we have 
any questions about your answers, and so that we can contact you if you have won the prize 
draw!  
In the field marked "Region" we would like you to give us an indication of the region you grew 
up in, so that we have an idea of the type of English you speak (we would like this information in 
case there are differences between dialects!).  
The personal data you give us is used only for scientific purposes. We will not give any of this 
information to anyone else (including other research groups), nor will we report any information 
in any way that can be identified with you.    
 
And finally...  
Taking part in this experiment is entirely voluntary! You should feel free to cancel the 
experiment at any point if you don't want to continue.  
Once again, thanks for your interest in taking part. You can start the experiment proper by 
clicking on the start button below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bird and puddle norming instructions, version 3 (likelihood, agent) 
Please read the following instructions carefully 
before starting the experiment   
 
Instructions  
In this experiment, you will be asked how likely it is that something will happen given the picture 
that appears immediately before the question. The following is an example:  
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 How likely is it that flying would occur?    
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7   
 
If you think that flying is highly likely given the bird, then you would select a high number on the 
scale. If you think it is unlikely to happen at all, then you would select a low number on the scale. 
A selection of ‘4’ means that it is no more or less likely for that thing to happen. A ‘7’ would 
mean that it would be almost certain to happen, and a ‘1’ that it would be almost certain it would 
not happen.  
For the above example, birds tend to fly and it would therefore be appropriate to 
select a high number (even a ‘7’). If, on the other hand, the bird had been a 
penguin, then a ‘1’ would be more appropriate. Similarly, if the question had 
read ‘how likely is it that eating would occur’, you might want to give a lower 
number – although birds fly, eat, drink, and so on, eating isn’t the first thing that 
comes to mind when thinking of birds, whereas flying probably is (your average 
bird is probably more likely to fly off when you watch it than to eat). There are 
no right or wrong answers. We are simply interested in what you think about the 
likelihood of these events (e.g. flying) given the objects shown.  
Questions in the experiment will look exactly as they do above, but with a large 
gap in between the picture and the selection buttons. There will also be two 
practice pictures before you start the experimental trials, and it shouldn't take any 
longer than 45 minutes to complete.  
 
Your personal details  
After the actual experiment ends, you will see a section asking for details about yourself. We 
would be grateful if you could give a valid email address so that we can contact you if we have 
any questions about your answers, and so that we can contact you if you have won the prize 
draw!  
In the field marked "Region" we would like you to give us an indication of the region you grew 
up in, so that we have an idea of the type of English you speak (we would like this information in 
case there are differences between dialects!).  
The personal data you give us is used only for scientific purposes. We will not give any of this 
information to anyone else (including other research groups), nor will we report any information 
in any way that can be identified with you.    
 
 177
And finally...  
Taking part in this experiment is entirely voluntary! You should feel free to cancel the 
experiment at any point if you don't want to continue.  
Once again, thanks for your interest in taking part. You can start the experiment proper by 
clicking on the start button below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Knife and tyre norming instructions, version 1 (plausibility) 
Please read the following instructions carefully 
before starting the experiment   
 
Instructions  
Each question will show two pictures that suggest the ‘playing out’ of a particular event. For 
example, you might see the following: 
 
These pictures are intended to show an event in which a match is used to light the candles. Your 
task is to say how likely it is you would see this happening in everyday life. You can make your 
decision on a rating scale like this one:  
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7   
If you think that lighting candles on a cake is highly likely to happen in everyday 
life, then you would select a ‘7’ on the scale. If you think it is a highly unlikely 
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that this would happen, then you would select a ‘1’ on the scale. If you think this 
event is no more or less likely to happen in everyday life, then you would select a 
‘4’. 
 
There is no right or wrong answer. We are simply interested in what you think 
about the likelihood of these events happening. For example, you might have 
been presented with the following:  
 
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7   
For this example, you may have wanted to choose a low score on the scale – the cigarette may 
have lighted the candles on the cake, but it is highly unlikely to see this in everyday life.  
 
Your personal details  
After the actual experiment ends, you will see a section asking for details about yourself. We 
would be grateful if you could give a valid email address so that we can contact you if we have 
any questions about your answers, and so that we can contact you if you have won the prize 
draw!  
In the field marked "Region" we would like you to give us an indication of the region you grew 
up in, so that we have an idea of the type of English you speak (we would like this information in 
case there are differences between dialects!).  
The personal data you give us is used only for scientific purposes. We will not give any of this 
information to anyone else (including other research groups), nor will we report any information 
in any way that can be identified with you.    
And finally...  
Taking part in this experiment is entirely voluntary! You should feel free to cancel the 
experiment at any point if you don't want to continue.  
 179
Once again, thanks for your interest in taking part. You can start the experiment proper by 
clicking on the start button below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Knife and tyre norming instructions, version 2 (likelihood, A and B) 
Please read the following instructions carefully 
before starting the experiment   
 
Instructions  
Each question will show two pictures that suggest the ‘playing out’ of a particular event. For 
example, you might see the following: 
 
These pictures are intended to show an event in which a match is used to light the candles. Your 
task is to say how likely it is you would see this happening in everyday life. You can make your 
decision on a rating scale like this one:  
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7   
If you think that lighting candles on a cake is highly likely to happen in everyday 
life, then you would select a ‘7’ on the scale. If you think it is a highly unlikely 
that this would happen, then you would select a ‘1’ on the scale. If you think this 
event is no more or less likely to happen in everyday life, then you would select a 
‘4’. 
 
There is no right or wrong answer. We are simply interested in what you think 
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about the likelihood of these events happening. For example, you might have 
been presented with the following:  
 
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7   
For this example, you may have wanted to choose a low score on the scale – the cigarette may 
have lighted the candles on the cake, but it is highly unlikely to see this in everyday life.  
 
Your personal details  
After the actual experiment ends, you will see a section asking for details about yourself. We 
would be grateful if you could give a valid email address so that we can contact you if we have 
any questions about your answers, and so that we can contact you if you have won the prize 
draw!  
In the field marked "Region" we would like you to give us an indication of the region you grew 
up in, so that we have an idea of the type of English you speak (we would like this information in 
case there are differences between dialects!).  
The personal data you give us is used only for scientific purposes. We will not give any of this 
information to anyone else (including other research groups), nor will we report any information 
in any way that can be identified with you.    
And finally...  
Taking part in this experiment is entirely voluntary! You should feel free to cancel the 
experiment at any point if you don't want to continue.  
Once again, thanks for your interest in taking part. You can start the experiment proper by 
clicking on the start button below.  
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Knife and tyre norming instructions, version 3 (commonality) 
Please read the following instructions carefully 
before starting the experiment   
Instructions  
Each question will show a picture of an object. This picture is meant to represent an object in a 
particular state, rather than a ‘kind’ of that object. For example, an object may look squashed, 
broken, painted, etc. For instance, you might see loaf of bread that has been sliced:  
 
Your task is to say how common you think a loaf of sliced bread is in everyday life. Note that we 
are asking you for a judgement about sliced bread, not bread in general, which in your experience 
could be more or less common than sliced bread. 
 
You can make your choices on a rating scale like this one:  
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7   
A choice of ‘7’ means that you think sliced bread is ‘very common’, a choice of ‘1’ means you 
think it is ‘not very common at all’, and a choice of ‘4’ means you think sliced bread is no more 
or less common in everyday life than anything else. 
 
Given an example to illustrate this, a book is very common, but a book with a torn page such as 
the one below is less common. If presented with this, you may want to choose a low score as this 
is not very common in everyday life. Remember, we are asking for a judgment on the specific 
state or condition of the object, not the class of objects. 
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There is no right or wrong answer. We are simply interested in how common you think these 
items are.  
 
Your personal details  
After the actual experiment ends, you will see a section asking for details about yourself. We 
would be grateful if you could give a valid email address so that we can contact you if we have 
any questions about your answers, and so that we can contact you if you have won the prize 
draw!  
In the field marked "Region" we would like you to give us an indication of the region you grew 
up in, so that we have an idea of the type of English you speak (we would like this information in 
case there are differences between dialects!).  
The personal data you give us is used only for scientific purposes. We will not give any of this 
information to anyone else (including other research groups), nor will we report any information 
in any way that can be identified with you.    
And finally...  
Taking part in this experiment is entirely voluntary! You should feel free to cancel the 
experiment at any point if you don't want to continue.  
Once again, thanks for your interest in taking part. You can start the experiment proper by 
clicking on the start button below.  
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 7 – Experiment 4 norming questionnaire instructions 
 
Experiment 4 norming instructions version 1 (plausibility) 
Please read the following instructions carefully 
before starting the experiment   
 
Instructions  
Each question will show two pictures that suggest the ‘playing out’ of a particular event. For 
example, you might see the following: 
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 These pictures are intended to show an event in which a match is used to light the candles. Your 
task is to say how likely it is you would see this happening in everyday life. You can make your 
decision on a rating scale like this one:  
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7   
If you think that lighting candles on a cake is highly likely to happen in everyday 
life, then you would select a ‘7’ on the scale. If you think it is a highly unlikely 
that this would happen, then you would select a ‘1’ on the scale. If you think this 
event is no more or less likely to happen in everyday life, then you would select a 
‘4’. 
 
There is no right or wrong answer. We are simply interested in what you think 
about the likelihood of these events happening. For example, you might have 
been presented with the following:  
 
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7   
For this example, you may have wanted to choose a low score on the scale – the cigarette may 
have lighted the candles on the cake, but it is highly unlikely to see this in everyday life.  
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Your personal details  
After the actual experiment ends, you will see a section asking for details about yourself. We 
would be grateful if you could give a valid email address so that we can contact you if we have 
any questions about your answers, and so that we can contact you if you have won the prize 
draw!  
In the field marked "Region" we would like you to give us an indication of the region you grew 
up in, so that we have an idea of the type of English you speak (we would like this information in 
case there are differences between dialects!).  
The personal data you give us is used only for scientific purposes. We will not give any of this 
information to anyone else (including other research groups), nor will we report any information 
in any way that can be identified with you.    
And finally...  
Taking part in this experiment is entirely voluntary! You should feel free to cancel the 
experiment at any point if you don't want to continue.  
Once again, thanks for your interest in taking part. You can start the experiment proper by 
clicking on the start button below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Experiment 4  norming instructions, version 2 (likelihood) 
Please read the following instructions carefully 
before starting the experiment   
 
Instructions  
Each question will show two pictures that suggest the ‘playing out’ of a particular event. For 
example, you might see the following: 
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 These pictures are intended to show an event in which a match is used to light the candles. Your 
task is to say how likely it is you would see this happening in everyday life. You can make your 
decision on a rating scale like this one:  
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7   
If you think that lighting candles on a cake is highly likely to happen in everyday 
life, then you would select a ‘7’ on the scale. If you think it is a highly unlikely 
that this would happen, then you would select a ‘1’ on the scale. If you think this 
event is no more or less likely to happen in everyday life, then you would select a 
‘4’. 
 
There is no right or wrong answer. We are simply interested in what you think 
about the likelihood of these events happening. For example, you might have 
been presented with the following:  
 
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7   
For this example, you may have wanted to choose a low score on the scale – the cigarette may 
have lighted the candles on the cake, but it is highly unlikely to see this in everyday life.  
 
 186
Your personal details  
After the actual experiment ends, you will see a section asking for details about yourself. We 
would be grateful if you could give a valid email address so that we can contact you if we have 
any questions about your answers, and so that we can contact you if you have won the prize 
draw!  
In the field marked "Region" we would like you to give us an indication of the region you grew 
up in, so that we have an idea of the type of English you speak (we would like this information in 
case there are differences between dialects!).  
The personal data you give us is used only for scientific purposes. We will not give any of this 
information to anyone else (including other research groups), nor will we report any information 
in any way that can be identified with you.    
And finally...  
Taking part in this experiment is entirely voluntary! You should feel free to cancel the 
experiment at any point if you don't want to continue.  
Once again, thanks for your interest in taking part. You can start the experiment proper by 
clicking on the start button below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Experiment 4 norming instructions, version 3 (commonality) 
Please read the following instructions carefully 
before starting the experiment   
Instructions  
Each question will show a picture of an object. This picture is meant to represent an object in a 
particular state, rather than a ‘kind’ of that object. For example, an object may look squashed, 
broken, painted, etc. For instance, you might see loaf of bread that has been sliced:  
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 Your task is to say how common you think a loaf of sliced bread is in everyday life. Note that we 
are asking you for a judgement about sliced bread, not bread in general, which in your experience 
could be more or less common than sliced bread. 
 
You can make your choices on a rating scale like this one:  
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7   
A choice of ‘7’ means that you think sliced bread is ‘very common’, a choice of ‘1’ means you 
think it is ‘not very common at all’, and a choice of ‘4’ means you think sliced bread is no more 
or less common in everyday life than anything else. 
 
Given an example to illustrate this, a book is very common, but a book with a torn page such as 
the one below is less common. If presented with this, you may want to choose a low score as this 
is not very common in everyday life. Remember, we are asking for a judgment on the specific 
state or condition of the object, not the class of objects. 
 
 
There is no right or wrong answer. We are simply interested in how common you think these 
items are.  
 
Your personal details  
After the actual experiment ends, you will see a section asking for details about yourself. We 
would be grateful if you could give a valid email address so that we can contact you if we have 
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any questions about your answers, and so that we can contact you if you have won the prize 
draw!  
In the field marked "Region" we would like you to give us an indication of the region you grew 
up in, so that we have an idea of the type of English you speak (we would like this information in 
case there are differences between dialects!).  
The personal data you give us is used only for scientific purposes. We will not give any of this 
information to anyone else (including other research groups), nor will we report any information 
in any way that can be identified with you.    
And finally...  
Taking part in this experiment is entirely voluntary! You should feel free to cancel the 
experiment at any point if you don't want to continue.  
Once again, thanks for your interest in taking part. You can start the experiment proper by 
clicking on the start button below.  
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